[ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED OCTOBER 27, 2017] Nos. 17-5142, 17-5164

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DENNIS BLACK; CHARLES CUNNINGHAM; KENNETH HOLLIS; DELPHI SALARIED RETIREES ASSOCIATION,

Respondents-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOINT APPENDIX, VOLUME 3 of 3

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To:		rcheval & Dan enefit Guaranty				
From	: Phillip Sie Compass A					
Date	February	13, 2009				
Subj	ect: Official C	ommittee of U	nsecured Creditors'	Meeting on Februar	y 12, 20	09

Introduction


Dana Cann, John Menke and Wayne Owen of the PBGC, David Burns and Nidhi Chadda of Greenhill & Company and Phil Siegel and Audrey Duboc of Compass Advisers, LLP ("Compass") attended the Joint Meeting of the Delphi Statutory Committees held at the offices of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom ("Skadden") in New York on February 12, 2009. The two participating committees were the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("UCC" or the "Committee") and the Official Equity Committee ("Equity Committee").

Meeting with the Unsecured Creditors Committee

- UCC meeting commenced with Jeffries reporting on the Amended Accommodation Agreement which is a subject of a February 5, 2009 report from Compass Advisers to PBGC
- A discussion ensued regarding Delphi's obligations to GM to be met by February 17, 2009
 - Under TARP, GM believes it will not be able to accept any additional pension obligations from Delphi and is now stating it doesn't even want to comply with the second 414(L) transfer previously agreed
 - Robert Rosenberg stated that there is no longer any value available to unsecured creditors and costs incurred by the estate as of now are not really the UCC's money and any recoveries would be coming out of the Term C DIP lenders recovery

Litigation Update from Warner Stevens

- Jack Butler's deposition made Delphi's argument regarding the interest calculations clear that Delphi believes there was agreement between the parties regarding the methodology
- Unfortunately, John Sheehan subsequently stated there were differences of opinion regarding the amortization of the original issue discount and acknowledged this resulted in a disagreement about the interest rate cap calculations between Delphi and Appaloosa
- The likely outcome will be a settlement, however, the amount may prove disappointing



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Joint Committee Meeting with the Debtors

- Delphi representatives began the meeting by noting the Company has made significant cuts in human capital and employee OPEB benefits including cancellation of health care to all retirees and their families
 - After incorporating all savings initiatives, Total Enterprise Value ("TEV") will be at or below post petition obligations
- Delphi lobbied Congress on February 3 and February 4, 2009 in an attempt to get financial • assistance and subsequently met with Treasury representatives on February 11 and are scheduled to meet again on February 13, presumably about pension options

Business and Financial Update

- Delphi's December 2008 net results were considerably lower than December 2007 numbers due to the continuing economic recession and automotive industry meltdown amounting to year-over-year declines of over 100%
- Year-to-date sales declined by 44% (\$709 million) compared to the prior period
- Operating income for December 2008 increased by \$352 million from the prior year to (\$520) million primarily due to a net change in restructuring expenses aided by GM contributions
- Base case projections have liquidity at \$108 million compared to a DIP covenant requirement of \$100 million at March 31, 2009, an unacceptable margin for error. Delphi has been in negotiations with GM for additional support in order to raise additional liquidity

Liquidity Review

- On or prior to February 17, 2009, Delphi must deliver a report to JPMorgan (as the administrative agent for the DIP), which must contain the following:
 - A proposal by Delphi for GM to purchase four or more of the domestic plants owned by Delphi or its subsidiaries
 - Delphi's related overall plan to emerge from chapter 11
- Under the Accommodation Agreement Amendment, on or prior to February 20, 2009, Delphi must deliver a second report to JPMorgan (as the administrative agent for the DIP), that must contain a budget business plan reflective of the February 17 Report
- If the Debtors do not meet these milestones, the Debtors would be required to use \$117 million of cash collateral to pay down Tranche A and Tranche B DIP Loans

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- Delphi's most recent 13-week Cash Flow Forecast as filed with JPMorgan projected noncompliance with liquidity covenant at the end of March
- GM Support Amendment will provide adequate liquidity until the last week in April
- The following is a schedule of Delphi's forecast borrowing base

Borrowing Base Availability and Facility Usage							
(\$ in millions)							
	Jan-09	Feb-09	Mar-09	Apr-09	May-09	Jun-09	
A/R	325.0	445.0	503.0	491.0	527.0	516.0	
Inventory	383.0	396.0	396.0	396.0	438.0	409.0	
Fixed Assets	300.0	318.0	318.0	315.0	315.0	315.0	
Cash Collateral	412.0	257.0	198.0	198.0	117.0	117.0	
Total	\$1,420.0	\$1,416.0	\$1,415.0	\$1,400.0	\$1,397.0	\$1,357.0	
Less: carve out ⁽¹⁾	82.0	82.0	81.0	82.0	82.0	82.0	
DIP Facility Usage	\$1,338.0	\$1,334.0	\$1,334.0	\$1,318.0	\$1,315.0	\$1,275.0	

Note: Extracted from the Joint Meeting of the Delphi Statutory Committees Presentation February 12, 2009

(1) Compass adjusted the carve out down by \$10 million to arrive at the DIP facility usage balance

- On January 20, 2009, Delphi entered into agreements with GM to further amend certain provisions of the GM-Delphi Agreement and to amend the Partial Temporary Accelerated Payment Agreement
 - Contemplates possible future amendments to the GM Arrangement that may increase GM's total commitment from \$300 million to \$350 million by February 27, 2009, and to \$450 million by March 24, 2009
- Delphi realizes it has to continue to maintain sufficient liquidity in each region taking into account the current global automotive production decline
- US liquidity Forecast updated February 9, 2009 provides a Base Case Cash Flow and liquidity outlook:
 - Assumes GM accelerates additional \$50 million of payables in February (beyond \$50 million currently accelerates)
 - Additional Borrowing Base Cash Collateral is applied to pay down DIP
 - Maintains \$100 million of available liquidity through the week ending April 3, 2009
- US liquidity projections improve with GM Agreement increase available draws \$150 million to \$450 million, providing an improved sash flow and liquidity outlook:
 - Maintains \$100 million of available liquidity through the end of May
 - As increase is not until end of February, Delphi must still manage liquidity carefully through low points for cycle

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The following table demonstrates the differences between the Base Case and GM Increase • case regarding Delphi's US liquidity and resulting cash balances

(\$ in millions)							Total
-	Jan-09	Feb-09	Mar-09	Apr-09	May-09	Jun-09	Change
Base Case GM A/R Acceleration	50.0	50.0	100.0	100,0	0.0	0.0	
GM Increase Case A/R Acceleration	50.0	(50.0)	100.0	100,0	100.0	0.0	
Net Change	0.0	(100.0)	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Base Case GM Draws	145.0	45.0	30.0	75.0	5.0	0.0	
GM Increase Case GM Draws	145.0	235.0	(5.0)	35.0	(35.0)	75.0	
Net Change	0.0	190.0	(35.0)	(40.0)	(40.0)	75.0	150.0
Base Case borrowing base cash collateral change	0.0	109.0	59.0	0.0	(32.0)	0.0	
GM Increase Case borrowing base cash collateral change	0.0	46,0	89.0	40.0	23.0	0.0	
Net Change	0.0	(63.0)	30.0	40.0	55.0	0.0	62.0
Base Case additional borrowing base cash collateral change	(89.0)	(28.0)	117.0	0,0	0.0	0.0	
IM Increase Case addt'l borrowing base cash collateral change	89.0	28.0	0.0	0,0	41.0	23.0	
Net Change	178.0	56.0	(117.0)	0.0	41.0	23.0	181.0
Base Case revolver/ term loan paydown	(131.0)	(25.0)	(117.0)	0.0	0.0	0.0	
BM Increase Case revolver/ term loan paydown	(131.0)	(25.0)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Net Change	0.0	0.0	117.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	117.0
GM Increase Case Ending Cash	83.0	54.0	49.0	49.0	49.0	31.0	

Note: Figures extracted from the Joint Meeting of the Delphi Statutory Committees Presentation February 12, 2009

- Europe continues to face near term liquidity pressure
 - Reduced accounts receivable balances have resulted in a reduction of debt levels of approximately (\$300) million from targeted levels at January 30, 2009
 - While management is aggressively pursuing actions to close this gap, the shortfall of cash _ is <u>currently not an issue</u> due to the low economic activity (emphasis is Delphi's)

European Cash Flow and Lie	quidity					
(\$ in millions)	Jan-09	Feb-09	Mar-09	Apr-09	Mav-09	Jun-09
Ending Cash	\$232	\$269	\$357	\$228	\$221	\$291
Fav / (Unfav) to Min. Cash	(\$68)	(\$31)	\$57	(\$72)	(\$79)	(\$9)

- Shortfall from minimum cash requirements believed okay in current auto market slump Note: Extracted from the Joint Meeting of the Delphi Statutory Committees Presentation February 12, 2009

GM Negotiation Update

- Delphi proposes transferring four US plant sites to GM, leaving Delphi with only two US sites (believed to be Vandalia and part of Warren Packard) and has presented a detailed proposal to GM. The sites subject to transfer produce solely or mostly GM parts, and obligations to produce parts for other customers will be transferred to Delphi's Mexican facilities
- Delphi has also set fourth a comprehensive list of key terms under discussion with GM; among them is a resolution of the status of the SRP and HRP in coordination with the US government, including the PBGC and US Treasury

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Emergence Update

- Delphi now believes it needs \$2.3 billion in emergence funding to be attained as follows:
 - \$1.5 billion secured from a combination of a sale of UAW Keep Sites to GM, a settlement of Plan Investor litigation and/or Government support which will be used to pay down
 - A and B Term DIP (\$0.7 billion)
 - Administration/transaction costs (\$0.2 billion), and
 - Provide post-emergence cash (\$0.6 billion)
 - Plus, an unfunded global revolving credit facility of \$0.8 billion
- Cash funding to be used to pay down:
- DIP Term C is equitized (\$2.7 billion)
- Delphi transfers liability from hourly and salaried pensions plans to GM
- The current timetable for filing a POR and disclosure statement by February 27, 2009, is dependent on:
 - Agreements with GM and A and B Term DIP lenders
 - Pensions transferred to GM or terminated, and
 - Funding
- Jack Butler expressed a view that GM's real deadline is March 31, 2009
- The plan currently incorporates the following high level assumptions
 - Sale of US UAW sites
 - Transfer of global Steering per MRA
 - Sale of idled US Plants (excludes Anaheim and Milwaukee
 - 414(L) transfer of hourly and salary pension plans assumed
 - Packard solution plant consolidation
 - \$50 million severance funded by GM
 - \$35 million product relocation funded by GM
 - \$25 million VEBA funding provided by GM
 - Labor subsidy to \$19/hour (\$12 million/ year)
 - Mexico solutions assume \$40 million severance funding
 - GM assumes all liabilities of transferred operations
 - Transaction and separation costs borne by GM

Real Estate Sale

- The Debtors are selling a vacant parcel of real property of approximately 21.7 acres in Anaheim, California
 - Bircher Anaheim Magnolia Avenue, LLC executed an Agreement to purchase the property for \$20 million
 - The Debtors filed a motion on February 4, 2009, seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of bidding procedures with respect to the proposed sale; the motion will be heard at the February 24, 2009 omnibus hearing

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Significant Business Transactions Update

- Suspension and Brake business:
 - Tempo Industry Ltd., a Hong-Kong-based-family owned company with other investments in the automotive sector, made an offer to purchase the combined Suspension and Brake business
 - The primary terms of the Tempo offer are as follows:
 - Preliminary purchase price of \$80 million for business assets excluding cash, accounts receivable and accounts payable of approximately \$15 million
 - Deposit of \$20 million due at signing
 - Tempo would agree to support certain capital expenditure requirements of the Brakes business by funding \$7 million between signing and closing, which would be repayable by Delphi if the business is sold to another bidder
 - The Debtors are targeting signing the agreement on February 13, 2009 and closing during the second quarter of 2009, however this timing is extremely aggressive
- Steering divestiture next steps:
 - Debtors have been unable to close the transaction with Platinum Equity, an affiliate of Steering Solution, because Platinum requires a modified supply agreement with GM
 - Debtors are discussing alternatives with GM, including the possibility that the site is transferred back to GM

Plan Investor Litigation Update

- On January 13, 2009, the Court approved the amended Joint Case Management Plan
 - The amended Joint Case Management Plan extended the deadline for the completion of fact discovery to February 7, 2009, and established a trial ready date of May 7, 2009
- Since the previous update, an additional 20 depositions have taken place, bringing the total number of depositions to 69
- The parties are currently pursuing expert discovery

Reconvening with the Unsecured Creditors Committee

Isaac Lee from Moelis & Company walked the UCC through their review of the various due diligence sessions that began the week of January 16, 2009 and their resulting value, recovery and debt capacity estimates

• The following table describes light vehicle sales and production volumes since 2004

Light Vehicle Sales and Production (millions)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009E
US Light Vehicle Sales	16.8	16.9	16.5	16.2	10.4	10.3
North America Light Vehicle Production	15.8	15.8	15.3	15.2	12.7	9.8

Note: Table extracted from the Moelis & Company Presentation to the official Committee of Unsecured Creditors February 11, 20

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The following selected multiples indicate how suppliers and aftermarket companies are • trading relatively low due to the current economic environment

Comparable Companies Selected Multipes						
	Total Debt/ EBITDA	TEV/ EBITDA 2008				
Suppliers						
Mean	2.2x	3.3x				
Median	2.3x	3.3x				
Aftermarket						
Mean	2.1x	5.6x				
Median	1.0x	5.2x				

Note: Table extracted from the Moelis & Company Presentation to the official Committee of Unsecured Creditors February 11, 2009

- Considering the fact that a significant portion of the debt in these categories is currently • trading at a 50% discount, it is not easy to argue that even these low multiples are out of line with current values
- The following table estimates total enterprise value using the net sales proceeds based on an analysis sale of each of the divisions and provides a rough estimate of recoveries to general unsecured creditors

Illustrative Sale Proceeds (\$ in millions)							
Illustrative Estimated Net Sale Proceeds:	\$3.5bn	\$3.8bn	\$4.2bn	\$4.5 <u>bn</u>	\$4.8bn	\$5.1bn	\$5.5bn
Total Illustrative Estimated Net Sale Proceeds	\$3,500	\$3,825	\$4,150	\$4,475	\$4,800	\$5,125	\$5,450
Add: Other Estimated JV Ventures	260	260	260	260	260	260	260
Net Sale Proceeds (1)(2)	3,760	4,085	4,410	4,735	5,060	5,385	5,710
Less: DIP Balance ⁽³⁾	(3,620)	(3,620)	(3,620)	(3,620)	(3,620)	(3,620)	(3,620)
Less: Administrative and Priority Claims	(211)	(211)	(211)	(211)	(211)	(211)	(211)
Less: GM Liquidity Support Administrative Claim ⁽⁴⁾	(650)	(650)	(650)	(650)	(650)	(650)	(650)
Proceeds Avail to Satisfy GM's \$2.055bn Admin Claim	(\$721)	(\$396)	(\$71)	\$254	\$579	\$904	\$1,229
Estimated Recoveries ⁽⁵⁾ :							
GUCs							
Recovery (\$)	-	-	-	\$127	\$290	\$300	\$300
Par - \$3,177 (%)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.0%	9.1%	9.4%	9.4%
GM							
Recovery	-	-	-	\$127	\$290	\$604	\$929
Recovery (Assuming \$2.055bn Claim) (%)	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	6.2%	14.1%	29.4%	45.2%

(1) Illustrative Net Sale Proceeds based on a range of preliminary valuation multiples ascribed to each of the core divisions

(2) Based on value for JVs not included in Packard and Thermal transaction. Estimated JV proceeds by the Debtors

(3) Based on total DIP facility balance as of 03/31/2009

(4) Assumes maximum draw of GM's liquidity support pursuant to the Accommodation Agreement

(5) Pursuant to October 2008 Plan of Reorganization assumes UCC and GM share 50/50 up to the first \$600 million of GM's Administrative Claims and then GM receives remaining amount up to its \$2.055 billion administrative claim

Note: Table extracted from the Moelis & Company Presentation to the official Committee of Unsecured Creditors February 11, 2009

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C O M P A S S A D V I S E R S

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- The following table indicates a likely range to estimate Delphi's debt capacity
 - Assuming Delphi achieves its 2009 and 2010 EBITDARP projections of \$426 million and \$1.4 billion, respectively the debt capacity will be dependent on how much EBITDARP can be achieved
 - Assumes annual capital expenditures of \$500 million and weighted average cost of debt of 12%

2009 Debt Capacity Analysis (\$ in millions) Representative EBITDARP \$400 \$650 \$900 \$1,150 \$1,400 Leverage Ratio \$1,000 2.50x\$1,625 \$2,250 \$2,875 \$3,500 3.00x \$1,200 \$1,950 \$2,700 \$3,450 \$4,200 Interest Coverage Ratio 2.50x \$1,000 \$1.625 \$2.250 \$2,875 \$3,500 2.75x \$1,100 \$1,788 \$2,475 \$3,163 \$3,850 Free Cash Flow Coverage (1) 1.50x \$600 \$975 \$1,350 \$1,725 \$2,100 1.75x \$700 \$1.138 \$1.575 \$2.013 \$2,450

(1) Free cash flow coverage ratio defined as EBITDAR less capital expenditure divided by interest expense Note: Table extracted from the Moelis & Company Presentation to the official Committee of Unsecured Creditors February 11, 2009

Compass Comments

- Greenhill will comment separately regarding their due diligence of Delphi's projections, however, from a review of Mesirow's analysis and comments they appear aggressive with central savings estimates incorporated in an overlay and yet to be identified by the divisions
- The consensual plan framework contains aggressive funding expectations from GM, Plan Investors and potentially the Government, along with an acknowledgement of Term C DIP lenders discomfort of accepting equity while the Company has meager cash financing
- Warner Stevens reservations about John Sheehan's deposition raises a serious question regarding how much may be forthcoming in teams of a settlement with the Plan Investors
- PBGC should continue their full court press to convince GM and Government officials that the 414(L) transfer is in everyone's best interest
 - GM doesn't need two classes of employees and should provide pensions to all retirees
 - PBGC can help GM with waivers if equity markets don't turn around in the next two years providing an adequate return on their pension assets



Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 1200 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-4026

Confidential Memorandum

То:	Andrea E. Schneider Chair, Trusteeship Working Group
From:	Joseph House RDB &~ Director, Department of Insurance Supervision & Compliance
	Kristina Archeval RDB for Manager, Corporate Finance & Restructuring Group
	Dana Cann
	Financial Analyst, Corporate Finance & Restructuring Group
	$N \neq R$ Cindy Travia $R \sim$ Senior Actuary, Department of Insurance Supervision & Compliance
Subject:	Delphi Corp. ("Delphi" or the "Company")

Introduction

We request that the Trusteeship Working Group concur with DISC's recommendation that PBGC initiate termination of the Delphi Retirement Program for Salaried Employees (the "SRP") and the Delphi Hourly-Rate Plan (the "HRP") (collectively, the "Plans").

Delphi has been operating in Chapter 11 since October 8, 2005. On April 2, 2009, Delphi announced that an agreement had been reached among itself, its debtor-in-possession ("DIP") lenders, General Motors Corporation ("GM") and the U.S. Department of Treasury ("Treasury") to allow a period of time for the relevant parties to negotiate a global solution to the Delphi situation, including GM's role in it. According to Delphi's 8-K filed with the SEC on April 2, 2009, Delphi has until April 17, 2009, to deliver to the DIP lenders a detailed term sheet (the "Term Sheet"), which has been agreed to by both GM and Treasury. The Term Sheet is to set forth the terms of a global resolution of matters relating to GM's contribution to the resolution of Delphi's Chapter 11 cases. Failure to deliver a term sheet triggers a \$117 million repayment obligation to the DIP lenders on April 20, 2009. Failure to deliver a term sheet and failure to repay the \$117 million repayment obligation are each events of default under the DIP credit agreements and subsequent amended accommodation agreements. These agreements provide a five-business-day grace period, meaning that the accommodation period under which Delphi is

Delphi Salaried AR000029

APR 17 2009

continuing to use its DIP borrowings may terminate on April 24, 2009. According to OCC, such a termination enables the DIP lenders to exercise all their remedies in the DIP credit agreements, including foreclosure on their collateral. Those agreements expressly provide that those remedies can be exercised without further notice to or order from the Bankruptcy Court. Among the collateral pledged to the DIP lenders is 100% of the stock in Delphi's foreign subsidiaries – stock currently owned by Delphi Automotive Systems Holding, Inc. ("DASHI"), a debtor entity. The foreign subsidiaries remain outside of bankruptcy, and, according to the attached report from Greenhill & Company, Inc. ("Greenhill"), PBGC's outside financial advisor, comprise substantially all of the value of the Delphi controlled group. As such, PBGC must initiate a termination and set a date of plan termination ("DOPT") prior to April 24, 2009, or risk a controlled group break-up, whereby substantially all value available for PBGC recoveries leaves the controlled group.

Delphi's current position is that it cannot keep the Plans. The company's most recent bankruptcy emergence assumptions show Delphi transferring both Plans to GM upon emergence¹. Delphi has further stated that the Plans must either be transferred to GM (with support from Treasury) or be terminated and trusteed by the PBGC².

DISC has concluded that PBGC's possible long-run loss with respect to the Plans may reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if the Plans are not terminated prior to April 24, 2009. Therefore, DISC recommends PBGC-initiated termination of the Plans in accordance with ERISA § 4042(a)(4).

DISC has also concluded that the Plans will be unable to pay benefits when due, given Delphi's statements that it cannot now maintain the Plans, combined with the Plans' substantial underfunding and the possibility that the Plans will be effectively abandoned if the DIP lenders foreclose on their collateral. Therefore, DISC recommends PBGC-initiated termination of the Plans in accordance with ERISA § 4042(a)(2).

In addition, the SRP has not met the minimum funding standard required under § 412 of the IRS Code³. Therefore, DISC recommends PBGC-initiated termination of the SRP in accordance with ERISA § 4042(a)(1).

Background

Delphi is one of the largest automotive parts suppliers in the world. The Company generated approximately \$18 billion in revenue in 2008 (down from \$22 billion in 2007)⁴, primarily through five operating divisions: Electronics and Safety, Powertrain Systems, Electrical/Electronic Architecture, Thermal Systems, and Automotive Holdings Group ("AHG"). With the exception of AHG, which Delphi is winding down, each of these divisions is

⁴ See p. 14 of 2008 10-K.

¹ See pages 5 and 9 of "Key Emergence Issues dated March 20, 2009.

³ See 412(n) Lien Calculation as of January 15, 2009, prepared by DISC actuaries.

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considered "core." As of December 31, 2008, Delphi employed approximately 147,000 people globally, including 19,000 in the U.S. Of these U.S. workers, approximately 8,800 were represented by the UAW, 1,300 were represented by the IUE-CWA, and 300 were represented by the USW⁵.

The Bankruptcy Filings

On October 8, 2005, Delphi, along with certain of its U.S. subsidiaries, filed voluntary Chapter 11 petitions in the Southern District of New York⁶. Delphi's foreign subsidiaries were not included in the bankruptcy filings, and continue to operate outside of bankruptcy.

At the time, Delphi cited the following factors that led to the bankruptcy filings:

- <u>High cost structure</u>: Delphi, which was spun-off from GM in 1999, operated under collective bargaining agreements that were similar to those of GM. Delphi's wages and benefits for its U.S. workers were significantly higher than its competitors.
- <u>Weak demand from GM</u>: GM represented approximately half of Delphi's consolidated sales. Revenues from GM fell by 18% in the first six months of 2005 due to poor demand for GM's cars and trucks.
- <u>*High raw material costs:*</u> Beginning in 2004, the costs of raw materials—especially steel and petroleum-based resin products—spiked higher.
- <u>High legacy costs</u>: Like GM, Delphi has significant retiree health and pension costs. ERISA minimum contributions in 2006 were expected to be in excess of \$1 billion.


In January 2008, the bankruptcy court confirmed Delphi's First Amended Plan of Reorganization (the "First Amended POR"), which would have allowed Delphi to transfer \$1.5 billion in net pension liabilities to GM, and emerge with the rest of its pension plans ongoing. On April 4, 2008, however, a group of investors withdrew its \$2.55 billion equity commitment to fund the First Amended POR. As a result, Delphi could not execute the First Amended POR.

In September 2008, Delphi announced new agreements with GM that would allow for, among other things, a transfer of substantially all of the HRP to GM. On September 29, 2008, the first tranche of the 414(l) transfer (slightly more than \$2 billion of net liabilities) was transferred to GM's Hourly Plan. The second 414(l) transfer was to occur upon Delphi's emergence from Chapter 11. Among the forms of consideration GM was to receive as a result of accepting the 414(l) Hourly transfer was preferred securities in reorganized Delphi valued at \$2 billion.

Sales of cars and light trucks in the U.S. fell significantly in 2008, from a seasonally-adjusted annualized rate ("SAAR") of 15.6 million units in January to 13.9 million units in August. Beginning in September 2008, however, the decrease in sales accelerated to less than 10 million units during the first quarter of 2009.


⁵ See p. 12 of 2008 10-K.

⁶ See October 8, 2005, press release.



Source: Automotive News

With the significant decrease in car sales, the equity values of Delphi's non-bankrupt competitors collapsed with the broader market beginning on or around October 1, 2008.



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Delphi Salaried AR000032

The significant decrease in automotive valuations since September 2008 has made it increasingly difficult for Delphi to raise the necessary capital it needs to exit Chapter 11^7 .

Current Situation-Liquidity Crisis and Treasury Involvement

Delphi's post-petition DIP facilities—including its \$1.1 billion first priority revolving facility, \$500 million first priority term loan, and \$2.75 billion second priority term loan—expired on December 31, 2008. These facilities are secured by substantially all the assets of the debtor entities, including 100% of the stock held by DASHI on Delphi's non-debtor foreign subsidiaries. Since the expiration of the DIP facilities, Delphi has been operating under various accommodation agreements⁸, which allow the Company continued use of its post-petition financing. As described earlier, the termination of the accommodation period (and the potential foreclosure on the DIP lenders collateral) is looming on April 24, 2009, assuming an acceptable resolution by and among GM, Treasury and the DIP lenders has not been reached by then.

According to Treasury, the parties are in discussions, and negotiations are expected to commence on April 17, 2009⁹. Treasury's interest in the negotiations is GM's role in the resolution, as GM requires ongoing support in the form of existing and prospective loans from Treasury. Because Delphi is still GM's largest supplier, Treasury is trying to weigh the benefits of additional GM investments in Delphi against the risks if the supply of parts from Delphi is interrupted.

One element of the Delphi negotiations is a pension solution. As described earlier, Delphi contends it cannot emerge with the Plans ongoing. Delphi has proposed that GM assume the SRP and the remainder of the HRP. GM contends it cannot afford the Plans, and that covenants in the Treasury loan agreement prevent GM from taking on new pension liabilities.

Based on discussions with Treasury, GM assumption of the HRP is still a possibility. If a Treasury resolution is reached that includes assumption of either of the Plans, PBGC can hold the notice of determination ("NOD"), if it has not yet been issued, or rescind the NOD, pending GM assumption.

Pension Information

The Plans are defined benefit plans, and both are now frozen. The HRP was frozen as of November 2008¹⁰, while the SRP was frozen as of September 2008¹¹. Delphi is the Plans' sponsor and administrator. The HRP and SRP were spun-off in 1999 from the GM Hourly and Salaried Plans, respectively.

⁷ For Delphi's latest emergence funding strategies, see p. 41 of "Joint Meeting of the Delphi Statutory Committees" presentation dated March 12, 2009.

⁸ See 8-K filed April 2, 2003, Supplemental Second Amendment to Accommodation Agreement.

⁹ Oral conversation on April 16, 2009, with Matt Feldman, who is a member of the Auto Taskforce at Treasury.

¹⁰ See Pension Information Profile prepared by DISC actuaries.

¹¹ See Pension Information Profile prepared by DISC actuaries.

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The following table summarizes key information concerning the Plans. The assets and liabilities assume a date of Plan termination ("DOPT") of January 31, 2009 and an interest factor of 6.0% for the first 20 years¹².

(enolitim ni 2)	Assets	Binefit Listificet	Unfunded Benefit Lieblittee	BL Funded Percent		Unfunded Guaranteed Liabilities		Particle oferrod Vested		Total
HRP	3.582.6	7,694.1	4,011.5	47.9%	7,473.0	3,790.4	11,872	5,148	27,577	44,597
SRP	2,328.3	5,042.5	2,716.2	46.1%	4,504.3	2,178.0	10,206	2,585	7,412	20,203
Total the Plans	\$6,008.9	\$12,736.6	\$6,727.7	47.2%	\$11,977.3	\$5,968.4	22,078	7,733	34,989	64,800

Pension Funding Summary--Delphi Corp. (estimates based on a hypothetical termination date of January 31, 2009)

Notes:

- PBGC estimates based on hypothetical termination date of 1/31/09

- PBGC valuation discount rates are those for January 2009 -- 6.02% first 20 years, 5.48% thereafter

- Assets used were the actual assets as of 1/31/2009

- Unfunded Guaranteed Liabilities are rough estimates and do not reflect application of PBGC's guarantee limitations or Section 4044 asset allocations.

In addition to the Plans, certain of Delphi's U.S. subsidiaries sponsor four smaller defined benefit pension plans (the "Subsidiary Plans") covering 2,200 participants with aggregate UBL of \$54 million as of January 31, 2009. The Subsidiary Plans are not recommended for termination at this time because the resolution of the Subsidiary Plans has not yet been addressed by Delphi or Treasury, and because the incremental recovery from terminating the Subsidiary Plans would not be meaningful relative to the HRP and SRP.

Upon Delphi's Chapter 11 filing, the Company chose to only pay the "normal cost" portion of its ERISA minimum contributions. During 2008, facing a languishing bankruptcy, limited access to capital markets, and a looming DIP expiration, the Company took extra measures to conserve its cash, including not making any pension contributions, including "normal cost."

However, with respect to the HRP, as a result of a combination of events, including expired minimum funding waivers and the first tranche (effective September 29, 2008) of the 414(l) transfer of the HRP to the GM Hourly Plan, there are no liens. Statutory liens (412(n) and 430(k)) have arisen only on the SRP and three Subsidiary Plans (\$ in millions)¹³:

Pension Plan	A	Lien mount
SRP	\$	165.5
Subsidiary Plans	\$	9.2
Total Liens	\$	174.7

Delphi missed additional contributions on April 15, 2009. The Forms 200 for these missed contributions are not due until April 25, 2009. Once received, DISC will calculate new lien amounts, and OCC will perfect new liens against Delphi's non-debtor controlled group members.

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¹² See Pension Information Profile prepared by DISC actuaries.

¹³ See 412(n) Lien Calculation as of January 15, 2009.

Controlled Group

Delphi is a global company with operations in dozens of countries¹⁴. The U.S. entities are substantially all operating under Chapter 11 protection, while the foreign-based controlled group members are substantially all operating outside of Chapter 11 protection. PBGC has perfected statutory liens for missed minimum contributions against the non-debtor entities.

DISC, in conjunction with its outside financial advisors, has performed a preliminary controlled group analysis. As noted below (see *Financial Analysis-Long-Run Loss*), nearly all the value of the consolidated enterprise (debtor and non-debtor) is concentrated in the foreign, non-debtor controlled group members.

A corporate organization chart, providing the ownership structure, is attached to this memo as an exhibit¹⁵.

Financial Analysis

The following table includes select financial operating results for Delphi, which includes its consolidated debtor and non-debtor subsidiaries.

Select Financial Operating Statistics—Consolidated

je je	2006	2007	2008
\$	9,344	\$ 8,301	\$ 5,525
	13,393	13,982	12,535
	22,737	22,283	18,060
	(4,542)	(1,945)	(1,481)
	(5,464)	(3,065)	3,037
	\$	13,393 22,737 (4,542)	13,393 13,982 22,737 22,283 (4,542) (1,945)

Source: 2008 10-K

The table depicts a number of operating trends:

- Delphi's decreased reliance on revenues from GM, accelerated by GM's continued lost market share and the particularly poor sales results in the U.S. in 2008.
- Significant operating losses in each of the past three years, each of which Delphi (U.S.) spent in bankruptcy.
- In 2008, net income is attributable to a \$5.3 billion gain from the September 2008 operating settlement with GM, where GM agreed to take, among other things, Delphi Retiree Healthcare Liabilities and the first tranche of the HRP 414(*l*).
- In 2006, the significantly larger operating and net losses were attributable to costs associated with attrition programs designed to reduce headcounts of U.S. hourly workers.

¹⁴ See p. 3 of 2008 10-K.

¹⁵ See Corporate organization chart dated June 30, 2008.

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Long-Run Loss Analysis—Valuation¹⁶

PBGC's financial advisor, Greenhill, prepared a valuation report on Delphi, based on information provided by the Company, including detailed trial balances and the latest business plan ("RPOR January 2009"). Greenhill also participated in substantial due diligence sessions with the Company's management regarding the operations and the RPOR January 2009 business plan.

The Greenhill report provides implied enterprise values for Delphi based on four data points:

- 1. 2008 Actual EBITDA
- 2. 2009 Projected EBITDA
- 3. 2010 Projected EBITDA
- 4. Precedent Transactions over the Past 12 Months


The table below provides a summary of the valuation ranges Greenhill computed based on each of the data points, and provides a conservative quantification of PBGC's economic loss should the value attributable to the non-debtor foreign controlled group members (rest of world or "ROW" in the table) leave the controlled group through a DIP foreclosure.

	C	CHENTER ON AND THE FL	1. C. C. C. S.	Range million	Contraction of the local division of the loc	Values	Value -	Conservative Range of
Data Point		Low		Mid		High	Attributable to ROW	PBGC Long- Run Loss
2008 Actual EBITDAR	\$	561	\$	659	\$	756	100%	
2009 Projected EBITDAR	\$	1,188	\$	1,386	\$	1,584	100%	WWW 1,100
2010 Projected EBITDAR	\$	2,123	\$	2,831	\$	3,538	64%	\$ 1358
Precedent Transaction Analysis	\$	1,134	\$	1,409	\$	1,683	100%	\$ 11134

According to Greenhill's analysis, most (if not all) of Delphi's value is attributable to non-debtor entities. Creditors of the Delphi estate do not have claims against the assets of the overseas entities. While the collateral for the DIP loans includes 100% of the stock of Delphi's first-tier foreign subsidiaries, the claims associated with this collateral are arguably junior to the claims PBGC would have to the *assets* of the non-debtor controlled group members through PBGC's ability through ERISA to recover from all controlled group members on a joint and several basis.

The range of values in Greenhill's analysis is supported by the market, where each tranche of the DIP facilities is trading for less than 100 cents on the dollar. The \$2.75 billion Tranche C term loan, for instance, with collateral junior in priority to the Tranche A and B (with approximately \$800 million outstanding), has been trading for less than 20 cents since February 2009, indicating that the market believes this debt will only recover about \$500 million of the face amount.

¹⁶ See detailed valuation report dated April 16, 2009, prepared by Greenhill. Page 8 of 10



Delphi's emergence objectives include providing recoveries to the Tranche C in currency other than cash (i.e. new common stock)¹⁷, indicating that some component of the DIP lenders, even in a consensual plan of reorganization, will own substantially all of the equity in a reorganized Delphi where the pension plans have either been transferred to GM or terminated and trusteed by the PBGC.

<u>ERISA § 4042</u>

The Plans are underfunded on a termination basis. The magnitude of underfunding is significant, and the funded ratio (assets-to-benefit liabilities) is poor (48% and 46% for the HRP and SRP, respectively). The only meaningful recovery for the Plans is against the value of the non-debtor foreign controlled group members. The looming deadline of April 24, 2009, in the latest DIP accommodation agreement presents a significant risk to PBGC's recoveries, since the DIP lenders, in addition to having security interests in substantially all the debtors' hard assets in the U.S., also have, as collateral, 100% of the stock of the first-tier foreign subsidiaries. DISC and OCC are concerned that a foreclosure may constitute a controlled group break-up if the DIP lenders take title to the stock or transfer title to a third party. According to Greenhill, PBGC's financial advisor, most (if not all) of Delphi's value is concentrated in the non-debtor controlled group members. Therefore, DISC recommends PBGC seek to terminate the Plans under ERISA § 4042(a)(4).

As discussed above, Delphi has stated that it will not be able to maintain the SRP and HRP under any circumstances. Moreover, if the DIP lenders foreclose, and Delphi is effectively liquidated, the Plans risk abandonment. Therefore, DISC recommends PBGC seek to terminate the SRP under ERISA § 4042(a)(2).

¹⁷ See p. 45 of "Joint Meeting of the Delphi Statutory Committees" presentation dated March 12, 2009. Page 9 of 10

In addition, by missing its \$61 million catch-up contribution due on June 15, 2008, Delphi failed to meet the minimum-funding standard for the 2005 plan year with respect to the SRP. Therefore, DISC recommends PBGC seek to terminate the SRP under ERISA § 4042(a)(1).

DISC believes that terminating the Plans prior to the April 24, 2009, deadline in the DIP accommodation agreement will allow PBGC to maximize its recoveries in the case. Therefore, DISC recommends that PBGC seek to terminate the Plans on or before April 23, 2009.

Date of Plan Termination

DISC recommends a DOPT as soon as practicable upon issuance of the Notice of Determination ("NOD") and, if possible, concurrent with publication of the NOD in order to extinguish participants' reasonable expectations that the Plans will continue. A DOPT no later than April 23, 2009, would minimize the unreasonable risk of long-term loss with respect to the Plans that PBGC faces from the looming DIP lender foreclosure.

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
Confidential – Material Non-Public Information DIP Steering Committee – Agent-Level Information

Major Amended GSA/MRA Issues

	Original GM Position	Original Delphi Position	Current Status: Resolution/Open Issues								
	Intellectual Property										
	GM to own IP and grant license to Delphi	Delphi to own IP and grant license to GM	Resolved: Delphi to own IP and grant GM license to GM with rights to sublicense selected IP for GM products Open Issues: (i) Ability of GM to use Delphi IP on parts not built in UAW Sites and (ii) sunset date for ROLR (which applies before GM can sublicense IP to Delphi competitor)								
B	GM not to assume pension liability unless terms of Amended MRA met	GM to assume HRP and SRP	Open Issue : Pension unresolved (see slide 9 below)								
		Selence another									
	GM to have sole discretion on who to hire and does not pay severance	GM to have sole discretion on who to hire but must pay severance to those not hired	Resolved: -GM has sole discretion on who to hire and will not pay severance -Severance costs to be addressed								
			through purchase price.								
Key	Emergence issues – March 20, 2009	Page 5									

Delphi Salaried AR000039

JA602



JA603

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Case #17-5142 Document #1690342

412(n) Lien Calculation as of January 15, 2009

Delphi Retirement Program for Salaried Employees After contributions reallocated to plan year beginning 10/1/2006. Valuation Interest Rate = 8.5%

Oate	Description	Unpaid Required Payment Amounts	8.50% Interest to 01/15/09	Unpaid Required Payments with Interest
1/11/07	Contribution to Plan	(\$31,827,000)	(\$5,682,435)	(\$37,509,435)
1/15/07	1st Quarterly Contribution for 2006 Plan Year	\$64,142,000	\$11,384,445	\$75,526,445
4/12/07	Contribution to Plan	(\$32,282,000)	(\$4,997,672)	(\$37,279,672)
4/15/07	2nd Quarterly Contribution for 2006 Plan Year	\$64,142,000	\$9,880,362	\$74,022,362
7/11/07	Contribution to Plan	(\$30,225,000)	(\$3,984,116)	(\$34,209,116)
7/15/07	3rd Quarterly Contribution for 2006 Plan Year	\$64,142,000	\$8,390,020	\$72,532,020
10/11/07	Contribution to Plan	(\$30,643,000)	(\$3,333,340)	(\$33,976,340)
10/15/07	4th Quarterly Contribution for 2006 Plan Year	\$64,142,000	\$6,913,801	\$71,055,801
1/14/08	Contribution to Plan	(\$27,114,000)	(\$2,317,843)	(\$29,431,843)
1/15/08	1st Quarterly Contribution for 2007 Plan Year	\$11,680,000	\$995,633	\$12,675,633
4/14/08	Contribution to Plan	(\$27,978,000)	(\$1,780,249)	(\$29,758,249)
4/15/08	2nd Quarterly Contribution for 2007 Plan Year	\$11,680,000	\$740,426	\$12,420,426
5/16/08	Contribution to Plan	(\$\$0,000,000)	(\$2,602,507)	(\$52,802,507)
6/15/08	Final Contribution for 2006 Plan Year	\$61,072,280	\$2,992,102	\$64,064,382
7/15/08	3rd Quarterly Contribution for 2007 Plan Year	\$11,680,000	\$490,357	\$12,170,357
10/15/08	4th Quarterly Contribution for 2007 Plan Year	\$11,680,000	\$242,658	\$11,922,658
1/15/09	1st Quarterly Contribution for 2008 Plan Year	\$14,081,000	\$0	\$14,081,000
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		\$148,372,280	\$17,131,642	\$165,503,922

s no contributions are made after May 16, 2008.

Determine Amount of Lien

- (A) Total unpaid contributions with interest
- (8) Estimated Untunded Benefit Liabilities
- (C) Total Lien Amount (lesser of A or B)
- (D) Balance of prior liens

(E) New Lien Amount

2/6/09

Susan P. Donahey, EA

Cat

6109

Orig Amount

\$245,896,897

Cynthia The ia, ASA, EA

Date Filed

10/15/08

Delphi Salaried AR000041

JA604


\$165,503,922

\$2,296,800,000

\$165,503,922

Batance \$251,005,527

\$0



430(k) Lien Calculation as of 1/15/2009

Plan Name:	ASEC Manufacturing Retirement program
Control Group Name:	Detphi
EIN/PN:	731474201/002
Date of Lien Calculation:	01/15/2009
Pian Year:	1/1
First Missed Payment:	04/15/2007
UBL Amount	\$10,000,000
Date Completed by User:	02/06/2009

A. Summary of Unpaid Contributions with Interest

	Applicable Plan				Interest to		Total as of
Date	Year		Amount		01/15/2009		01/15/2009
Required							
04/15/2007	2007	\$	563,414	S	84,159	S	647,573
07/15/2007	2007	\$	563,414	\$	71,486	5	634,900
09/15/2007	2006	S	-	\$	-	\$	-
10/15/2007	2007	S	563,414	5	58,926	\$	622,340
01/15/2008	2007	S	563,414	\$	46,614	S	610,028
04/15/2008	2008	\$	63,200	S	5,263	S	68,463
07/15/2008	2008	\$	63,200	\$	3,474	S	66,674
09/15/2008	2007	\$	472,992	\$	12,700	S	485,692
10/15/2008	2008	\$	63,200	\$	- 1,714	\$	64,914
01/15/2009	2008	5	63,200	\$	-	\$	63,200
			1.		•		
Paid			,				
04/12/2007	2007	\$	(330,000)	s	(49,540)	5	(379,540)
07/11/2007	2007	\$	(330,000)	S	(42,194)	\$	(372,194)
10/11/2007	2007	\$	(330,000)	\$	(34,831)	\$	(364,831)
01/17/2008	2007	\$	(330,000)	\$	(27,147)	S	(357,147)
Total Unpaid Contributions with Interest						\$	1,790,072

B. Total Lien Amount as of 01/15/09 [Lesser of (A) or UBL Amount]

C. Prior Perfected Liens with Interest

Date	Amount Filed	Interest to 01/15/2009	Total as of 01/15/2009
Total Balance of P	rior Liens		\$ 0

D. New Lien Amount as of 01/15/09 [B-C; not<\$0]

1,790,072

1,790,072

\$

\$

E. User Comments

Required contribution amounts and actual payment information provided by plan's actuary. 9/15/2008 required amount determined by PBGC.

Completed by Susan P-Bonahey, EA

02/06/2009 Date

216/09

Reviewed by Cynthia Travia, ASA, EA

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Delphi Salaried AR000042

JA605

430(k) Lien Calculation as of 1/15/2009

Plan Name:	Packard-Hughes Interconnect Bargaining Retirement Plan
Control Group Name:	Delphi
EIN/PN:	330595219/002
Date of Lien Calculation:	01/15/2009
Plan Year:	1/1
First Missed Payment:	04/15/2007
UBL Amount:	\$10,000,000
Date Completed by User:	02/09/2009

A. Summary of Unpaid Contributions with Interest

	Applicable Plan				Interest to		Total as of
Date	Year		Amount		01/15/2009		01/15/2009
Required							
04/15/2007	2007	5	269,365	\$	41,493	\$	310,858
07/15/2007	2007	5	269,365	5	35,234	\$	304,599
09/15/2007	2006	\$	-	5	-	\$	-
10/15/2007	2007	5	269,365	\$	29,035	\$	298,400
01/15/2008	2007	\$	269,365	\$	22,961	\$	292,326
04/15/2008	2008	\$	239,505	\$	19,609	\$	259,114
07/15/2008	2008	\$	239,505	\$	12,949	\$	252,454
09/15/2008	2007	\$	280,914	S	7,765	\$	288,679
10/15/2008	2008	\$	239,505	\$	6,389	5	245,894
01/15/2009	2008	\$	239,505	\$	-	s	239,505
Paid		ł			-		
10/11/2007	2007	s	(6,235)	s	(678)	5	(6,913)
01/14/2008	2007	s	(84,431)	5	(7,218)	S	(91,649)
04/14/2008	2007	\$	(81,428)	\$	(5,181)	5	(86,609)
07/14/2008	2007	\$	(82,585)		(3,486)		(86,071)
Total Unpaid Contri	butions with Intere	L st	······································	Ĺ	<u></u>	5	2,220,587

B. Total Lien Amount as of 01/15/09 [Lesser of (A) or UBL Amount]

2,220,587

\$

C. Prior Perfected Liens with Interest

Date	Amount Filed	Interest to 01/15/2009	Total as of 01/15/2009
07/15/2007	\$ 1,671,232	\$ 173,355	\$ 1,844,587
Total Balance of Pr	\$ 1,844,587		

D. New Lien Amount as of 01/15/09 [B-C; not<\$0]

\$ 376,000

E. User Comments

llonake $\neg \land$ eted by Susan P. Bonahey, EA Comp

02/09/2009 Date

Reviewed by Cynthia Travia, ASA, EA

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Delphi Salaried AR000043

430(k) Lien Calculation as of 1/15/2009

Plan Name:	Packard-Hughes Interconnect Non-Bargaining Retirement Plan
Control Group Name:	Detphi
EIN/PN:	33-0595219/001
Date of Lien Calculation:	01/15/2009
Plan Year:	1/1
First Missed Payment:	04/15/2007
UBL Amount:	\$10,000,000
Date Completed by User:	02/09/2009

A. Summary of Unpaid Contributions with Interest

,.

				Interest to		Total as of	
Date	Year		Amount		01/15/2009		01/15/2009
Required							
04/15/2007	2007	\$	758,102	5	116,777	\$	874,879
07/15/2007	2007	\$	758,102	5	99,163	\$	857,265
. 09/15/2007	2006	\$	-	5	•	\$	•
10/15/2007	2007	5	758,102	S	81,715	\$	839,817
01/15/2008	2007	s	758,102	\$	64,623	5	822,725
04/15/2008	2008	5	459,379	5	37,915	\$	497,294
07/15/2008	2008	s	459,379	\$	25,034	\$	484,413
09/15/2008	2007	S	779,245	S	21,541	\$	800,786
10/15/2008	2008	5	459,379	\$	12,351	\$	471,730
01/15/2009	2008	\$	459,379	\$	-	\$	459,379
Paid		· ·					
10/11/2007	2007	s	(146,398)	s	(15,925)	\$	(162,323
01/14/2008	2007	s	(251,243)		(21,478)	\$	(272,72)
04/14/2008	2007	s	(218,161)		(13,882)		(232,043
07/14/2008			(221,261)		(9,341)		(230,602
Total Unpaid Contr	<u>.</u>	5,210,599					

B. Total Lien Amount as of 01/15/09 [Lesser of (A) or UBL Amount]

C. Prior Perfected Liens with Interest

		•		tr	terest to	Total as of
Date Am		Vnount Filed		01	/15/2009	01/15/2009
07/15/2006	5	1,294,045		5	257,006	\$ 1,551,051
10/15/2006	S	644,152		s	112,219	\$ 756,371
01/15/2007	\$	692,072		s	104,028	\$ 796,100
07/15/2007	5	1,829,015		s	191,511	\$ 2,020,526
Total Balance of Pri	ior Lie	สาร		l		\$ 5,124,048

D. New Lien Amount as of 01/15/09 [B-C; not<\$0]

E. User Comments

Completed by Susan P. Donabey, EA

Reviewed by Cynthia Travia, ASA, EA

02/09/2009 Date

9109 2

5,210,599

86,551

\$

\$

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Delphi's organizational structure and management reporting support the management of these core product lines. Our current product offerings are organized in the following five operating segments: Electronics and Safety, Powertrain Systems, Electrical/Electronic Architecture, Thermal Systems, as well as the Automotive Holdings Group. Our operating segment product offerings and principal competitors as of December 31, 2008 are described below. Refer to Note 22. Segment Reporting to the consolidated financial statements and Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operating segments, we have product sales in the automotive aftermarket, including diesel and original equipment service, consumer electronics and the medical device industry which are reported in the Corporate and Other segment and we have steering and halfshaft product sales and interiors and closures product sales which are reported in discontinued operations.

Below is a summary of financial information related to each of our segments followed by a description of our segment product offerings and principal competitors.

			vertrain ystems	ns Architecture			Thermal <u>Systems</u> n millions)		Automotive Holdings Group		Corporate and Other		<u>Total</u>		
2008:			_	· .		:	• •	÷	÷.,					_	
Net sales	\$_	4,048	\$.	4,470	S	:	5,649	\$	2,121	\$ _	1,348	\$	424	\$	18,060
Operating (loss)	÷ .	(654)	æ .	11200			19735		. 10	*			mócs	æ	(1 401)
income OIBDAR	3		2	(130)	.3		(361)	5	18	ě	. (68)	3	(286) 40	S .	
2007:	¢	(70)	Þ	120	\$	анана Стран	. 96	\$	<u>39</u>	\$	44	. \$.	40	₽	269
Net sales	S	5,035	\$	5,663	\$		5,968	\$	2,412	\$	2,946	\$	259	\$	22,283
Operating income	•		· ·	· . ·	•	•••	· · .							•	
(loss)	\$	63	5	(276)	S .	· .	(36)	S	(29)	\$	(393)	\$	(1,274)	\$	(1,945)
OIBDAR	\$	439	\$	125	\$		329	\$	84	\$	73	5	(319)	\$	731
2006:		4 - 18 - E			• ° •		•								• •
Net sales	\$	5,093	\$	5,565	S	:	5,365	\$	2,607	\$	3,638	\$	469	\$	22,737
Operating income	· .		÷				<i>·</i> ·		· .						
(loss)	· \$	188	\$	(128)	.\$		(110)	\$	(170)	\$. (488)	\$	(3,834)	\$	(4,542)
OIBDAR	\$	489	\$	234	\$		154	\$	(6)	\$	(121)	\$	(864)	\$	(114)

Corporate and Other, which includes the Product and Service Solutions business which is comprised of independent aftermarket, diesel aftermarket, original equipment service, consumer electronics and medical systems, in addition to the expenses of corporate administration, other expenses and income of a non-operating or strategic nature, and the elimination of inter-segment transactions.

Management believes segment operating income before depreciation, amortization, transformation and rationalization charges and discontinued operations ("OIBDAR") is a meaningful measure of performance and it is used by management and our Board of Directors to analyze Company and stand-alone segment operating performance. Segment OIBDAR should not be used as a substitute for results prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP and should not be considered as an alternative to operating income, which is the most directly comparable financial measure to OIBDAR that is in accordance with U.S. GAAP. Segment OIBDAR, as determined and measured by Delphi, should also not be compared to similarly titled measures reported by other companies. Refer to Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations Results of Operations by Segment in this Annual Report for further details, including a reconciliation to U.S. GAAP operating income (loss).

Continuing Operations

Electronics and Safety. This segment offers a wide range of electronic and safety equipment in the areas of controls, security, entertainment, communications, safety systems and power electronics.

 Controls and security products primarily consist of body computers, security systems, displays and mechatronics (interior switches, integrated center panel, gear shift sensors).

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meaningful protection for Delphi's products and technical innovations. Similarly, while our trademarks are important to identify Delphi's position in the industry, and we have obtained certain licenses to use intellectual property owned by others, we do not believe that any of these are individually material to our business. We are actively pursuing marketing opportunities to commercialize and license our technology to both automotive and non-automotive industries. This leveraging activity is expected to further enhance the value of our intellectual property portfolio.

Materials

The principal raw materials we use to manufacture our products include aluminum, copper, resins, and steel. We have not experienced any significant shortages of raw materials and normally do not carry inventories of such raw materials in excess of those reasonably required to meet our production and shipping schedules.

For the past three years, we were challenged by commodity cost increases, most notably copper, aluminum, petroleum-based resin products, steel and steel scrap, and fuel charges. We are continually seeking to manage these and other material related cost pressures using a combination of strategies, including working with our suppliers to mitigate costs, seeking alternative product designs and material specifications, combining our purchase requirements with our customers and/or suppliers, changing suppliers, hedging of certain commodities and other means. In the case of copper, which primarily affects the Electrical/Electronic Architecture segment, contract escalation clauses have enabled us to pass on some of the price increases to our customers and thereby partially offset the impact of increased commodity costs on operating income for the related products. However, despite our efforts, surcharges and other cost increases, particularly when necessary to ensure the continued financial viability of a key supplier, had the effect of reducing our earnings. We anticipate that an increase in the number of financially volatile key suppliers is likely to continue into the future. We will continue and increase our efforts to pass market-driven commodity cost increases to our customers in an effort to mitigate all or some of the adverse earnings impacts incurred on quoted customer programs. At the end of the third quarter and throughout the fourth quarter of 2008, and into early 2009, the market price of certain commodities, including copper and oil prices, declined significantly and may foreshadow lower cost petroleum-based resin products and lower fuel charges in the future; however prices remain extremely volatile, complicating hedging strategies and other efforts to plan and manage such costs. Our overall success in passing commodity cost increases on to our customers has been limited. As contracts with our customers expire, we will seek to renegotiate terms in order to recover the actual commodity costs we are incurring.

Employees-Union Representation

As of December 31, 2008, we employed approximately 146,600 people (18,900 in the U.S., and 127,700 outside of the U.S.): approximately 32,700 salaried employees and approximately 113,900 hourly employees. On a comparable basis, as of December 31, 2007, we employed approximately 169,500 people (28,400 in the U.S., and 141,100 outside of the U.S.): approximately 36,100 salaried employees and approximately 133,400 hourly employees. Our unionized employees are represented worldwide by approximately 50 unions, including the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW"), the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers-Communication Workers of America ("IUE-CWA"), the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union and its Local Union 87L (together, the "USW"), and Confederacion De Trabajadores Mexicanos ("CTM"). As of December 31, 2008 and 2007, approximately 8,800 and 14,200 hourly employees were represented by the UAW, approximately 1,300 and 2,000 by the IUE-CWA and approximately 300 and 500 by the USW and other unions, respectively

In 2006, the Court entered orders authorizing Delphi to enter into an attrition program and supplemental attrition program with GM and the UAW (the "UAW Attrition Programs"), which offered, among other things, certain eligible Delphi U.S. hourly employees represented by the UAW normal and early voluntary retirements and incentives. Also in 2006, Delphi, GM, and the IUE-CWA reached agreement on the terms of a special attrition program which mirrored in all material respects the UAW Attrition Programs (the "IUE-CWA Special





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news release

CONTACT: Delphi – Media Contacts Claudia Baucus - 248-813-2942 Lindsey Williams - 248-813-2528 Brad Jackson - 248-813-6873

Delphi Corporation Files Voluntary Chapter 11 Business Reorganization Cases to Execute Transformation Plan And Address Legacy Issues and High-Cost Structure in the U.S.

Non-U.S. Subsidiaries Are Not Included in U.S. Filing and Are Not Subject to Court Supervision or Chapter 11 Process

Existing Global Management Team to Continue to Operate U.S. Businesses as Debtors-in-Possession and Non-U.S. Subsidiaries in the Ordinary Course of Business

> Global Operations and Shipments to Customers Expected to Continue Without Interruption

Aggregate USD \$4.5 Billion Financing Includes Commitment for USD \$2 Billion in Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Adequate Protection Package for USD \$2.5 Billion Prepetition Facilities

> DIP Financing and Cash on Hand of USD \$1.6 Billion Available to Support Delphi's Worldwide Operations

TROY, Mich. -- October 8, 2005 -- Delphi Corporation (NYSE:DPH) today

announced that in order to preserve the value of the company and complete its

transformation plan designed to resolve Delphi's existing legacy issues and the resulting

high cost of U.S. operations, Delphi and 38 of its domestic U.S. subsidiaries filed

voluntary petitions for business reorganization under chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy

Code on Saturday in New York City. Delphi's non-U.S. subsidiaries were not included

in the filing, will continue their business operations without supervision from the U.S.

courts and will not be subject to the chapter 11 requirements of the U.S. Bankruptcy

Code. Delphi's global management team will continue to manage both the U.S. and



global businesses. Delphi expects to complete its U.S.-based restructuring and emerge from chapter 11 business reorganization in early to mid-2007.

"Our global operations, both U.S. and non-U.S., will continue without interruption," said Robert S. "Steve" Miller, Delphi's chairman and CEO. "Our customers all over the world can be assured that we will continue to meet their scheduling, delivery and production needs in a timely manner. Throughout this reorganization of our U.S. businesses and beyond, we will be intensely focused on continuing to provide all of our customers with leading-edge technology, product development, superior engineering, outstanding quality products and services, and world-class customer support."

Delphi plans to finance its global operations going forward with USD \$4.5 billion in debt facilities plus additional committed and uncommitted financing lines and/or securitization facilities in Asia, Europe and the Americas. The financing includes USD \$2.5 billion borrowed from prepetition revolver and term loan facilities and a commitment for up to USD \$2 billion in senior secured debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing from a group of lenders led by JPMorgan Chase Bank and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. The company plans to obtain approval of an adequate protection package for the benefit of its prepetition lenders as part of the Company's overall financing activities.

The proceeds of the DIP financing together with cash generated from daily operations and cash on hand will be used to fund post-petition operating expenses, including its supplier obligations and employee wages, salaries and benefits. The overall liquidity available to Delphi (including more than USD \$1 billion on hand outside the U.S., which Delphi does not plan to repatriate to fund U.S. operations) will support its global operations outside the U.S. and help ensure the continued adequacy of working capital throughout its global business units.

"We took this action because we are determined to achieve competitiveness for Delphi's core U.S. operations, and the key to accomplishing that goal is reducing these costs as soon as possible," said Miller. "We simply cannot afford to continue to be encumbered by high legacy issues and burdensome restrictions under current labor agreements that impair our ability to compete. We must also realign our global product portfolio and manufacturing footprint to preserve our core businesses. This will rèquire a substantial segment of our U.S. manufacturing operations to be divested, consolidated or wound-down through the chapter 11 process. We believe the chapter 11 process will provide the flexibility to address our legacy issues and allow us to take advantage of the fundamental strength of our businesses."

Miller said that Delphi has been engaged in constructive discussions with representatives of its major unions, but was unable to complete the necessary modifications to its collective bargaining agreements without assistance from General Motors Corporation or intervention of the U.S. courts. "Having been unable to resolve our U.S. legacy issues out of court," Miller said, "we determined it was in Delphi's best interest to address the U.S. cost-structure issues through the chapter 11 process *now* while our liquidity position is strong. We will be making a further proposal this month to each of our unions to transform our labor agreements to a competitive labor cost structure and to address non-profitable and non-strategic U.S. operations. In addition, we expect to address pension plans and health and retiree benefits to align them with competitive benchmarks in the industry and our transformation plan."

Delphi noted that its non-U.S. subsidiaries are generally competitive, cash flow positive and experiencing high growth opportunities. "One of our primary goals is to preserve and continue the strategic growth in non-U.S. operations while we address our U.S. cost structure issues through the chapter 11 process," said Miller.

Delphi filed more than 40 "first-day" motions along with its voluntary petitions covering Delphi's employees and business operations, post-petition DIP financing, continuing supplier relations, customer practices, certain executory contracts, taxes and related matters, utilities, retention of professionals and case administration matters. The company said it expects that the Bankruptcy Court will hold hearings on the first-day

> 3 Delphi Salaried AR000049

motions following the Columbus Day holiday observed in the U.S. and, in the interim, will approve bridge orders granting interim relief with respect to employees and business operations, continuing vendor relations and customer practices pending the Court's consideration of first-day hearings. Delphi will issue a further press release this weekend regarding the Bankruptcy Court's consideration of Delphi's request for the entry of interim bridge orders and providing further information about its chapter 11 reorganization cases including the date, time and location of the hearing on Delphi's first day motions.

Among other matters, the relief anticipated from the Bankruptcy Court this weekend and at the first day hearings next week would permit the company to continue to pay wages, salaries and current benefits of U.S. hourly and salaried employees and certain retiree benefits without disruption and in the same manner as before the filing. Similar relief for employees in Delphi's subsidiaries outside the U.S. is not required because they will continue to be paid in the ordinary course of business without court supervision.

"The Board of Directors, the senior management team and I greatly appreciate the loyalty and support of our employees," said Miller. "Their dedication and hard work are critical to our success and integral to the future of Delphi."

Delphi also noted that the execution of its transformation plan through the chapter 11 process may give rise to the incurrence of additional prepetition claims as collective bargaining agreements, executory contracts, retiree health benefits and pension plans, and other liabilities of the company are addressed and resolved to maximize stakeholder value going forward. There is no assurance as to what values, if any, will be ascribed in the chapter 11 cases as to the value of Delphi's existing common stock and/or any other equity securities. Accordingly, the company urges that the appropriate caution be exercised with respect to existing and future investments in any of these securities as the value and prospects are highly speculative.

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More information on Delphi's U.S. restructuring, including access to Court documents and other general information about the chapter 11 cases, is available at www.delphidocket.com. Delphi has also set up two separate toll-free information lines: one for specific supplier inquiries, 866-688-8679 or 248-813-2601, and another for employees, customers, shareholders and other interested parties, 866-688-8740 or 248-813-2602.

For more information about Delphi and its operating subsidiaries, visit Delphi's Media Room at www.delphi.com/media/.

This press release as well as other statements made by Delphi may contain forward-looking statements within the "safe harbor" provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, that reflect, when made, the Company's current views with respect to current events and financial performance. Such forward looking statements are and will be, as the case may be, subject to many risks, uncertainties and factors relating to the Company's operations and business environment which may cause the actual results of the Company to be materially different from any future results, express or implied, by such forward-looking statements. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from these forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, the following: the ability of the Company to continue as a going concern; the ability of the Company to operate pursuant to the terms of the DIP facility; the Company's ability to obtain court approval with respect to motions in the chapter 11 proceeding prosecuted by it from time to time; the ability of the Company to develop, prosecute, confirm and consummate one or more plans of reorganization with respect to the chapter 11 cases; risks associated with third parties seeking and obtaining court approval to terminate or shorten the exclusivity period for the Company to propose and confirm one or more plans of reorganization, for the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee or to convert the cases to chapter 7 cases; the ability of the Company to obtain and maintain normal terms with vendors and service providers; the Company's ability to maintain contracts that are critical to its operations; the potential adverse impact of the chapter 11 cases on the Company's liquidity or results of operations; the ability of the Company to fund and execute its business plan; the ability of the Company to attract, motivate and/or retain key executives and associates; and the ability of the Company to attract and retain customers. Other risk factors are listed from time to time in the Company's SEC reports, including, but not limited to the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2005. Delphi disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

Similarly, these and other factors, including the terms of any reorganization plan ultimately confirmed, can affect the value of the Company's various pre-petition liabilities, common stock and/or other equity securities. No assurance can be given as to what values, if any, will be ascribed in the bankruptcy proceedings to each of these constituencies. Accordingly, the Company urges that the appropriate caution be exercised with respect to existing and future investments in any of these liabilities and/or securities.

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Confidential - Material Non-Public Information

2009 Emergence Update - Strategic Overview -Objectives

De-lever Emergence Balance Sheet	 Secure \$1.5 billion of emergence funding through sale of UAW Keep Sites to GM, Settlement of Plan Investor Litigation, and/or Government Support. Emergence funding used to: repay DIP A/B (\$0.7 billion), plus: Pay Admin/Transaction Costs (\$0.2 billion) Provide Post-emergence cash (\$0.6 billion) DIP C is receives consideration other than cash (\$2.7 billion) Delphi terminates salaried OPEB (\$1.1 billion) Delphi transfers liability for hourly and salaried pension plans to GM in cooperation with U.S. Treasury Department (\$5.1 billion) Note: ELSA would increase emergence funding by an incremental \$0.5 billion to support hedging obligations, additional post-emergence cash, and anticipated final terms and conditions of amendments to the GSA and MRA
Sufficient Post- Emergence Liquidity	 Confirmed Business Plan based upon reasonable assumptions, including as to global production volumes and commodity prices, that generates positive cash flow in each period
	 \$2 billion in post-emergence liquidity, including at least \$700 million of operating cash on balance sheet, \$0.6 billion of excess cash on balance sheet and <u>an unfunded global revolving credit facility (\$0.8</u> <u>billion)</u>
Joint Meeting Of The Delphi St	atutory Page 41

Exhibit 99(a) SUPPLEMENTAL SECOND AMENDMENT TO ACCOMMODATION AGREEMENT AND SECOND AMENDMENT TO AMENDED AND RESTATED REVOLVING CREDIT, TERM LOAN AND GUARANTY AGREEMENT (this "<u>Amendment</u>") dated as of April 3, 2009, and effective as of the Effective Date (as hereinafter defined), among DELPHI CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation (the "<u>Borrower</u>"), a debtor and debtor-in-possession in a case pending under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the subsidiaries of the Borrower signatory hereto (each a "<u>Guarantor</u>" and collectively the "<u>Guarantors</u>"), each of which Guarantors is a debtor and debtor-in-possession in a case pending under Chapter 11 of the Darkentury Code to be under merchanter and MMODECAN CHAPTER DATE of the Darkent Code and the subsidiaries of the locater (is under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Lenders party hereto, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., as administrative agent for the Lenders (in such capacity, the 'Administrative Agent")

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the Borrower, the Guarantors, the Lenders (or in the case of the Accommodation Agreement, certain Lenders), the Administrative Agent and Citicorp USA, Inc., as Syndication Agent, are parties to (a) that certain Amended and Restated Revolving Credit, Term Loan and Guaranty Agreement, dated as of May 9, 2008 (as the same has been and may be further amended, modified or supplemented from time to time, the "<u>Credit Agreement</u>") and (b) that certain Accommodation Agreement, dated as of December 12, 2008 (as the same has been amended on January 30, 2009 pursuant to the First Amendment thereto and on February 24, 2009 pursuant to the Supplemental Amendment thereto, and may be further amended on Santaary 30, 2009 pursuant on supplemented from time to time, the "<u>Accommodation Agreement</u>"); unless otherwise specifically defined herein, each term used herein that is defined in the Accommodation Agreement has the meaning assigned to such term in the Accommodation Agreement; WHEREAS, in recognition of the United States Treasury's desire for additional time to agree upon a timetable by which it will review and consider the

Borrower's position in the automotive sector and various alternatives with respect to the Borrower's emergence from chapter 11, the Borrower and the Guarantors desire to modify the Accommodation Agreement as provided herein;

WHEREAS, the Borrower, the Guarantors and certain Participant Lenders entered into the Second Amendment to the Accommodation Agreement (the

"Second Amendment"), effective as of March 31, 2009; WHEREAS, on April 2, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court approved the Second Amendment, subject to certain further modifications to the terms set forth in

the Second Amendment, and subject to requisite approval from the Lenders of such modifications; WHEREAS, the Required First Priority Participant Lenders and the Required Total Participant Lenders have agreed, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, to modify the Accommodation Agreement (including to modify the terms of the Second Amendment to reflect the modifications approved by the Bankruptcy Court on April 2, 2009) in response to the Borrower's request as set forth below; WHEREAS, the Required Lenders have agreed, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, to modify the Credit Agreement in response to the Bankruptcy Court on April 2, 2009) in response to the Borrower's request as set forth, to modify the Credit Agreement in response to

the Borrower's request as set forth below;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and for other good and valuable consideration (the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged), the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:

"GM Transaction Termsheet" shall mean a detailed term sheet setting forth the terms of a global resolution of matters relating to GM's

contribution to the resolution of the Borrower's Chapter 11 Cases, including, without limitation, all material transactions between the Borrower and GM relevant to such resolution.

"GM Transaction Termsheet Condition" shall be satisfied, if and only if, on or prior to April 17, 2009, the Borrower shall have (i) delivered to the Administrative Agent a GM Transaction Termsheet and (ii) certified in writing that such GM Transaction Termsheet has been agreed to among the Borrower, GM and the United States Treasury

"Minimum Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Account Balance" shall mean \$160,000,000 through and including April 18, 2009 and \$140,000,000 from and after April 19, 2009; provided that the Minimum Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Account Balance shall mean \$47,000,000 from and after the date, if any, on which the Required First Priority Participant Lenders and the Required Total Participant Lenders shall have delivered to the Borrower a Satisfactory Termsheet Notice.

"OPER Settlement Agreement" shall mean the agreement entered into among the Borrower, the Guarantors, the Delphi Salaried Retirees' Association (the "Association"), and the Committee of Eligible Salaried Retirees (the "Retirees' Committee") resolving the Association's and the Retirees' Committee's appeals of the Provisional Salaried OPEB Termination Order (Docket No. 16380) and the Final OPEB Termination Order (Docket No. 16448).

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"Satisfactory Termsheet Notice" shall mean one or more notifications from the Required First Priority Participant Lenders and the Required Total Participant Lenders (or a notification from the Administrative Agent on behalf of the Required First Priority Participant Lenders and the Required First Priority Participant Total Participant Lenders) to the Borrower within three (3) Business Days after satisfaction of the GM Transaction Termsheet Condition that the GM Transaction Termsheet is satisfactory.

Supplemental Second Amendment to the Accommodation Agreement" shall mean the Supplemental Second Amendment to the Accommodation Agreement, dated as of April 3, 2009.

(b) Section 1(b) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby further amended by (x) deleting the word "or" at the end of clause (ii) of the definition Accommodation Default", (y) replacing the period at the end of clause (iii) of such definition with ";" and (z) adding clauses (iv) through (v) to such oť definition to read as follows:

"(iv) the Administrative Agent shall have notified the Borrower in writing, within 10 Business Days after the filing with the Bankruptcy Court of a new Reorganization Plan or modifications to the Existing Reorganization Plan, that such new Reorganization Plan or modifications to the Existing Reorganization Plan is not satisfactory to the Required Lenders or the Required Total Participant Lenders; or (v) the Borrower shall have (x) proceeded with the hearing before the Bankruptcy Court on the Borrower's Motion for Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 363 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004 Authorizing and Approving Option Exercise Agreement with General Motors Corporation (Docket #16410) or (y) sold the steering business of the Global Entities, in either case without the prior written consent of the Required First Priority Participant Lenders with the Required First Priority Participant Lenders." and the Required Total Participant Lenders."

(c) The definition of "Accommodation Period" in Section 1(b) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by (w) deleting the proviso to clause (i), (x) deleting "and" at the end of clause (iii), (y) renumbering clause (iv) as clause (v) and (z) inserting the following clause (iv) after clause (iii):

"(iv) April 25, 2009, unless the Required First Priority Participant Lenders and the Required Total Participant Lenders shall have delivered to the

Borrower a Satisfactory Termsheet Notification on or prior to April 24, 2009; and" (d) Section I(b) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby further amended by deleting clause (ii) of the definition of "Borrower Liquidity. <u>Availability</u>" and replacing it with the following: "(ii) the Excess Cash Amount at such time".

(e) Section 1(b) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby further amended by deleting the definition of "GM-Delphi Agreement Amendment. Second Condition". (f) The definition of "Minimum Liquidity Amount" in Section 1(b) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended and restated in its entirety

to read as follows:

"Minimum Liquidity Amount" shall mean \$25,000,000."

(g) Section 1(b) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby further amended by inserting the following proviso at the end of the definition of "Satisfactory Reorganization Plan'

(h) Section 2(b) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by replacing both references to "Accommodation Agreement" in the second

sentence with "Accommodation Period" (i) Section 3(e)(ii) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by adding at the end of the last sentence the following: "and the Required

Total Participant Lenders'

(i) Section 3(e)(iii) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by (x) inserting, after the phrase "other than a Specified Default" in clause (2) of the first proviso, the following: "during the Accommodation Period", (y) replacing "and" with "," immediately prior to "(2)" and (z) adding, immediately prior to "and provided, further", the following: "and (3)(x) there shall be not less than the Minimum Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Account Balance remaining in the Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Accounts and (y) the Borrower shall have certified in writing to the Administrative Agent that funds are not otherwise available to pay current ordinary course of business operating expenses of the Borrower and its Subsidiaries (and for purposes hereof payments pursuant to the OPEB Settlement Agreement up to \$10,000,000 in the aggregate for all such payments are deemed to be

(I) Section 3(e) is hereby amended by adding subsection (v) as follows: 4

"For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of Sections 3(e)(iii) and (iv) and this Section 3(e)(v) shall continue to apply notwithstanding the termination of the Accommodation Period and such sections shall not be amended, supplemented, waived or otherwise modified without the consent of the Required First Priority Participant Lenders and the Required Total Participant Lenders), and the Borrower shall not have access to the amounts on deposit in the Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Accounts and the Incremental Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Accounts except as provided in Sections 3(e)(iii) and (iv)."

(m) Section 3(m) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by amending and restating such subsection in its entirety to read as follows: "The Borrower shall apply the aggregate amount held in all Incremental Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Accounts to the repayment of Obligations in accordance with Section 2.19(b) of the Credit Agreement:

(i) on April 20, 2009 unless, on or prior to April 17, 2009, the GM Transaction Termsheet Condition shall be satisfied, or

(ii) if such amount has not been previously applied to the repayment of Obligations pursuant to this Section 3(m), within one Business Day after the occurrence of the Automatic Accommodation Termination Default set forth in paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 hereof, or

(iii) if such amount has not been previously applied to the repayment of Obligations pursuant to this Section 3(m), within one Business Day after the Administrative Agent shall have notified the Borrower in writing, within 10 Business Days after the filing with the Bankruptcy Court of a new Reorganization Plan or modifications to the Existing Reorganization Plan, that such new Reorganization Plan or modifications to the Existing Reorganization Plan, that such new Reorganization Plan or modifications to the Existing Reorganization Plan is not satisfactory to the Required Lenders or the Required Total Participant Lenders."
(n) Section 3(n)(i) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by deleting the phrase "with third parties in connection with the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower and SM and/or the Borrower and SM and/or the Borrower's construction and the Borrower's construction of the Borrower's construction and the sum of the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between the Borrower and GM and/or the Borrower's emergence from Chapter 11 and/or material transactions or arrangements between

Borrower and the United States Treasury'

(o) Schedule 1 of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by adding the following paragraphs:

"4. The GM Transaction Termsheet Condition shall have failed to be satisfied on or prior to April 17, 2009.

5. The Required First Priority Participant Lenders or the Required Total Participant Lenders (or the Administrative Agent on behalf of the Required First Priority Participant Lenders or the Required Total Participant Lenders) shall have either (i) notified the Borrower within three (3) Business Days after delivery of the GM Transaction Termsheet that the GM Transaction Termsheet is not satisfactory or (ii) failed to deliver to the Borrower a Satisfactory Termsheet Notice within three (3) Business Days after delivery of the GM Transaction Termsheet." (p) The second sentence of Section 3(g) of the Accommodation Agreement is hereby amended by inserting "in respect of interest accrued on or after April 1, 2009" immediately after "Tranche C Lenders".

Amendments to the Credit Agreement. (a) The parties hereto hereby agree that upon their execution and delivery of this Amendment and subject to the other terms and conditions set forth herein, including the terms and conditions set forth in Section 4 hereof with respect to the effectiveness of this Amendment, (i) the Credit Agreement

herein, including the terms and conditions set forth in Section 4 hereof with respect to the effectiveness of this Amendment, (i) the Credit Agreement shall be amended as set forth herein and shall be binding upon all parties thereto, subject to the terms hereof and (ii) each reference to "hereof", "hereunder", "herein" and "hereby" and each other similar reference and each reference to "this Agreement" and each other similar reference contained in the Credit Agreement shall, after the Effective Date, refer to such agreements as amended by this Amendment. (b) Section 2.31 of the Credit Agreement is hereby amended by (w) inserting the phrase "(a) Except as set forth in clause (b) below of this Section 2.31, the" before the first sentence, (x) inserting the phrase "Except as set forth in clause (b) below of this Section 2.31, the" before the third sentence, (y) deleting "The" in the first and third sentences, and (z) inserting the following clause (b) at the end of Section 2.31 of the Credit Agreement: "(b) On or prior to April 6, 2009, the Borrower shall apply the aggregate amount held in all Segregated Tranche C Interest Accounts to the repayment of Obligations in accordance with Section 2.19(b). For the avoidance of doubt, such application by the Borrower shall not affect (i) the Borrower's obligation to pay, and each Tranche C Lender's right to receive, interest on such Tranche C Lender's portion of the Tranche C Loans pursuant to Sections 2.08 and 2.09 hereunder (including unpaid interest accrued prior to such application), (ii) any Lender's right under this Section 2.31 with respect to any future funds deposited into any Segregated Tranche C Interest Account after April 6, 2009 and (iii) the Borrower's obligation to deposite funds into the Segregated funds into the Segregated

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Tranche C Interest Accounts from time to time in accordance with the provisions of the Accommodation Agreement." 3. <u>Representation and Warranty</u>. The Borrower and the Guarantors hereby represent and warrant that (i) all representations and warranties in the Accommodation Agreement, the Credit Agreement and the other Loan Documents are true and correct in all material respects on and as of the Effective Date except to the extent such representations and warranties expressly relate to an earlier date and (ii) after giving effect to the amendment set forth in Sections 1(f) and (m) above as if such amendment had been in effect on March 24, 2009, no Event of Default (other than a Specified Default) has occurred and is continuing on the date hereof.

4. Conditions to Effectiveness. This Amendment shall become effective on the date (the "Effective Date") on which each of the following shall have

occurred and the Administrative Agent shall have received evidence reasonably satisfactory to it of such occurrence: (i) this Amendment shall have been executed by the Borrower, the Guarantors, the Required First Priority Participant Lenders, the Required Total

(ii) immediately prior to the effectiveness of this Amendment, but after giving effect to the amendment set forth in Sections 1(f) and (m) above as if such amendment had been in effect on March 24, 2009, no Event of Default (other than a Specified Default) shall have occurred and be continuing. 5. <u>Conditions Subsequent</u>. This Amendment shall automatically be null and void and of no further force and effect on April 7, 2009 (the "<u>First</u>

Termination Date"), unless prior to such date (1) the Bankruptcy Court shall have entered one or more orders reasonably satisfactory in form and substance to the Administrative Agent authorizing (A) this Amendment (it being understood and agreed by the parties hereto that such approval is not required for this Amendment to become effective, but will be sought by the Borrower solely for the avoidance of doubt), which authorization may be on an interim or a final Aniendament we become effective, but will be sought by the Borrower solery for the avoidance of adulo), which aduloitzation may be on an interval of an ab-basis, (B) the payment by the Borrower to the Administrative Agent of all fees referred to herein or in that certain Fee Letter (the "Fee Letter") and (D) the payment by the Borrower of the Amendment Fees (as defined below), and (11) the Borrower shall have paid (A) to the Administrative Agent all fees referred to herein or in the Fee Letter, (B) to each Participant Lender that has executed and delivered a signature page hereto to the Administrative Agent no later than 5:00 p.m. (New York City time) on April 3, 2009, an amendment fee in an amount equal to 25 basis points of the Tranche A Total Commitment Usage, Tranche B Loans and Tranche C Loans of each such Participant Lender as of the Effective Date (the "Amendment Fees"), (C) all invoiced expenses (including the fees and expenses of counsel to the Administrative Agent) of the Administrative Agent incurred in connection with the preparation, negotiation and execution of this Amendment and other matters relating to the Loan Documents in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Credit Agreement and (D) all invoiced expenses of the Lenders payable pursuant to any Expense Side Letters. Furthermore, this Amendment shall automatically be null and void and of no further force and effect on April 25, 2009 (the "Second Termination Date"), unless prior to such date (i) the order 7

or orders referred to in clause (1) of the immediately preceding sentence shall have been entered on a final basis (with only such changes to the interim order as are reasonably satisfactory in form and substance to the Administrative Agent), and (ii) the Borrower shall have paid (x) all invoiced expenses (including the fees and expenses of counsel to the Administrative Agent) of the Administrative Agent incurred in connection with the preparation, negotiation and execution of this Amendment and other matters relating to the Loan Documents in accordance with Section 10.05 of the Credit Agreement and (y) all invoiced expenses of the Lenders payable pursuant to any Expense Side Letters.

6. <u>Release</u>. To the fullest extent pernitted by applicable law, in consideration of the Agents' and the execution of this Amendment by the Participant Lenders that executed and delivered this Amendment (together with any such Participant Lender's successors and assigns, the "<u>Amendment Participant Lenders</u>"), the Borrower and the Guarantors each, on behalf of itself and each of its successors and assigns (including, without limitation, any receiver or trustee, collectively, the "<u>Releasors</u>"), does hereby forever release, discharge and acquit the Agents, each Amendment Participant Lender and each of their respective parents, subsidiaries and affiliate corporations or partnerships, and their respective officers, directors, partners, trustees, shareholders, agents, attorneys and employees, and their respective successors, heirs and assigns, in the case of each of the foregoing solely in their capacities as such (collectively, the "<u>Releasees</u>") of and from any and all claims, demands, liabilities, rights, responsibilities, disputes, causes of action (whether at law or equity), indebtedness and obligations (collectively. "<u>Claims</u>"). of every type, kind, nature, description or character, and irrespective of how, why or by reason of what facts, whether such Claims have heretofore arisen, are now existing or hereafter arise, or which could, might, or may be claimed to exist, of whatever kind or name, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, each as though fully set forth herein at length, which in any way arise out of, are connected with or in any way relate to actions or omissions which occurred on or prior to the date hereof with respect to the Obligations, this Amendment, the Accommodation Agreement, and of this Amendment (including due to the occurrence of the First Termination Date or the Second Termination Date) and (ii) the termination of the Credit Agreement, the payment in full of all Obligations and the remination of all Commitments.

7. Miscellaneous.

(a) The Amendment Participant Lenders hereby waive any defaults (including any Automatic Accommodation Termination Defaults or Accommodation Defaults) or Events of Default that may have occurred as a result of the failure of the Borrower to (i) apply the aggregate amount held in all Incremental Borrowing Base Cash Collateral Accounts to the repayment of Obligations pursuant to Section 3(m)(i) of the Accommodation Agreement and (ii) maintain Borrower Liquidity Availability in an amount greater than the Minimum Liquidity Amount pursuant to Section 3(d) of the Accommodation Agreement, in each case as in effect immediately prior to giving effect to the amendments to the Accommodation Agreement set forth in Section 1 of this Amendment and Section 1 of the Section 1 of this

(b) Except to the extent hereby amended, each Loan Party hereby affirms that the terms of the other Loan Documents (i) secure, and shall continue to secure, and (ii)



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guarantee, and shall continue to guarantee, in each case, the Obligations (as defined in the Credit Agreement) and acknowledges and agrees that each Loan Document is, and shall continue to be, in full force and effect and is hereby ratified and affirmed in all respects.

(c) The Borrower agrees that its obligations set forth in Section 10.05 of the Credit Agreement shall extend to the preparation, execution and delivery of this Amendment, including the reasonable fees and disbursements of special counsel to the Administrative Agent and the Arrangers.

(d) No Person other than the parties hereto and any other Lender, and, in the case of Section 6 hereof, the Releasees, shall have any rights hereunder or be entitled to rely on this Amendment, and all third-party beneficiary rights (other than the rights of the Releasees under Section 6 hereof and any other Lender) are hereby expressly disclaimed.

(e) The parties hereto hereby agree that Section 8 of the Credit Agreement shall apply to this Amendment and each other Loan Document and all

(b) The parties nettor nettor agree that bector of the extent of the extent agreemplated hereby.
(1) Nothing in this Amendment shall be deemed, asserted or construed to impair or prejudice the rights of the Administrative Agent and the Lenders to appear and be heard on any issue, or to object to any relief sought, in the Bankruptcy Court, except to the extent that such actions would constitute a breach of the Administrative Agent's or any Participant Lender's obligations under the Accommodation Agreement.

(g) Any provision of this Amendment held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any jurisdiction shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability without affecting the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions hereof, and the invalidity of a particular provision in a particular jurisdiction shall not invalidate such provision in any other jurisdiction.

(h) Section headings used herein are for convenience only and are not to affect the construction of or be taken into consideration in interpreting this Amendment

(i) This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts and by the different parties hereto in separate counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed to be an original and all of which taken together shall constitute but one and the same instrument. A facsimile or .pdf copy of a counterpart signature page shall serve as the functional equivalent of a manually executed copy for all purposes. (j) THIS AMENDMENT SHALL IN ALL RESPECTS BE CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE

STATE OF NEW YORK AND (TO THE EXTENT APPLICABLE) THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

(k) EACH OF THE BORROWER, THE GUARANTORS, THE AGENTS AND EACH LENDER HEREBY IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ALL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ANY ACTION, PROCEEDING OR COUNTERCLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS AMENDMENT. [SIGNATURE PAGES TO FOLLOW]

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Delphi Corporation

		Despin Gerpe					
	Pension Information Profile						
EIN/PN Plan Frozen? Plan Terminated? Cash Balance Plan? Part I Actuarial Information	Delphi Hourly- Rate Employees Pension Plan 383430473/003 30-Nov-08 No No	Delphi Retirement Program for Salaried Employees 383430473/001 30-Sep-08 No No	ASEC Manufacturing Retirement Program 731474201/002 01-Oct-07 No No	Delphi Mechatronic Systems Retirement Program 383589834/001 30-Sep-08 No No	Packard-Hughes Interconnect Bargaining Retirement Plan 330595219/002 No No No	Packard-Hughes Interconnect Non- Bargaining Retirement Plan 330595219/001 30-Sep-08 No No	Total of Underlunded Plans
			00.0-1.05	00.0+05	08-Oct-05	08-Oct-05	08-Oct-05
Date of Bankruptcy Filing PBGC Valuation Date PBGC Interest Factors First 20 Years Thereafter Date Calculation Completed by DISC Actuaries	08-Oct-05 31-Jan-09 6.02% 5.48% 03-Mar-09	08-Oct-05 31-Jan-09 6.02% 5.48% 03-Apr-09	08-Oct-05 31-Jan-09 6.02% 5.48% 03-Mar-09	08-Oct-05 31-Jan-09 6.02% 5.48% 03-Mar-09	6.02% 5.48% 03-Mar-09	6.02% 5.48% 03-Mar-09	6.02% 5.48% 03-Mar-09
Part II Underfunding Details (in millions)							
Assets as of January 31, 2009 Projected to January 31, 2009	\$3,682.6	\$2,326.3	\$16.2	\$5.5	\$4.4	\$15.0	\$6,050.0
Estimated Unfunded Guaranteed Liability - UGL Retired Terminated Vested Active <u>Expenses</u> Total	\$7,010.5 \$111.1 \$279.8 <u>\$71.6</u> \$7,473.0	\$2,521.7 \$151.1 \$1,789.9 <u>\$41.6</u> \$4,504.3	\$16.0 \$13.8 \$0.0 <u>\$0.4</u> \$30.2	\$0.7 \$2.4 \$4.1 <u>\$0.0</u> \$7.2	\$11.5 \$2.3 \$0.8 <u>\$0.2</u> \$14.8	\$17.8 \$15.1 \$5.8 <u>\$0.5</u> \$39.2	\$9,578.2 \$295.8 \$2,080.4 <u>\$114.3</u> \$12,068.7
UGL	\$3,790.4	\$2,178.0	\$14.0	\$1.7	\$10.4	\$24.2	\$6,018.7
Funded GL Ratio [Assets/Guaranteed Liabilities]	49%	52%	58%	76%	30%	38%	50%
Estimated Unfunded Benefit Liability - UBL Retired Terminated Vested Active <u>Expenses</u> Total UBL	\$7,010.5 \$138.5 \$471.3 \$7 <u>3.8</u> \$7,694.1 \$4,011.5	\$2,521.7 \$160.7 \$2,313.5 <u>\$46.6</u> \$5,042.5 \$2,716.2	\$16.0 \$13.8 \$0.0 <u>\$0.4</u> \$30.2 \$14.0	\$0.7 \$2.4 \$4.8 <u>\$0.0</u> \$7.9 \$2.4	\$11.5 \$2.3 \$1.9 <u>\$0.2</u> \$15.9 \$11.5	\$17.8 \$15.1 \$8.4 <u>\$0.6</u> \$41.9 \$26.9	\$9,578.2 \$332.8 \$2,799.9 <u>\$121.6</u> \$12,832.5 \$6,782.5
Funded BL Ratio [Assets/Benefit Liabilities]	48%	46%	58%	70%	28%	36%	47%
Part III Number of Participants at Plan Valuation Date Retired Terminated Vested	27,577 5,148	7,412 2,585 10,206	108 425 <u>0</u>	5 62 <u>81</u>	80 70 15	231 1,007 <u>145</u>	35,413 9,297 22,319
<u>Active</u> Total	<u>11.872</u> 44,597	20,203	533	<u>01</u> 148	165	1,383	67,029
Part IV Unpaid Minimum Required Contributions (in dollars)							

Unpaid Minimum Required Contributions have not been calculated.

Delphi Salaried AR000062

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PARTI **DELPHI CORPORATION**

ITEM 1. BUSINESS

As further described below, Delphi Corporation (referred to as "Delphi," the "Company," "we," or "our") and certain of its United States ("U.S.") subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions for reorganization relief under chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code "Bankruptcy Code") in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Court") and are currently operating as "debtors-in-possession" under the jurisdiction of the Court and in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and orders of the Court. Delphi's non-U.S. subsidiaries were not included in the filings, continue their business operations without supervision from the Court and are not subject to the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.

Overview. Delphi is a leading global supplier of mobile electronics and transportation systems, including powertrain, safety, thermal, controls and security systems, electrical/electronic architecture, and in-car entertainment technologies, engineered to meet and exceed the rigorous standards of the automotive industry. Delphi was incorporated in 1998 in contemplation of its separation from General Motors Corporation ("GM") in 1999 (the "Separation"). Technology developed and products manufactured by Delphi are changing the way drivers interact with their vehicles. Delphi is a leader in the breadth and depth of technology to help make cars and trucks smarter, safer and better. The Company supplies products to nearly every major global automotive original equipment manufacturer.

We have extensive technical expertise in a broad range of product lines and strong systems integration skills, which enable us to provide comprehensive, systems-based solutions to vehicle manufacturers ("VMs"). We have established an expansive global presence, with a network of manufacturing sites, technical centers, sales offices and joint ventures located in major regions of the world. We operate our business along the following reporting operating segments that are grouped on the basis of similar product, market and operating factors:

- Electronics and Safety, which includes audio, entertainment and communications, safety systems, body controls and security systems, displays, mechatronics and power electronics, as well as advanced development of software and silicon.
- · Powertrain Systems, which includes extensive systems integration expertise in gasoline, diesel and fuel handling and full end-to-end systems including fuel injection, combustion, electronics controls, exhaust handling, and test and validation capabilities.
- Electrical/Electronic Architecture, which includes complete electrical architecture and component products.
- Thermal Systems, which includes Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning ("HVAC") systems, components for multiple transportation and other adjacent markets, and powertrain cooling and related technologies.
- Automotive Holdings Group, which includes non-core product lines and plant sites that do not fit Delphi's future strategic framework.
- · Corporate and Other, which includes the Product and Service Solutions business, which is comprised of independent aftermarket, diesel aftermarket, original equipment service, consumer electronics and medical systems, in addition to the expenses of corporate administration, other expenses and income of a non-operating or strategic nature, and the elimination of inter-segment transactions

We also have non-core steering and halfshaft product lines and interiors and closures product lines that are reported in discontinued operations for accounting purposes. Previously, the steering and halfshaft product line was a separate operating segment and the interiors and closures product line was part of our Automotive Holdings Group segment. Refer to Note 5. Discontinued Operations to the consolidated financial statements for more information.




 Section 2010
 Foreign entities for sale

 Foreign entities not owned by DASHI

Non-Debtor / Debtor transactions²

Delphi Proprietary



* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company

June 30, 2008


Page 1

² Each transaction is numbered to correspond to the transaction analysis and identify the foreign party

[°] Indicates Joint Venture

¹ Assumed US


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Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi
 Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008

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* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company


° Indicates Joint Venture

¹ Assumed US

Delphi Salaried AR000066

June 30, 2008

Delphi Proprietary




* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company

° Indicates Joint Venture

Delphi Salaried AR000067

June 30, 2008

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
* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company

° Indicates Joint Venture

Delphi Salaried AR000068

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


* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company

° Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008

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


* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company

° Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008


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° Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008


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
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
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
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Delphi Salaried AR000075


June 30, 2008

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° Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008




* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company

° Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008


Case 1:12-mc-00100-EGS Document 6-11 Filed 03/05/12 Page 51 of 81 USCA Case #17-5142 Document #1690342 Filed: 08/28/2017 Page 64 of 259



° Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008

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Delphi Proprietary

Delphi Salaried AR000079

* Indicates Owned by more than one Delphi company

° Indicates Joint Venture

June 30, 2008

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Presentation to Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

Discussion Materials

April 16, 2009

Greenhill

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- 2. Valuation Summary

Appendix

- A. Comparable Company Analysis
- B. Summary of 2008 Trial Balances

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

In connection with its Delphirelated work for the PBGC, Greenhill has evaluated the relative value of Delphi and its foreign businesses

- As a follow-up to our meeting on March 10, 2009, Greenhill has focused on further refining the valuation range for consolidated Delphi ("the Company") and its foreign operations, with a focus on estimating the relative value of Delphi's foreign businesses
 - We continue to rely on the interim January 2009 RPOR for Delphi's projected revenue and EBITDAR since the updated business plan is not yet available
- To develop its views on value, Greenhill has:
 - Reviewed the financial performance of Delphi
 - Reviewed the financial projections prepared by the management of Delphi
 - Discussed with the management of Delphi both past and projected future financial performance
 - Participated in extensive due diligence meetings covering operational, financial, legal and tax issues impacting the Company
- Greenhill has conducted a variety of analyses to determine the standalone valuation of Delphi
- As a starting point, we first analyzed the broader auto supplier space to develop a set of comparables that met the following criteria:
 - Product diversification similar to Delphi
 - Geographic revenue mix with strong presence in both Europe and North America
 - Classified as a Tier I supplier
 - Currently trades on one of the major U.S. or foreign exchanges
- 9 companies meet the above criteria, all of which are U.S. based, with the exception of 1 Canadian firm
- Given the distressed trading valuations across this sector, Greenhill has applied the following methodology to better reflect the observed enterprise value of each comparable company
 - For those companies with debt trading substantially below par, we have relied on the market value of debt as opposed to book value of debt as a better proxy for overall observed valuation
 - For the purposes of this presentation, we have assumed that all cash on the balance sheets of comparables represents excess cash. This assumption remains subject to further review

Greenhill

Delphi Salaried AR000083 Removed

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Valuation Summary

Valuation Methodology

Greenhill relied primarily on the comparable company analysis to estimate the value of Delphi as a whole as well as its foreign businesses

- Comparable company analysis
 - Greenhill identified comparable companies to Delphi and applied their market multiples to 2008, 2009E and 2010E metrics to calculate a standalone valuation of the Company and the foreign subsidiaries
- Precedent transaction analysis
 - Greenhill reviewed a range of industry transactions and applied these multiples on a LTM basis to derive a change-of-control valuation of the Company and the foreign subsidiaries
- Discounted cash flow analysis
 - Greenhill did not rely on a discounted cash flow approach due to the lack of reasonably current long-term projections for the Company

Delphi Salaried AR000086 Removed

Delphi Salaried AR000087

Overview of Delphi's Comparables

Comparison Across Businesses

(\$ in millions, except per share data)	RUMURAN STATES I		Name and American Street of Street	Caler	Namacilles Vacation (Schlideling	Dec-31 Year-E	NEW CONTRACTOR OF THE OWNER		
Congeny	2008 Sales	EBITOAR	ESTOAR Margin	NA I	**************************************	nue by Guogri Europe		Other	Comments
🕅 BorgWarner	\$5,263.9	\$587.7	11.2%	28% ⁽¹⁾	0%	57%	5% ⁽²⁾	9%	 Supplier of powertrain applications to OEMs Strong European presence
6 FEDERAL MOGUL	6,865.6	691.4	10.1%	44%	0%	46%	0%	10%	 Supplier of powertrain, safety and other automotive components Strong presence in North America and Europe Geographic revenue mix in line with Delphi
TRW Automotive	14,995.0	1,055.0	7.0%	30%	0%	56%	9%	5%	 Diversified automotive parts supplier, with a focus on safety-related products Strong European presence 70% of revenue is derived outside of North America
<u>Ń MAGNA</u>	23,704.0	1,487.0	6.3%	59%	0%	38%	0%	3%	Diversified Canadian automotive parts supplier with GM and Chrysler as its largest customers
O LEAR	13,570.5	718.1	5.3%	36%	0%	19% ⁽³⁾	0%	46% ⁴⁾	 Automotive seating and electrical systems supplier Significant operations outside of North America
TENNECO	5,916.0	374.0	6.3%	44%	0%	47%	9%	0%	 Supplier of ride control and emissions products Geographic revenue mix in line with that of Delphi Revenue split about equally between North America and Europe
	8,095.0	236.0	2.9%	48%	14%	30%	8%	0%	Has similar business mix and geographic exposure as Delphi
ArvinMeritor."	6,874.0	308.0	4.5%	41%	0%	38%	21%5	0%	 Primary business in line with Delphi's Powertrain segment Geographic revenue mix in line with Delphi
	2,109.0	71.6	3.4%	70%	25% ⁽⁷⁾	6% ⁽⁸⁾	0%	0%	Supplier of substantially all of GM's axle requirements
DELPHI	20,933.0	378.0	1,8%	44%	6%	38%	12%	0%	
eenhill	(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)	Represents Represents Other includ Revenue bri Represents Company fill Company fill	les South Am eakdown for g Asia and Oth ing combines ing classifies	erica, Asia, Afi geography as o er Mexico and S European and	of FYE 9/30/ outh Americ Other as a	08. Sales and a as a combine	EBITDAR sho ed operation ration	wn LTM a	down not available per filings s of 12/31/08

Overview of Delphi's Comparables

Relative Trading Performance

(\$ in	millions, except per share data)								-			
	Company	Share Price 4/13/09	Equity Value	d to Dec-31 Ye Enterprise Value	Book Value of Net Debt	Market Value	. ' By E	V / EBITC 2009E	AR 2010E		⁽¹⁾ / Евіто 2009е	AR 2010E
	🕅 BorgWarner	\$25.75	\$2,982.5	\$3,727.7	\$713.7	\$646.3	6.3x	9.3x	6.3x	6.2x	9.2x	6.2x
	PEDERAL MOGUL	10.15	1,009.0	3,035.5	1,981.5	654.7	4.4x	5.3x	4.8x	2.5x	3.0x	2.7x
	S S WW Automotive	6.49	658.4	2,951.4	2,156.0	122.6	2.8x	17.1x	4.8x	0.9x	5.3x	1.5x
	<u>AL MAGNA</u>	32.83	3,697.1	2,149.1	(1,548.0)	(1,603.0)	1.4x	5.9x	2.4x	1.4x	5.7x	2.3x
*****	O LEAR	1.10	85.3	2,069.0	1,934.7	(703.1)	2.9x	7.6x	3.4x	n.m.	n.m.	n.m.
	TENNECO	2.50	117.3	1,473.3	1,325.0	461.8	3.9x	4.3x	3.6x	1.6x	1.8x	1.5x
	BANA	0.72	72.0	1,424.0 ⁽²⁾	474.0	(466.8)	6.0x	15.8x	8.1x	n.m ⁽³⁾	n.m ⁽³⁾	n.m ⁽³⁾
Del	ArvinMeritor.	1.15	85.1	1,356.1	1,215.0	295.7	4.4x	12.0x	8.2x	1.4x	3.9x	2.6x
; Delphi Salaried	(1.58	87.7	951.7	864.0	6.7	13.3x	4.9x	3.3x	1.3x	0.5x	0.3x
		Median Mean					4.4x 5.1x	7.6x 9.1x	4.8x 5.0x	1.4x 2.2x	3.9x 4.2x	2.3x 2.4x
AR000088		Note:										

Note:

Includes only JPM and Deutsche Bank estimates to maintain consistency in methodology of calculating adjusted EBITDA (Federal-Mogul is not covered by either company. Estimates represent IBES consensus estimates. Dana Holding is not covered by Deutsche Bank.) (1) Market value enterprise value represents market value of debt and equity less cash plus book value of minority interests and preferred stock (2) Includes \$771mm of preferred stock

9

(3) Accounts for shares of Series A Preferred having an aggregate liquidation preference of not more than \$125mm Source: JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank estimates, Company filings, FactSet IBES consensus estimates

Delphi Corporation

Revenue by Geographic Region⁽¹⁾ **Revenue by Product®** South America Automotive 6% Holdings Group Electrical/ Asia Pacific 8% Electronic Steering 12% Architecture 10% 26% Delphi Product and Service North America Solutions 44% 6% Therma Systems 10% Electronics owertrain Europe Safety Systems 38% 19% 21% \$20,933mm FY 2008 Total: FY 2008 Total: \$20,933mm OIBDAR by Geographic Region(1) (1) OIBDAR by Product⁽¹⁾⁽²⁾ Automotive Holdings Group South America 13% 11% Electrical/ Electronic Delphi Product Architecture and Service 31% Solutions Asia Pacific 9% 31% Thermal Systems Europe 9% 58% Powertrain Systems 38% FY 2008 Total: FY 2008 Total: \$378mm \$378mm Notes: (1) Represents LTM revenue as of 12/31/08; revenue contribution excludes eliminations (2) Steering and Electronics and Safety excluded from chart due to \$3mm and \$14mm in OIBDAR loss, respectively (3) North America excluded from chart due to \$679mm OIBDAR loss 10 Source: Delphi Overview Presentation Materials for Stakeholders, Delphi data room files

Delphi is a global supplier of transportation components, with almost half of its business from powertrain systems and vehicle electronics

Greenhill

Delphi Salaried AR000090-92 Removed

Precedent Auto Supplier M&A Transactions

Last Three Years

To Be Updated

(\$ in millions) Date Annownced 31-Jul-08	Target Amtek India Ltd.	Acquiror Amtek Auto Ltd.	Transaction Value hipplied EV/	BITDA
01-00-00	Annek india Liu.	Amiek Auto Lia.	[\$404]	[2.7x]
23-Apr-08	Bosch Corp. (40.3% Remaining Stake)Robert Bosch GmbH	[\$1,016]	[6.6x]
17-Mar-08	Beru (17.8% Remaining Stake)	BorgWarner Germany GmbH	[\$206]	[8.4x]
18-Jun-07	Federal-Mogul (43% Stake)	Carl C. Icahn	[\$775]	[9.4x]
15-Jan-07	Koninklijke Nedschroef Holding	Gilde Investment Management and Parcom Ventures	[\$363]	[6.0x]
13-Nov-06	Spectra Premium Industries	Fonds de Solidarité, Desjardins Capital Régional et Coopératif, Camada Group and Management	[\$115]	[6.6x]
18-Oct-06	Pacifica Group	Robert Bosch GMBH	[\$441]	[6.2x]
	Componenta Doktas Dokumculuk Ticaret ve Sanayi (54.96% Stake)	Componenta Corp.	[\$159]	[10.7x]
31-Aug-06	Metaldyne Corp.	Asahi Tec Corporation	[\$1,189]	[8.6x]
		Mean	······	17.041
		Median		[7.0x] [7.6x]
		L		[1.07]

Greenhill

Note: Includes deal with a transaction value greater than \$100mm Source: CapitalIQ

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Delphi Consolidated Valuation

Precedent Transaction – LTM Multiples

To Be Updated

Based on precedent transactions, a multiple range of 3.0x to 6.0x is applied to Delphi's LTM EBITDAR of \$378 million and to its foreign business EBITDAR of \$561 million

Implied Total Delphi Enterprise Value	\$1,134	\$1,701	\$2,268
2008 EBITDAR	\$378	\$378	\$378
2008 EBITDAR Multiple Range	3.0x	4.5x	6.0x
(US\$ in millions)	Low	Mid-point 4-1	High
		STELZAS BRUGUPTES	

Implied Foreign Valuation - LTM EBITDAR Multiples

Intelled Total Datability literation 1 Thi

(US\$ in millions)	Low	Mid-point	High
2008 EBITDAR Multiple Range	3.0x	4.5x	6.0x
2008 EBITDAR	\$561	\$561	\$561
Implied Rest of World Enterprise Value	\$1,683	\$2,525	\$3,366

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Source: Delphi Overview Presentation Materials for Stakeholders (Revised 2/5/09)

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Comparable Company Trading Statistics

(\$ in millions, except per share data)													
Calendarized to Dec-31 Year-End; Prices as of Apr-13-09													
在市场中国际沿行的常心的现在 于	Share	62-WX	Discours to 52-Wk	Equity	Enterprise	Valuetty	i ni	EV / EBITD			N/EBITDA		Long Tem
Company	Price 4/13/09	High	High	Equity Value	Book Value :	Martiel Veixe	2008	Store	2010E	2006	20095	2010E	Growth
[dibs: Likibanihide/CL1, Ladamidzenninger/**a.p. Art. Artesteld, Middle C. Cash, here represent an interfactorization.	n von menterstikelistikelisti	aldinorumon (Namodaniae) komunis andalasi	Par and a subject of	Insulated - 1793 A Surrounder date	1- water - Samager Awayse - Salaria -								
BorgWarner	\$25.75	\$55.28	(53.4%)	\$2,982.5	\$3,727.7	\$3,660.3	6.3x	9.3x	6.3x	6.2x	9.2x	6.2x	20.0%
Federal-Mogul	10.15	21.00	(51.7%)	1,009.0	3,035.5	1,708.6	4,4x	5.3x	4.8x	2.5x	3.0x	2.7x	n.a.
TRW Automotive	6.49	29.20	(77.8%)	658.4	2,951.4	918.0	2.8x	17.1x	4.8x	0.9x	5.3x	1.5x	n.a.
Magna International	32.83	79.02	(58.5%)	3,697.1	2,149.1	2,094.1	1.4x	5.9x	2.4x	1.4x	5.7x	2.3x	12.8%
Lear	1.10	31.50	(96.5%)	85.3	2,069.0	(568.8)	2.9x	7.6x	3.4x	n.m.	n.m.	n.m.	10.0%
Tenneco	2.50	27.57	(90.9%)	117.3	1,473.3	610.0	3.9x	4.3x	3.6x	1.6x	1.8x	1.5x	10.0%
Dana	0.72	12.25	(94.1%)	72.0	1,424.0	(162.8)	6.0x	15.8x	8.1x	n.m.	n.m.	n.m.	n.a.
ArvinMeritor	1,15	17.00	(93.2%)	85.1	1,356.1	436.7	4.4x	12.0x	8.2x	1.4x	3.9x	2.6x	12.0%
American Axle	1,58	22.75	(93.1%)	87,7	951.7	94,4	13.3x	4.9x	3.3x	1.3x	0.5x	0.3x	8.0%

Median	4,4x	7.6x	4.8x	1.4x	3.9x	2.3x	11.0%
Mean	5.1x	9.1x	5.0x	2.2x	4.2x	2.4x	12.1%

Note:

Includes only JPM and Deutsche Bank estimates to maintain consistency in methodology of calculating adjusted EBITDA (Federal-Mogul is not covered by either company. Estimates represent IBES consensus estimates)

17

EPS are projected to be negative for most of the comps. Therefore, P/E multiples are not meaningful (1) Market value enterprise value represents market value of debt and equity less cash plus book value of minority interests and preferred stock Source: JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank estimates, Company filings, FactSet IBES consensus estimates

Greenhill

Comparable Company Operating Statistics

(\$ in millions)

Book Vsiue Market Vsiue 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 201E 2		Mean			(25.5%) (23.0%)	11.0% 12.1%	(61.3%) (44.2%)	46.1% 34.9%	2.7% 5.3%	5.2% 7.2%	3.9x 4.4x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ¹¹ Revenue Growth EntrpA Growth EBITOA Growth EBITOA Margin Date Land orgWarner \$2,982.5 \$3,727.7 \$3,660.3 (21.3%) 17.1% (31.9%) 48.8% 9.7% 12.3% 20.02 2005 2016 2016		Median			(OF		<u> </u>				10.07
Company Entroprise Value Entroprise Value ¹¹ Revanue Growth Entroprise, 2005 Entroprise, 2005 2005 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016 2016		01.1	951.7	94.4	(13.3%)	22.1%	n.m.	49.4%	10.6%		
Company Equity Value Efterprise Value ¹¹ Revenue Growth EBITOA Growth EBITOA Value Date Value Date Value Date Value Name Value Date Value	nerican Axle				-	19.7%	(61.3%)	46.1%	2.5%		4.2x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ¹¹ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Margin Debited Marg	vinMeritor					3.5%	(61.9%)	n.m.	1.6%	3.0%	5.3x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ¹⁷ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Margin Data Margin DogWarner \$2,982.5 \$3,727.7 \$3,660.3 (21.3%) 17.1% (31.9%) 48.8% 9.7% 12.3% 2.0 OrgWarner \$2,982.5 \$3,727.7 \$3,660.3 (21.3%) 17.1% (31.9%) 48.8% 9.7% 12.3% 2.0 Aderal-Mogul 1,009.0 3,035.5 1,708.6 (20.1%) 5.8% (15.4%) 10.5% 11.0% 4.2% 3.6 Agna International 3,697.1 2,149.1 2,094.1 (26.6%) 9.2% (73.9%) n.m. 2.1% 4.7% 0.8 nneco 117.3 1.172.0 (568.8) (25.5%) 16.2% (62.0%) n.m. 2.7% 5.2% 0.0	na				-	4.2%	(2.7%)	19.5%	6.6%	7.5%	3.9x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ¹¹ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Mergin Debiter Norder Jahren Book Value Market Value 2009E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2	nneco					16.2%	(62.0%)	n. m.	2.7%	5.2%	0.0x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ⁽¹⁾ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Margin Data LTM YorgWarner \$2,982.5 \$3,727.7 \$3,660.3 (21.3%) 17.1% (31.9%) 48.8% 9.7% 12.3% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 10.5% 11.0% 42.3% 20.0% 20	ar					9.2%	(73.9%)	n.m.	2.1%		0.8x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ⁽¹⁾ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Margin Debit Rook Value Market Value 2005E 2010E 2010E 2005E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2005E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E 2010E	igna International		-		•	11.0%	n.m.	n.m.	1.6%	5.2%	3.6x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ⁽¹⁾ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Margin Debt Book Value Market Value 2005E 2010E	RW Automotive				(20.1%)	5.8%	(15.4%)	10.5%	10.5%	11.0%	4.2x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ¹¹ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Marpin Debt Book Value Market Value 2005E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E 2009E 2010E EBITDA	deral-Mogul				(21.3%)	17.1%	(31.9%)	48.8%	9.7%	12.3%	2.0x
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ¹¹ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Mergin Debt	orgWarner	* 0.000 -					a construction of a strate to an additional states of	un en se	COULD IN A REAL PROPERTY.		
Company Equity Value Enterprise Value ⁽¹⁾ Revenue Growth EBITDA Growth EBITDA Margin Debi			Book Value	Market Value	20095	2010E	2009E	20108	2003E	2010E	
		Equity Value	Enterprie	e Yalue".	Revenue	Growth	EBITDA	Growth	EBITOA	Margin	- Debi
Latenda 1720 to Doo 24 Year Could Be			新生产的100mm(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm))(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(100mm)(10		Prices as of	Apr-13-09	· MY REPORTED AND A PROPERTY OF				

Greenhill

Includes only JPM and Deutsche Bank estimates to maintain consistency in methodology of calculating adjusted EBITDA (Federal-Mogul is not covered by either company. Estimates represent IBES consensus estimates) Ens are projected to be negative for most of the comps. Therefore, P/E multiples are not meaningful EPS are projected to be negative for most of the comps. Therefore, P/E multiples are not meaningful (1) Market value enterprise value represents market value of debt and equity less cash plus book value of minority interests and preferred stock Source: JPMorgan and Deutsche Bank estimates, Company filings, FactSet IBES consensus estimates

Note:

BorgWarner, Inc.

BorgWarner primarily provides products for powertrain applications across Europe


Company Overview

- BorgWarner, Inc. ("BorgWarner", the "Company") is a global supplier of highly engineered automotive systems and components, primarily for powertrain applications for OEMs of light-vehicles
- The Company operates manufacturing facilities serving customers in the Americas, Europe and Asia
- BorgWarner, Inc. operates in 2 segments:

Notes:

- Engine: develops products to manage engines for fuel efficiency, reduced emissions and enhanced performance
- Drivetrain: produces clutching and control systems
- BorgWarner's largest customer was Volkswagen, representing 19% of total 2008 sales
- The Company is headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan and was incorporated in 1987

Revenue by Product^{eg}





(\$ in millions)			Value
Loans			
Bank Borrowings and Other	\$268.4 ⁽¹⁾	100% ⁽²⁾	\$268.4
Term Loans due through 2015	66.0	100%(2)	66.0
Total Loans	\$334.4		\$334.4
Notes and Other			
5.75% Senior Notes due 2016	\$149.2	80%	\$119.7
8.00% Senior Notes due 2019	133.9	88%	118.0
7.125% Senior Notes due 2029	119.2	89%	106.2
3.50% Convertible Notes due 2012	373.8	109% ⁽³⁾	408.3
Impact of Derivatives on Debt	43.6	n.a.	n.a
Total Notes and Other	\$819.7		\$752.3
Total Debt	\$1,154.1		\$1,086.7
Cash ⁽³⁾	440.4		440.4
Net Debt	\$713.7		\$646.3

Revenue by Geographic Region⁽⁴⁾

Market Capitalization




United States

28%

South Korea 5%

19

Delphi Salaried AR000098







Rest of World

Assumes 6.5% Notes due February 2009 were retired using funds from the revolving credit facility
 Assumes non-priced credit facility trades at at par

(3) On 4/9/09, BorgWarner completed the issuance of \$374mm of 3.5% Convertible Notes for estimated proceeds of \$362mm, \$25mm of which was used on hedge and warrant transactions. 12/31/08 cash has been adjusted by \$337mm accordingly

(4) Represents LTM revenue by product and by geography as of 12/31/08. Revenue contribution excludes intersegment eliminations Source: Company filings, Bloomberg, Markit, CapitalIQ

Federal-Mogul Corporation

Federal-Mogul is a leading supplier of technology in vehicle and industrial products, primarily focused on North America and Europe

Company Overview


- Federal-Mogul Corporation ("Federal-Mogul", the "Company") is a leading global supplier of vehicular and industrial fuel economy, alternative energy, environment and safety systems products
- The Company serves automotive, light commercial, heavy-duty, industrial, agricultural, aerospace, marine, rail and off-road vehicle OEMs, as well as the worldwide aftermarket
- The Company operates through 6 segments; Powertrain Energy, Powertrain Sealing and Bearings, Vehicle Safety and Protection, Automotive Products, Global Aftermarket and Corporate
- The Company filed for bankruptcy on October 1, 2001 and emerged from bankruptcy on December 27, 2007
- Federal-Mogul Corporation is headquartered in Southfield, Michigan


	Capital Structure		
(\$ in millions)			
Loans			
Tranche B Term Loan	\$1,940.4	51%	\$994.5
Tranche C Term Loan	990.0	51%	507.4
Debt Discount	(\$140,8)	n.a,	n.a.
Total Loans	\$2,789.6		\$1,501.8
Other Debt	\$80.1	51% ⁽¹⁾	\$41.1
Total Debt	\$2,8\$9.7		\$1,542.9
Cash	888.2		888.2
Net Debt	\$1,981.5		\$654.7

\$1,009.0

Market Capitalization

Delphi Salaried AR000099





Greenhill

TRW Automotive Holdings Corporation

TRW Automotive is one of the world's largest and most diversified suppliers of automotive systems to global OEMs and related aftermarkets

Company Overview

- TRW Automotive Holdings Corporation ("TRW", the "Company") is a global supplier of automotive systems, with a focus on safety-related products
- The Company operates in 3 segments:
 - Chassis Systems: Steering, braking, linkage and suspension products
 - Occupant Safety Systems: Air bags, seat belts, safety electronics, steering wheels and security electronic systems
 - Automotive Components: Engine valves, body controls and engineered fasteners and components
- As of December 31, 2008, the Company had approximately 65,200 employees operating in 26 countries
- Chrysler, Ford and GM are some of TRW's largest customers .
- The Company was founded in 1904 and is based in Livonia, . Michigan

Capital Structure

	The Brank Value /	Chinat	
(\$ in millions)	121212000		Yaha
Loans			
Term Loan A	\$593.0	45%	\$265.4
Term Loan B	500.0	56%	281.9
Revolver	1,100.0 ⁽¹⁾	60%	660.0
Total Loans	\$2,193.0		\$1,207.2
Notes and Other			
7% Senior Notes due 2014	\$500.0	41%	\$206.9
6 3/8% Senior Notes due 2014	371.0	25%	92.8
7.25% Senior Notes due 2017	600.0	40%	242.3
Capital Leases	47.0	n.a.	n.a.
Other Borrowings	45.0	36%	16.0
Short-Term Debt	66.0	36%	23.5
Total Notes and Other	\$1,629.0		\$681.4
Total Debt	\$3,822.0		\$1,788.6
Cash and ST Investments	1.666.0 ⁽¹⁾		1,668.0
Net Debt	\$2,156.0		\$122.6
Market Capitalization			\$658.4


Market Capitalization




Europe

56%

21





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Magna International Inc.

Magna International provides technologically advanced systems and components primarily to car and light truck OEMs in North America and Europe

Company Overview


- Magna International ("Magna", the "Company") is a global automotive supplier focused on providing technologically advanced automotive systems, assemblies, modules and components and engineering and assembling complete vehicles, primarily for sale to OEMs of cars and light trucks
- Key products include automotive interior systems, seating systems, closure systems, body and chassis systems, vision systems, electronic systems, exterior systems, powertrain systems, roof systems as well as complete vehicle engineering and assembly
- As of December 31, 2008, the Company had 240 manufacturing divisions and 86 product development, engineering and sales centers in 25 countries
- GM and Chrysler are the Company's largest North American customers
- The Company was founded in 1957 and is based in Ontario, Canada


ania and an	module and all the second	alithe of the local difference of
\$909.0	100% ⁽¹⁾	\$909.0
25.0	100%	25.0
\$934.0		\$934.0
\$139.0	80% ⁽¹⁾	\$111.2
83.0	80% ⁽¹⁾	66.4
53.0	80%(1)	42.4
\$275.0	_	\$220.0
\$1,209.0		\$1,154.0
2,757.0		2,757.0
(\$1,548.0)		(\$1,603.0)
		\$3,697.1
	25.0 \$934.0 \$139.0 83.0 53.0 \$275.0 \$1,209.0 2,757.0	25.0 \$934.0 100%

Revenue by Geographic Region⁽²⁾

Delphi Salaried AR000101

Greenhill





 Note:
 FY 2008 Total:
 \$23,704mm
 FY 2008 Total:
 \$23,704mm

 (1) Assumes non-priced bank debt trades at par and notes and other trade at 80%
 FY 2008 Total:
 \$23,704mm

 (2) Represents LTM revenue as of 12/31/08; Geographic breakdown excludes revenue from Complete Vehicle Assembly and Tooling, Engineering and Other
 22

 Source: Company filings, Bloomberg, Markit, CapitalIQ
 22

Lear Corporation

Lear is a global Tier 1 supplier with a #2 market share in automotive seat systems

Company Overview


- Lear Corporation ("Lear", the "Company") is a global Tier I supplier of automotive seat systems, electrical distribution systems and electronic products
- As of December 31, 2008, the Company had 210 facilities, including 169 manufacturing facilities and assembly sites, 32 administrative/technical support facilities, 6 advanced technology centers and 3 distribution centers, in 36 countries
- The Company believes that, on a market share basis, it has the #2 position in automotive seats and #3 and #4 positions in North American and European electrical distribution systems, respectively
- The Company is headquartered in Southfield, Michigan and was incorporated in 1987


C.	pital Structu	()	
(\$ in millions)	Terrariant	Charrent	Market Volue
Loans			
Revolver	\$1,192.0	22%	\$262.2
Term Loan	985.0	37%	366.5
WC Lines of Credit	42.5	22% (1)	9.4
Total Loans	\$2,219.5		\$638.1
Notes and Other			
8.50% Senior Notes due 2013	\$298.0	19%	\$55.5
8.75% Senior Notes due 2016	589.3	18%	107.5
5.75% Senior Notes due 2014	399.5	21%	83.9
Zero Coupon Convertible Notes	0.8	19% ⁽²⁾	0.2
Other	19.7	19% ⁽²⁾	3.8
Total Notes and Other	\$1,307.3		\$250.9
Total Debt	\$3,526.8		\$889.0
Cash and ST Investments	1,592.1		1.592.1
Net Debt	\$1,934.7		(\$703.1
Market Capitalization			\$85.3



Electrical and Electronic


21%





23

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JA663

Seating 79%

Tenneco Inc.

Tenneco is one of the world's largest producers of automotive emission control and ride control products and systems, serving both OEMs and the aftermarket worldwide


Company Overview


- Tenneco Inc. ("Tenneco", the "Company") is the largest global producer of automotive emission control and ride control products and systems
- As of December 31, 2008, Tenneco Inc. had approximately 21,000 employees at the following facilities:
 - Walker Brand: Operates 11 and 41 manufacturing facilities in and outside the U.S. respectively, and 5 engineering and technical facilities worldwide
 - Monroe Brand: Operates 8 and 23 manufacturing facilities in and outside the U.S. respectively, 7 engineering and technical facilities worldwide and shares 2 other such facilities with Walker
- Tenneco serves major OEMs, including GM, Chrysler and Ford
- The Company is incorporated in 1996 and is headquartered in Lake Forest, Illinois

Capital Structure


(\$ m miliuna)	Contraction of the second s		
Loans	and the first state of the second s	the matrice of the state of the line of the state of the	diff in this radiation flaure con-
Revolver	\$239.0	63%	\$150.6
Senior Term Loans due 2012	150.0	50%	75.0
Total Loans	\$389.0		\$225.6
Notes and Other			
10 1/4% Senior Secured Notes due 2013	\$250.0	55%	\$137.5
8.625% Senior Sub Notes due 2014	500.0	25%	126.9
8 1/8% Senior Notes due 2015	250.0	30%	75.0
Debentures due 2012-25	1.0	37%	0.4
Notes due 09 - 17	17.0	37%	6.3
Notes Payable	44.0	37%	1) 16.2
Total Notes and Other	\$1,062.0	•	\$362.2
Total Debt	\$1,451.0		\$587.8
Cash	126.0		126.0
Net Debt	\$1,325.0	•	\$461.8
Market Capitalization			\$117.3











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Dana Holding Corporation

Dana Holding is a diversified supplier serving the light vehicle, commercial and offhighway markets

The Company emerged from bankruptcy on January 31, 2008


Company Overview


- Dana Holding Corporation ("Dana", the "Company") is a leading supplier of axle, driveshaft, structural, sealing and thermal management products for global vehicle manufacturers
- . As of December 31, 2008, the Company employed approximately 29,000 people in 26 countries and operated 113 major facilities throughout the world
- . The Company operates through 5 product-based and 2 marketbased segments, with Ford, GM and Toyota among its largest customers
- . Dana and its 42 wholly-owned subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on March 3, 2006
 - Dana Holding Corporation emerged from bankruptcy on -January 31, 2008
- The Company is headquartered in Toledo, Ohio .


9	apital Structure		
(S in millions)	Book Volue	Current Trice	Value -
Loans			
Term Loan	\$1,266.0	25%	\$310.2
Discount on Term Loan	(\$87.0)	n.a.	n.a
Total Loans	\$1,179.0		\$310.2
Notes and Other			
5.92% Nonrecourse Notes	\$6.0	n.a,	n.a
Other	66.0	n.a.	n.a
Total Notes and Other	\$72.0		\$0.0
Total Debt	\$1,251.0		\$310.2
Cash	777.0		777.0
Net Debt	\$474.0		(\$466.8
Market Capitalization			\$72.0



Greenhill








ArvinMeritor, Inc.

ArvinMeritor is a global supplier of modules and components, primarily serving commercial truck OEMs


Company Overview

- ArvinMeritor, Inc. ("ArvinMeritor", the "Company") is a global supplier of a broad range of integrated systems, modules and components serving commercial truck, light vehicle, trailer and specialty original equipment manufacturers and certain aftermarkets
- As of September 30, 2008, the Company operated 82 manufacturing facilities in 22 countries around the world
- The Company operates in 2 segments:
 - Commercial Vehicle Systems ("CVS"): Drivetrain and ride control products for medium and heavy-duty trucks
 - Light Vehicle Systems ("LVS"): Body systems, chassis and wheels for passenger vehicles
- The Company's largest customer is Volvo, which represented . 14% of total sales in 2008
- ArvinMeritor was incorporated in Indiana in 2000 in connection . with the merger of Meritor Automotive, Inc. and Arvin Industries, Inc.



Capital Structure

(S in millions)	Internet States		
Loans			
Revolving Credit Facility	\$103.0	50%	\$51.5
Lines of Credit and Other	45.0	50% ⁽¹⁾	22.5
Total Loans	\$148.0		\$74,0
Notes and Other		11)	
Accounts Receivable Securitization	\$93.0	50%(1)	\$46.5
8 3/4% Notes due 2012	276.0	32%	87.1
8 1/8% Notes due 2015	251.0	28%	70,3
4 5/8% Convertible Notes due 2026	300.0	21%	61.5
4.0% Convertible Notes due 2027	200.0	19%	37.3
Unamortized Gain on Swap Unwind	28.0	n.a.	n.a.
Total Notes and Other	\$1,148.0		\$302.7
Total Debt	\$1,296.0		\$376.7
Cash ⁽²⁾	81.0		81.0
Net Debt	\$1,215.0		\$295.7
Market Capitalization			\$85.1



Asia and Other 21% North America 41%

Revenue by Geographic Region⁽³⁾



FY 2008 Total:

26

(1) Assumes secured debt is priced in line with the Revolving Credit Facility (2) Assumes 7 1/8% Notes were repaid using funds from the previously established trust and 6.8% Notes were repaid using cash on hand

(3) Represents LTM revenue as of FYE 9/30/08 Source: Company filings, Bloomberg, Markit, CapitalIQ

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
American Axle & Manufacturing Holdings, Inc.

American Axle is a principal supplier of driveline components to GM

- Company Overview
- American Axle & Manufacturing Holdings, Inc. ("American Axle", the "Company") is the principal supplier of driveline components to General Motors Corporation ("GM") for its rear- wheel drive light trucks and SUVs manufactured in North America
- The Company supplies substantially all of GM's rear axle and front four-wheel drive and all-wheel drive axle requirements for these vehicle platforms, with sales to GM representing 74% of 2008 sales
- The Company was formed out of GM in 1994 and is headquartered in Detroit, Michigan

		the data sector	96. · · ·
(\$ m millions)			
Loans			
Revolver	\$295.0	26%	\$76.7
Term Loan due 2012	250.0	31%	77.0
Foreign Credit Facilities	36.9	41%1)	15.1
Total Loans	\$581.9		\$168.8
Notes and Other			
7.875% Notes	\$300.0	20%	\$60.0
5.25% Notes	249.8	22%	53.7
2% Convertible Notes	0.4	21% ⁽²⁾	0.1
Capital Lease Obligations	7.8	n.a.	n, a.
Total Notes and Other	\$558.0		\$113.8
Total Debt	\$1,139.9		\$282.6
Cash and ST Investments	275.9		275.9
Net Debt	\$864.0		\$6.7
Market Capitalization			\$87.7

Capital Structure



Greenhill

Delphi Salaried AR000106

Table of Contents

- 1. Executive Summary
- 2. Valuation Summary

Appendix

- A. Overview of Delphi's Comparables
- B. Summary of 2008 Trial Balances

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Delphi Salaried AR000108-11 Removed

Summary of 2008 Trial Balances

Non-Debtor Valuation by Entity

Estimated Net Asset Value

Using net PPE as a proxy reinforces the view that a significant majority of Delphi's value resides in foreign entities

The combined collateral value potentially subject to foreign liens is currently estimated at \$2.4 billion

n millions)	and the second	(\$ in millions)	
Country	Estimated Net Asset Value (NAV) *	Country	Estimated Not Asset Value (NAV) ⁽¹⁾
ance K ermany pain ortugal ustria xxembourg aly elgium weden etherlands eland	REDACTED	Poland Hungary Romania Turkey Czech Republic Slovak Republic Russia Total Eastern Europe	REDACTEI
otal Western Europe in millions)		(\$ in millions)	
Country	Estimated Net Asset Value (NAV)*	Conners	Estimated Net Assot Valu (NAV)
hina orea ingapore Idia		Mexico Brazij Argentina Canada	REDACTEI
ustralia Ialaysia apan hailand Monesia	REDACTED	Total Americas (S in millions)	
aiwan Pakistan P otal Australia / Asia		Coantry	Estimated Net Asset Valu (NAV) ⁵⁵
		Morocco South Africa Total Africa	REDACTEI
lote: i) Assume Net Asset Value refle	cts 100% of net PPE ny trial balances posted in the data room		3


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Delphi-AR-000112

Confidential – Material Non-Public Information

2009 Emergence Update – Summary Of Distributions Under Consensual Plan Framework



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

DENNIS BLACK, ET AL.,

v.

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 09-13616

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE ARTHUR J. TARNOW

PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, ET AL.,

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

Defendants.

ORDER SUSTAINING PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS [172] TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S SCHEDULING ORDER, GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADOPTION OF SCHEDULING ORDER [152], ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATING PBGC'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER [178], ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY [179], AND ENTERING SCHEDULING ORDER

Now before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Order [169] denying Plaintiffs' Motion

for Adoption of Scheduling Order.

On April 11, 2011, Plaintiffs filed objections [172] to the order. Defendant PBGC filed a

response [173] to the objections on April 25, 2011 and Plaintiffs filed a reply [174] on May 2,

2011.

I. Plaintiffs' Objections

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review set forth in F.R.C.P. 72(a) governs this nondispositive matter.

Pursuant to that rule, "The district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify

or set aside any part of the [Magistrate Judge's] order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to

law."

B. Analysis

Upon review of the record, this Court makes the following findings:

By denying Plaintiff's Motion for Adoption of Scheduling Order, the Magistrate Judge erred.

On December 22, 2009, at a hearing held on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction [7], this Court questioned counsel regarding what Plaintiffs would be required to show if it were assumed that they were correct that they were entitled to a hearing prior to the termination of the Salaried Plan. The Court ultimately ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing the termination of the Plan.

On September 24, 2010, the Court held a hearing on various motions in this matter, including PBGC's Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 through 3 of the Second Amended Complaint [23] and PBGC's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count 4 [45]. The Court again questioned counsel as to what would be shown at a hearing to terminate the Plan that Plaintiffs asserted was required. The Court denied PBGC's dispositive motions without prejudice and specifically permitted discovery to proceed as to Plaintiffs' complaint. The Court did not address the full scope of discovery that would be permitted.

Plaintiffs then filed their Motion for Adoption of Scheduling Order [152] seeking to set a schedule for conducting discovery on Counts 1 through 4. PBGC opposed the motion, arguing that discovery should not be permitted. On March 28, 2011, the Magistrate Judge entered an order [169] concluding that this "is an action for review on an administrative record" and denying discovery as to Counts 1 through 3. The only discovery permitted related to Count 4 and whether any deficiencies existed in the administrative record. Defendants were permitted to object to this discovery.

In the instant objections, Plaintiffs assert that the Magistrate Judge erred in not allowing discovery on Counts 1 through 3 of the complaint. Plaintiffs also maintain that the Magistrate Judge improperly concluded that this is an action for review on an administrative record.

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The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that discovery is not permitted on Counts 1 through 3 of the complaint since the Court previously concluded on September 24, 2010 that this case may proceed to discovery.¹ The Court did not limit that discovery to only certain counts of the complaint.

The Court further concludes that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that this is an action for review on an administrative record, as the parties have disputed whether this action only concerns the administrative record and this Court has never concluded that it will only focus on the administrative record in considering Plaintiffs' complaint.

As Plaintiffs correctly point out, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that "[t]he scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite broad." *See Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc.*, 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 states, "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense.... Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Since "discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issue,' the limits set forth in *Rule 26* must be 'construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case." *Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc.*, 326 Fed. Appx. 900, 904 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting *Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders*, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)).

In terms of addressing the scope of discovery for purposes of entering a scheduling order– The Court's initial focus, keeping the above case law in mind, is on Count 4 and whether

¹ Following the hearing, neither party filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider its ruling.

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termination of the Salaried Plan would have been appropriate in July 2009² if, as Plaintiffs contend, Defendants were required under 29 U.S.C. §1342(c) to file before this court "for a decree adjudicating that the plan must be terminated in order to protect the interests of the participants or to avoid any unreasonable deterioration of the financial condition of the plan or any unreasonable increase in the liability of the fund." Plaintiffs maintain in their objections that addressing this question may allow the Court to avoid constitutional and statutory questions raised within the Second Amended Complaint in an exercise of judicial restraint The Court agrees. Such a finding by the Court that termination was proper under 29 U.S.C. §1342(c) would moot the remainder of the complaint pertaining to the PBGC, as it would be irrelevant whether ERISA and the Due Process Clause require that a hearing be held under 29 U.S.C. §1342(c) before termination of a plan (since with or without a hearing, termination would have been proper). Certainly, this matter, which the Court will address, "bear[s] on" the case issues. Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 351; see also Conti, 326 Fed. Appx. at 904. Proceeding in this manner is also an appropriate application of judicial restraint.³ See Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 285-286 (6th Cir. 1992) (court, quoting Supreme Court precedent, notes, "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable. Deciding constitutional issues only after considering and rejecting every nonconstitutional ground for the decision is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint") (citations

² The Plan termination date, as per the agreement reached between PBGC and the plan administrator, was July 31, 2009.

³ Of course, the PBGC may still prevail in this lawsuit even if the evidence demonstrates that termination would not have been proper after a hearing under 28 U.S.C. §1342(c), as the Court would consider at that time the relevant statutory and constitutional questions; these questions could ultimately be decided in the PBGC's favor.

and internal quotation marks omitted).

In addressing termination in Count 4 under 28 U.S.C. §1342 and assuming that a hearing

was required before termination, this Court, pursuant to In re UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.

2006), will conduct a de novo review of the PBGC's decision to terminate the Plan. Such a

review is not characterized as an APA review limited to the administrative record, with the

agency's decision receiving deference. As the Court concluded in UAL:

Deference is appropriate when agencies wield delegated interpretive or adjudicatory power– the former usually demonstrated by rulemaking and the latter by administrative adjudication (which also may yield rules in common-law fashion). The PBGC did not use either rulemaking or adjudication to decide that United's plan should be wrapped up at the end of 2004. Its decision was made unilaterally and was not self-executing. The only authority that the PBGC has under §1342 is to ask a court for relief. That implies an independent judicial role. When making its decision a court must respect any regulations issued after noticeand-comment rulemaking, but the PBGC has not promulgated any rules pertinent to this subject. Nor has it issued the sort of interpretive guidelines that deserve the court's respectful consideration even though they lack the power to control. All the PBGC had done is commence litigation, and its position is no more entitled to control than is the view of the Antitrust Division when the Department files suit under the Sherman Act. As the plaintiff, a federal agency bears the same burden of persuasion.

Nothing in 29 U.S.C. §1342(c), which describes the judicial function after the PBGC files an action seeking termination, suggests that the court must defer to the agency's view.

See UAL Corp., 468 F.3d at 449-450 (citations omitted).⁴

Once again, a finding by the Court in the PBGC's favor on Count 4 after this review

would render moot the remainder of the complaint pertaining to the PBGC. In the event that the

Court finds that termination of the plan was not supported by the factors set forth in 28 U.S.C.

⁴ The Court of course recognizes that unlike in *UAL*, the PBGC did not move here for a court decree seeking termination; rather, the PBGC and the plan administrator reached an agreement to terminate the plan. However, the same principles enunciated in *UAL* apply to the review the Court is conducting here. Defendant has not offered the Court any Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit case that has addressed the specific issue considered in *UAL*. The Court finds the Seventh Circuit's analysis of the issue persuasive.

§1342(c), the Court will consider the remaining issues raised in the complaint.

II. Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order [178] and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery [179]

Also pending before the Court are Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order [178] and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery [179]. These motions were filed following the Magistrate Judge's order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Adoption of Scheduling Order. Plaintiffs' objections have now been sustained and the Motion for Adoption of Scheduling Order has been granted. Therefore, the issues raised in the motion may now be mooted based on the Court's ruling.

The Court concludes that these motions should be deemed administratively terminated and closed without prejudice. If necessary, the parties may file discovery motions at some later date that account for the instant ruling.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Objections [172] to the Magistrate Judge's Scheduling Order and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Adoption of Scheduling Order are **SUSTAINED**. As the Court previously ruled, this case will proceed to discovery.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Adoption of Scheduling Order [152] is **GRANTED**.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order [178] and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery [179] are **HEREBY ORDERED** administratively terminated by this Court. The Motions shall be closed without prejudice. The parties may file, if necessary, discovery motions at a later date that account for the Court's ruling in this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that these proceedings as to Plaintiffs and the PBGC will

continue as follows:

1. Plaintiffs and Defendant PBGC shall serve the initial disclosures which are required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) by September 16, 2011.

2. All discovery related to claims 1-4 shall be served in time to be completed by April 30, 2012.

3. All discovery motions related to claims 1-4 shall be filed by March 30, 2012.

4. Plaintiffs and the PBGC shall exchange names of all witnesses, lay and expert, by February 29, 2012.

5. Each party shall be entitled to serve a maximum of 25 interrogatories upon another party, with responses thereto required to be served in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Plaintiffs and the PBGC shall each be allowed 10 depositions on claims 1-4 without leave of the Court.

7. All dispositive motions related to claims 1-4 shall be filed no later than May 31, 2012. These motions, consistent with the above discussion in this order, must address under Count 4 whether termination of the Salaried Plan would have been appropriate in July 2009 if, as Plaintiffs contend, Defendants were required under 29 U.S.C. §1342(c) to file before this court "for a decree adjudicating that the plan must be terminated in order to protect the interests of the participants or to avoid any unreasonable deterioration of the financial condition of the plan or any unreasonable increase in the liability of the fund."

#09-13616 Black et al v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2011

s/Arthur J. Tarnow Arthur J. Tarnow Senior United States District Judge

I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record on September 1, 2011 by U.S./electronic mail.

s/Michael Williams Relief Case Manager for the Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow

From:	Walter Borst, GM
То:	Wilson, Harry;
CC:	Markowitz, David; Fred Fromm, GM ; Feldman, Matthew;
	Rick Westenberg, GM ; Malik, Sadiq; Niharika Ramdev. GM
Subject:	Re: PBGC - Delphi Plans
Date:	Tuesday, June 02, 2009 10:15:27 PM

Good. Is there a time that works for Matt and you late tomorrow afternoon or early evening?

Regards, Walter

----- Original Message -----From: [Harry.Wilson@do.treas.gov] Sent: 06/02/2009 09:34 PM AST To: Walter Borst Cc: <David.Markowitz@do.treas.gov>; Fred Fromm; <Matthew.Feldman@do. treas.gov>; Rick Westenberg; <Sadiq.Malik@do.treas.gov>; Niharika Ramdev Subject: Re: PBGC - Delphi Plans

Perfect, thx

----- Original Message -----From: walter.borst@gm.com <walter.borst@gm.com> To: Wilson, Harry Cc: Markowitz, David; Fred Fromm. GM Matthew; Rick Westenberg, GM Niharka Ramdey, GM

Feldman, Malik, Sadiq;

Sent: Tue Jun 02 21:14:01 2009 Subject: RE: PBGC - Delphi Plans

Harry,

Why don't you have the PBGC start with me. I will put together a team at GM from my Delphi and Pension groups. We will then pass on to Niharika to make sure it's properly folded into the forecast/budget.

I'd like to have a discussion with Matt and you in advance though so that I can better understand where you've left it with them and what you think from the UST perspective is expected from GM...and what isn't. We think

we understand the Salaried side but want to understand the Hourly options better.

Regards, Walter

<harry.wilson@do.treas.gov></harry.wilson@do.treas.gov>		
06/02/2009 07:22 PM		

IO < <u>Matthew</u> Feldman@do treas dov> Rick Westenberg. GM	
<matthew.feldman@do.treas.gov>,</matthew.feldman@do.treas.gov>	
СС	
<walter.borst@gm.com>, Fred Fromm.GM</walter.borst@gm.com>	, <sadiq.malik@do.treas.< td=""></sadiq.malik@do.treas.<>
gov>,	
<david.markowitz@do.treas.gov></david.markowitz@do.treas.gov>	
Subject	
RE: PBGC - Delphi Plans	

Guys, who's the right person for the PBGC to call? After the call, I'd love for someone at GM to walk David and Sadiq (cc'ed here) through the deal so that we can make sure it's modeled correctly in the forecast/budget.

Original Message		•
From: Feldman, Matthew		
Sent: Tuesday, June 02, 2009 7:13 PM		
To: Rick Westenberg, GM		
Cc: Wilson, Harry; Walter Borst. GM	Fred Fromm, GM	
Subject: Re: PBGC - Delphi Plans		

 $\ensuremath{\mathbb{I}}\xspace$ ve told the PBGC to speak directly to you guys. I will ask them to do so again.

Original Message	
From: Rick Westenberg. GM	
To: Feldman, Matthew	
Cc: Wilson, Harry; Walter Borst, GM	
Fred Fromm, GM	

Sent: Tue Jun 02 19:00:29 2009 Subject: PBGC - Delphi Plans

Matt,

We were looking to understand the details of the settlement with the PBGC regarding Delphi's hourly and salaried plans. Has it been finalized? Could you please provide an overview for how the hourly and salaried plans

will be treated/addressed? Would it be appropriate/helpful to have GM involved in any discussions?

Thanks, Rick Hearing Date And Time: July 1, 2009 at 10:00 a.m.

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 155 North Wacker Drive Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 407-0700 John Wm. Butler, Jr. Albert L. Hogan III Ron E. Meisler

- and -

SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP Four Times Square New York, New York 10036 (212) 735-3000 Kayalyn A. Marafioti

Attorneys for Delphi Corporation, <u>et al.</u>, Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession

Delphi Legal Information Hotline: Toll Free: (800) 718-5305 International: (248) 813-2698

Delphi Legal Information Website: http://www.delphidocket.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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	:	
In re	:	Chapter 11
	:	
DELPHI CORPORATION, <u>et</u> <u>al.</u> ,	:	Case No. 05-44481 (RDD)
	:	
	:	(Jointly Administered)
Debtors.	:	
	Х	

DECLARATION OF JOHN D. SHEEHAN IN SUPPORT OF PLATINUM EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT MOTION

I, John D. Sheehan, declare as follows:

1. I am the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Delphi Corporation ("Delphi"). In addition, I am a member of the Delphi Strategy Board, Delphi's top policy-making group. I joined Delphi in July 2002 as its Chief Accounting Officer and Controller, and held those positions through July 2006. In March 2005, I was named acting Chief Financial Officer. As such, my responsibilities included oversight of Delphi's treasury, tax, mergers and acquisitions, internal and external reporting, internal control, budgeting, forecasting, and financial planning and analysis. I was named Vice President and Chief Restructuring Officer effective October 2005, and continued in that capacity until October 3, 2008, when I was named Chief Financial Officer. Before I joined Delphi, I was a partner at KPMG LLP, where I worked for 20 years on a number of assignments in the United States, England, and Germany.

2. Since the Debtors filed their voluntary petitions for reorganization relief with this Court, I have been involved to some degree in virtually all of the significant decisions made by Delphi in connection with all aspects of Delphi's transformation plan and these chapter 11 cases. Except as otherwise indicated, all facts and opinions set forth in this declaration are based upon my personal knowledge and experience, my review of relevant documents, my involvement in and knowledge of the Debtors' businesses, and knowledge obtained from Delphi employees reporting to me and upon whom I rely in the regular course of performing my duties. I submit this declaration in support of the Platinum Expense Reimbursement Motion.

3. On June 1, 2009, Delphi entered into the Master Disposition Agreement with affiliates of General Motors Corporation ("GM") and Platinum Equity,

LLC ("Platinum"). The MDA will facilitate a global resolution of Delphi's chapter 11 cases through the purchase by Platinum of substantially all of Delphi's global businesses, the purchase by GM of four U.S. manufacturing facilities (the "Keep Sites") and the Delphi global steering division, and the assumption by Platinum and GM of liabilities associated with the businesses and facilities they are purchasing. The MDA transaction is the product of many months of extensive discussions among Delphi and its stakeholders, including its DIP lenders, GM, the Automotive Task Force of the U.S. Treasury Department, the Creditors' Committee, and potential third-party investors, including Platinum and other investors who have expressed an interest in Delphi both before and after Delphi's plan investors refused to close their investment under Delphi's confirmed plan of reorganization (the "Confirmed Plan").

4. The MDA does not provide Platinum with either a break-up fee or expense reimbursement in the event the transaction is not consummated because the parties contemplated a private sale to Platinum, either in connection with Delphi's proposed modifications to the Confirmed Plan or pursuant to a section 363 sale if the proposed modifications are not approved. Although Delphi's motion in support of its proposed plan modifications contemplated that Delphi in the exercise of its fiduciary duties could consider any alternative transactions that were proposed prior to consummation of an emergence transaction, the plan modification procedures order incorporated into Exhibit N formal procedures for Delphi and potential bidders to follow in making and evaluating offers of alternative transactions.

5. As was discussed with the Court during the hearing to approve the plan modification procedures, Platinum is now exposed to the risk inherent in the process

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ordered by the Court. Thus, Delphi is seeking authority to provide for reimbursement of Platinum's expenses in the event that Delphi accepts and consummates an Alternative Transaction under the procedures. The purpose of this declaration is to describe the breadth and history of Platinum's relationship with Delphi, the transparent process that Delphi engaged in leading up to the MDA, and my views regarding the amount of the Platinum expense reimbursement.

Breadth And History Of Platinum's Relationship With Delphi

6. Platinum first became involved with Delphi as early as the spring of 2006 in connection with Platinum's interest in purchasing Delphi's global steering division, but also developed an interest in investing in reorganized Delphi. Although Platinum was at that time significantly engaged in discussions regarding the purchase of Delphi's global steering division, it also executed an NDA in February 2007 related to this broader interest. Pursuant to the NDA, I provided to Platinum Delphi's business plan and other due diligence materials. In April 2007 Platinum submitted to me a written expression of interest in investing in reorganized Delphi, including an Equity Commitment Term Sheet. At a meeting later that spring, Rod O'Neal and I informed representatives of Platinum that Delphi was not prepared to explore an investment transaction with Platinum at that time because other parties-in-interest had an agreement to invest in reorganized Delphi.

7. After the transaction with our plan investors failed to close,
Platinum again approached Delphi with an interest in participating in our restructuring.
From September 2008 to January 2009, Platinum engaged in substantive and intensive
due diligence with Delphi, both at the corporate headquarters and with each of our global

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operating divisions. While Platinum was still seeking to consummate the purchase of Delphi's global steering division, it was also very engaged in attempting to lead a comprehensive Delphi emergence transaction. Platinum committed substantial internal resources and engaged multiple financial and operational diligence firms to support its efforts, including multiple teams that met with Delphi in every region of the world.

8. In January 2009, I arranged for Platinum to meet with the lead DIP lender from the Tranche C Collective. I believed that putting them in contact with each other could help enable Delphi to complete an emergence transaction.

9. In the second half of January 2009, Rod O'Neal and I decided that it would no longer be productive to continue discussions and due diligence with Platinum because of the level of progress achieved at that time in discussions with GM and our DIP lenders on reaching an agreement for Delphi to emerge from chapter 11. My belief at that time was that the DIP lenders understood the liquidity requirements of Delphi post-emergence, were prepared to take equity of Delphi in exchange for their debt, and would be supportive owners of the business. When circumstances changed in April 2009, however, Platinum authorized me to express Platinum's interest to the Auto Task Force and came back to the table.

10. Over the past three years Platinum has dedicated a team of professionals to forge strong relationships in the automotive industry, not just with Delphi but also with the OEMs (particular GM and Ford), the UAW, and other suppliers. Platinum personnel spent weeks at a time learning the industry, the management teams and the issues. All of this knowledge was brought to bear as Platinum negotiated an agreement for a Delphi emergence transaction. Furthermore, I believe this knowledge

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will benefit Delphi post-emergence as we meet our commitments to our customers, suppliers, and employees. The automotive industry has evolved and changed during the past year in ways that were previously unthinkable, and I believe that Platinum has assembled the necessary financial and operational skills to lead Delphi in the future. Emergence Transaction Process Leading To Executing MDA With Platinum

11. Since April 2008 when the plan investors refused to close on their investment transaction under Delphi's confirmed plan of reorganization, GM has provided significant incremental liquidity necessary for Delphi to continue operating. Although Delphi's DIP lenders are no longer providing incremental liquidity to Delphi, they also supported Delphi by allowing Delphi to maintain access to certain proceeds of Delphi's existing DIP facility. Thus, in addition to the Creditors' Committee and the Equity Committee (until it was recently disbanded), the DIP lenders and GM have closely monitored Delphi's efforts to effectuate an emergence transaction throughout this time period.

12. Immediately after the plan investors walked away from their obligations, Delphi initiated a process to stabilize its liquidity situation and develop an updated business plan. As a result of the Confirmed Plan not being consummated, most of GM's obligations to Delphi under the original Global Settlement Agreement (the "GSA") and Master Restructuring Agreement ("MRA") did not become effective. Accordingly, GM helped Delphi stabilize its liquidity by entering into an agreement with Delphi as of May 9, 2008 (the "GM Arrangement") to provide for up to \$650 million in GM advances to cover amounts that would have been paid or reimbursed by GM if the original GSA and MRA had become effective. During the months of April through June

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2008, Delphi also developed an updated business plan based upon its delayed emergence and the state of the automotive industry at that time.

13. Based on Delphi's updated business plan, GM indicated in June 2008 that it was not prepared to provide Delphi the level of incremental financial support that would be necessary to support an internally funded plan of reorganization without external equity financing. Delphi then began a thorough review of strategic alternatives, including completing a chapter 11 plan of reorganization, the sale of the Company in whole or in part, or liquidating under chapter 11 or chapter 7, among other potential strategic alternatives. As part of this review, Delphi's financial advisor Rothschild prepared a strategic analysis of the value Delphi's bankruptcy estates might receive through a partial sale of Delphi's business units. This process culminated in presentations and discussions at two meetings of Delphi's board of directors on July 15 and August 20, 2008. Delphi ultimately determined that it would achieve greater value for stakeholders through completing a reorganization of the company in chapter 11. Delphi reviewed these strategic alternatives and conclusions with its stakeholders.

14. As a result of the review of strategic alternatives, Delphi continued to pursue negotiated modifications to the original GSA and MRA as well as modifications to its Confirmed Plan that would support emergence from chapter 11. Delphi and GM entered into amendments to the GSA and MRA under which most of GM's obligations became immediately effective as of September 29, 2008. As a result, the advances under the GM Arrangement were set off against amounts to be paid by GM under the amended GSA and MRA, and GM's \$650 million commitment terminated.

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15. GM continued to support Delphi's liquidity needs by entering into the First Amendment to the GM Arrangement, effective as of October 6, 2008, by which GM made an additional \$300 million in advances available to Delphi through December 31, 2008. This commitment supported Delphi's funding needs through the planned emergence under proposed modifications to Delphi's Confirmed Plan that were filed on October 3, 2008.

16. In conjunction with the plan modifications filed publicly on October 3, 2008, a member of the Creditors' Committee attempted to achieve a creditorsupported rights offering and Delphi held discussions with potential third-party investors, but such discussions were not fruitful.

17. Unfortunately, market conditions deteriorated significantly in the wake of the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, thereby limiting Delphi's ability to access the credit markets to support its emergence under the proposed plan modifications. In addition, following the stock market collapse in October 2008, the automotive industry suffered historic declines in volume and there was market speculation about GM's financial health and the consequences of a potential GM chapter 11 filing. When it became clear in the face of these events that Delphi could not emerge from chapter 11 by December 31, 2008, GM entered into a Second Amendment to the GM Arrangement as of December 3, 2008, to extend the availability of the \$300 million commitment from December 31, 2008 to June 30, 2009. At the same time, GM provided an additional \$300 million in liquidity by agreeing to temporarily accelerate certain accounts payable to Delphi during the second quarter of 2009 (the "Pull-Forward

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Agreement").¹ Although the DIP lenders would not agree to extend the maturity date on Delphi's DIP facility beyond December 31, 2008, the requisite percentage of DIP lenders also provided support to Delphi by agreeing not to exercise remedies under the DIP facility until June 30, 2009, subject to the terms and conditions of the Accommodation Agreement effective as of December 3, 2008.

18. Starting in late November 2008 and continuing through the month of December, certain of the Tranche C DIP lenders, including Silver Point, Anchorage, Monarch, and Carlson (the "Tranche C Collective"), as well as financial advisors to the DIP lenders and the Tranche C Collective (<u>e.g.</u>, Alvarez & Marsal, Blackstone, and Storm Consulting), conducted significant operational due diligence on Delphi's businesses. This due diligence included on-site due diligence at Delphi's corporate headquarters in Troy, Michigan, as well as in Delphi's divisions, including in Kokomo, Indiana and Warren, Ohio. At that point I believed the Tranche C Collective had an expectation that they would be the owners of Delphi going forward.

19. In December 2008 the Bush Administration decided to make funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program available to GM and Chrysler. In late December 2008 and over the year-end holidays, Delphi was focused on how to further amend the MRA in light of the historic changes to the auto industry in the fourth quarter of 2008. At this time, Delphi was considering selling the Keep Sites to generate cash to pay off the Tranche A and Tranche B DIP Lenders. In turn, Delphi hoped to pay the Tranche C DIP lenders in equity in reorganized Delphi rather than in cash, and to secure funding in the

¹ GM and Delphi subsequently amended the Pull-Forward Agreement to further accelerate some of the trade payments to the first quarter of 2009, and entered into a Third Amendment to the GM Arrangement to provide GM the option to covert certain of the accelerated trade payments to advances under the GM Arrangement.

capital markets, including from DIP lenders, to fund Delphi going forward. In the early part of January 2009, the discussions with GM focused primarily on the four Keep Sites, production volumes anticipated in 2009, and the resulting effects on Delphi's business plan and liquidity requirements.

20. Over the December 2008 holiday period Rod O'Neal and I engaged in discussions with members of the Tranche C Collective regarding prospective executive incentive compensation programs and met at their request with an individual they had identified to us to be a potential future member of Delphi's board of directors. Each of these events, together with the significant diligence conducted during the month of December, reinforced my view that the Tranche C lenders were preparing to be (and were prepared to be) Delphi's future owners.

21. During the first half of January 2009, Delphi's DIP lenders organized an unofficial steering committee (the "DIP Steering Committee") consisting of certain Tranche A, Tranche B, and Tranche C lenders. One of the Tranche C lenders on the DIP Steering Committee was our largest DIP lender at the time and was the organizer and leader of the Tranche C Collective.

22. On January 15, 2009, Delphi had its first real negotiating session with GM since GM became eligible for TARP funds. AlixPartners, a new financial advisor to GM, took the lead and made it clear that GM was no longer in a position to provide incremental liquidity to Delphi in the absence of a definitive agreement for a comprehensive solution to GM's relationship with Delphi. We informed the DIP Steering Committee of the information conveyed during this meeting.

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23. To support our newly formed DIP Steering Committee as well as GM's advisors' desire to engage in a new round of due diligence of Delphi, Delphi established a data room on January 18, 2009. In addition to GM and our DIP lenders, I wanted to ensure that Delphi's other stakeholders, including the statutory committees, were kept apprised so that they would be very involved in and supportive of Delphi's actions. Generally, whenever we had a session with GM, Delphi would advise the DIP Steering Committee of the materials reviewed, matters discussed, and positions expressed by the parties. In addition, the statutory committees, the DIP Steering Committee, the DIP lenders' advisors (e.g., Alvarez & Marsal, Blackstone, O'Horizons, and Storm Consulting), and the PBGC all had access to the data room and the opportunity to request and receive diligence sessions. During this time the Tranche C Collective members had already completed substantial business due diligence. During January and February, the principal areas of focus in due diligence were Delphi's business plan, liquidity projections, and negotiations with GM.

24. Delphi formally met with our DIP Steering Committee ten times between January 14 and March 26, 2009, including meetings with members of Delphi's treasury, strategic planning, restructuring, and legal staffs. During these meetings, Delphi provided the DIP Steering Committee with substantive information about Delphi's business plan, global liquidity, negotiations with GM, and other subjects. The meetings included significant discussions among the parties on the state of the auto industry and resolution of Delphi's chapter 11 cases. In addition, we consulted with the DIP Steering Committee on strategies to sell the Keep Sites to GM to generate proceeds to pay off DIP

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loans, and informed them of the incremental funding needed to operate Delphi's businesses.

25. In late February 2009 Delphi provided to the DIP Agent for distribution to all of the DIP lenders who had agreed to receive non-public information about Delphi (the "Private-Side Lenders") detailed information on the Company's business plan. The information included a "three statement" business plan as well as substantive information on details of the business plan by division and by geographic region. Further, in early March Delphi provided to the DIP Agent for distribution to Private-Side Lenders an emergence liquidity sensitivity analysis (the "ELSA"). The ELSA, which was the product of a joint work effort with the DIP lenders' financial advisors, provided a detailed analysis of Delphi's required emergence liquidity based upon a downside business planning scenario. Each of these documents, which have been available to all Private-Side Lenders for months, provided our DIP lenders with significant information on Delphi's business plan and post-emergence liquidity needs.

26. In the meantime, Delphi had been negotiating with GM regarding a term sheet reflecting amendments to the MRA as well as an agreement for GM to purchase Delphi's global steering division. By the end of February 2009, GM and Delphi had agreed to enter into the Steering Option Exercise Agreement and had otherwise virtually completed the negotiations over the MRA amendments, including agreements in principle regarding transfer of the four UAW Keep Sites, ongoing commercial arrangements, and treatment of intellectual property and tooling. We kept the DIP Steering Committee fully apprised of our discussions with GM. During this time, I or

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Keith Stipp, Executive Director – Restructuring for Delphi, spoke with members of the DIP Steering Committee on nearly a daily basis, including on weekends.

27. Given the progress toward a comprehensive resolution, in late February and early March 2009, GM agreed to provide \$150 million of additional interim financing pursuant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the GM Arrangement.

28. During this time it had become apparent that any external funding for Delphi's reorganization would likely come with substantial government involvement and assistance. For that reason, during the month of February 2009 I spent about 30 percent of my time in Washington, D.C., often with Rod O'Neal, to meet senators and congressmen and relate to them the Delphi story. We also wanted to make sure that the Treasury Department was aware of the size of Delphi and its importance to GM and other automobile manufacturers. Treasury's Auto Task Force was formed in late February, and we met with the Auto Task Force in early March to describe Delphi's situation, including its importance to the global automotive industry and to GM in particular.

29. The Auto Task Force intervened in these cases on March 23, 2009, when it objected to GM's entry into the previously negotiated Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the GM Arrangement on the grounds that it needed more time to review the transactions and Delphi's liquidity needs.

30. On March 25, 2009, I, Keith Stipp, and John Arle from Delphi, and Rick Westenberg from GM, met in Washington, D.C. with Harry Wilson and Matthew Feldman of the Auto Task Force. At the meeting, we discussed Delphi's short-term liquidity needs and the previously negotiated agreements with GM, and generally told

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them Delphi's story. On April 3, 2009, Delphi delivered a substantial set of written materials to the Auto Task Force regarding Delphi's business plan and liquidity.

31. On Sunday, April 5, 2009, Harry Wilson convened a conference call with me and other representatives of Delphi. He indicated the preliminary view of the Auto Task Force that it was not prepared to provide emergence funding for Delphi's exit from chapter 11. Instead, he informed us, the Auto Task Force was only prepared to acquire, at a fair price, certain Delphi assets including but not limited to the four UAW Keep Sites and Delphi's global steering division as supply protection for GM.

32. Throughout the month of March as Delphi had reviewed its liquidity requirements under the ELSA with its DIP lenders, Delphi had made clear that Delphi would require post-emergence liquidity to have a feasible business plan. Later in the day on April 5, I informed the DIP Steering Committee of the call with the Auto Task Force.

33. The DIP Steering Committee requested a meeting in New York for the following day. We met at the offices of Davis Polk with J.P. Morgan and the head of the Tranche C Collective representing the DIP lenders, as well as Alvarez & Marsal, Blackstone, and Willkie, Farr & Gallagher, counsel to the Tranche C Collective. At that meeting, I was informed by counsel for the DIP Agent that, based on their discussions with all lenders, the lenders were not prepared to provide interim or emergence funding.

34. Counsel for the DIP Agent also informed us that in the lenders' view Delphi's only alternative was to pursue a self-financed liquidation. They envisioned Delphi selling assets (manufacturing facilities, business lines, or divisions) to secure operating liquidity and then using the proceeds to fund operations and, to the extent

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additional proceeds were available, to pay down the DIP. Under this scenario Delphi would then move on to sell additional assets.

35. I was concerned that such an approach would yield little or no value for our DIP lenders. First, I believed that Delphi would not receive significant new business from customers once those customers became aware that Delphi would be selling off business lines and, therefore, Delphi's enterprise value would rapidly deteriorate. Second, suppliers' concerns regarding a possible Delphi liquidation could lead them to seek to shorten or accelerate payment terms, thereby requiring Delphi to procure additional liquidity to fund operations. Third, based on Delphi's experience selling businesses into the depressed auto market, I was concerned that buyers might only be willing to accept liabilities but not pay any significant cash proceeds for the acquired businesses. Fourth, given Delphi's short-term need to stabilize liquidity, I was concerned with the amount of time that would be required to effect such sales.²

36. In addition to the value destruction which I believed would result from the liquidation approach suggested by the DIP lenders, the fact that no incremental DIP financing or emergence capital was available from my broad syndicate of lenders led me to conclude that there would be no market transaction available from third parties.

37. Shortly after receiving this message from the DIP lenders, Steve Miller and Rod O'Neal had dinner with the CEO of another automotive supplier who had previously expressed interest in investing in all or part of Delphi. In addition, given Platinum's prior and consistent interest, we had been keeping Platinum apprised of

² Delphi has not hesitated to explore divestitures that are in line with its transformation goals. During these chapter 11 cases Delphi has divested to a diverse group of buyers more than 20 businesses or portions of businesses, representing between \$3 and \$4 billion in annual revenue (exclusive of operations being sold to GM, restructuring of ownership positions, and minor divestitures by joint ventures).

developments. I informed Platinum of these events and Platinum asked us to make the Auto Task Force aware of their interest. I called Harry Wilson to inform him of this.

38. On Monday and Tuesday, April 13 and 14, 2009, the DIP Agent and the DIP lenders' advisors (and, on April 14, a member of the Tranche C Collective) met with the Auto Task Force. In these meetings the DIP lenders presented an analysis of the cost to GM if Delphi were unwilling or unable to provide supply to GM should the DIP lenders exercise certain remedies resulting in a shutdown of Delphi. The analysis was the product of a detailed operational and financial analysis performed by third party consultants for the DIP lenders that previously held senior management positions in GM's purchasing organization. The analysis asserted that it would take GM years and tens of billions of dollars to fully re-source Delphi's products because Delphi is a sole source provider of many components for every vehicle GM produces.

39. A fundamental change to the landscape of these cases occurred in mid-April when GM, with the support of the Auto Task Force, agreed to support a comprehensive resolution of the Delphi chapter 11 cases. On April 18, 2009, GM provided a comprehensive proposal directly to Delphi's DIP lenders. Importantly, the proposal provided for payment in full of the Tranche A and Tranche B DIP lenders, and offered the Tranche C lenders a recovery of approximately 3% in cash and a 67% economic interest in the equity of a newly capitalized Delphi. The proposal made clear that GM was prepared to fund the company pre- and post-emergence. This proposal made by GM provided the same basic transaction structure that GM and Platinum ultimately negotiated in connection with the MDA transaction. Delphi received a copy of the proposal the next day, April 19, 2009, and provided written comments to the DIP

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lenders later that day. Importantly, the Delphi comments on the GM proposal recommended that the DIP lenders focus on the financing and corporate governance aspects of the proposal.

40. Rather than following Delphi's recommendations, on the night of April 19, 2009, the DIP Steering Committee countered with a separate proposal. Instead of choosing to engage the transaction structure put forward by the Auto Task Force, the DIP lenders put forth a response that encompassed a completely different structure. It provided for a total recovery for the Tranche C lenders of at least \$750 million in cash, \$625 million in debt, and of 51% of the equity of new Delphi. This response chilled discussions with GM and the Auto Task Force and effectively ended their dialogue with the DIP lenders. GM and the Auto Task Force withdrew the prior offer and began looking for a different solution in lieu of partnering with the DIP lenders.³

41. During this time, the DIP lenders were fully informed that Platinum and another bidder were engaged in due diligence working towards a transaction with Delphi and GM that was supported by the Auto Task Force. I kept the DIP Steering Committee members apprised of the status of the parties' due diligence. Despite this awareness, at no time did the DIP lenders tell me that they had changed their position articulated on April 6 that none of them was prepared to put new money into Delphi.

42. In early May 2009, Delphi completed and distributed to stakeholders its hypothetical liquidation analysis. GM and the Auto Task Force had been of the view that the Tranche C lenders were not entitled to a recovery because the value

³ The DIP Lenders made a second counter offer on April 28, 2009, in which they generally conformed to the transaction structure that had been proposed in the April 18, 2009 GM proposal, but they left the economic terms blank.

of Delphi's assets would be lost without GM's injection of new money. Delphi asked its advisors at FTI to prepare a liquidation analysis in part to demonstrate to GM and the Auto Task Force that Delphi's Tranche C lenders would likely receive some recovery even in a liquidation scenario. The mid-point of the range of recoveries showed that the Tranche C lenders would receive approximately a 20% recovery in liquidation. Delphi then advocated that the Tranche C DIP lenders needed to receive a recovery at least in that range in a comprehensive transaction.

43. On May 5, 2009, counsel for the Auto Task Force sent a letter to Delphi disclosing that negotiations were ongoing with two potential buyers and setting a May 18, 2009, target for completion of negotiations. Notwithstanding that timeframe, the letter also indicated that the Auto Task Force would not object to providing additional time for the DIP lenders to market Delphi's assets if the DIP lenders were willing to fund Delphi's operations during the additional time.⁴

44. On May 12, 2009, Delphi convened a series of meetings with stakeholders in Skadden's Washington, D.C. offices. Delphi met with the DIP lenders in the morning and then with GM and the Auto Task Force in the afternoon. Delphi delivered to the Auto Task Force a statement of the objectives we understood the Auto Task Force wanted to achieve in a Delphi transaction. In addition, we set out Delphi's objectives and the elements of a Debtors-sponsored emergence transaction. In the meeting with the Auto Task Force, Delphi and its advisors sought to support and convey the DIP lenders' positions to the Auto Task Force.

⁴ In connection with their agreement to extend certain milestones under the Accommodation Agreement, certain DIP Lenders sought Delphi's agreement to a marketing process with the DIP Steering Committee. Although I did execute the marketing letter on May 7, 2009, the Tranche C Collective did not follow through on the alternative marketing process.

45. The transaction objectives that Delphi put forth were to (i)

maximize business enterprise value and related recoveries for Delphi's stakeholders; (ii)

maximize feasibility and speed of execution (including provision of sufficient interim

liquidity); (iii) protect franchise value by ensuring continuity of supply for Delphi's

customers, preserving Delphi's supplier tiers, and preserving Delphi's human capital (to

the extent possible under the circumstances); and (iv) provide the opportunity to

consummate a modified plan of reorganization in order to achieve a comprehensive

resolution of Delphi's chapter 11 cases and achieve Delphi's transformation objectives (to

the extent possible under the circumstances).

46. In addition, Delphi put forth the following outline of the required

elements for a Debtors-sponsored emergence transaction:

1. Resolution of Stakeholder Recoveries (assuming non-consensual)

- DIP Tranche A/B (full recovery; paid in cash)

- Hedge Obligations (full recovery; roll over on a secured basis)

- DIP Tranche C (evaluate HLA recoveries (including stakeholder feedback), market valuation and trading history and foreclosure risk data points)

- Administrative claims (assumption/payment in ordinary course

- General Unsecured Creditors (warrant structure)

-Validate the value of new equity if used as portion of currency to be distributed

2. Resolution of Delphi-General Motors Commercial Discussions (see attachments)

- Reaffirm General Motors' commitment to Delphi portfolio

- Plant ownership: UAW keep sites / Other US plants / Mexico plants

- Protection of supply: access agreements, IP rights and tooling ownership

- Understand GSA/MRA modifications and validate corresponding changes to RPOR, ELSA and related financial information provided to the US Treasury Auto Task Force, Delphi stakeholders and prospective acquirers

<u>3. Resolution of Defined Benefit Pension Plans</u>
- Implement 414(l) transactions for HRP (second step) and SRP

 Confirm consistent treatment of General Motors' pensioners (whether retired from Delphi or General Motors)
 Alternatively, resolve PBGC ROW liens if pensions are terminated by PBGC

4. Resolution of Emergence Funding

- Select mutually acceptable third-party acquirer

- Finalize structure and amount of US Treasury funding

5. Resolution of Human Capital Issues

- Agree on plan structure to maximize job preservation

- Confirm intended treatment of confirmed plan provisions affecting

human capital (including Articles VII and XI)

- Confirm treatment of salaried severance program

6. Transaction Implementation

- Resolve approach to consummation: plan modifications vs. Section 363 sale (or combination of both approaches)

- Adopt DIP Facility "collective action" mechanics

- Develop contingency plans for interim funding to emergence (including consideration of any potential DIP Lenders' objection(s))

- Resolve disposition of avoidance actions

- Resolve allocation of potential Plan Investor litigation settlement proceeds

47. The next day, May 13, Bill Shaw from Rothschild and I met with

the lead member of the Tranche C Collective. I expressed my view that to achieve a consensual resolution the DIP lenders needed to understand that traditional negotiation of starting high and then gradually making concessions would not work in these circumstances. I suggested that the goal should be to identify the correct recovery and agree to it quickly. I requested them to authorize Bill Shaw and me to present a proposal to GM and the Auto Task Force for a 25% recovery made up of 10% in cash, 10% in a note, and 5% based on a recovery in the plan investor litigation. Nevertheless, the Tranche C lender delivered a letter to me making adjustments to Delphi's liquidation analysis and showing a mid-point recovery of 45%. The letter also indicated that the

Tranche C lender was conducting its own liquidation analysis that would show 45% to be the low-end of the range of recovery, rather than the mid-point.

48. From May 18 forward, GM and the Auto Task Force negotiated directly with the bidders who were seeking to partner with them. Delphi was kept apprised of the discussions and negotiations. I also kept the DIP lenders apprised.

49. The Court appointed Judge Cecelia Morris to serve as a judicial mediator for Delphi and its stakeholders to attempt to reach a consensual, comprehensive resolution. Delphi, the DIP lenders, GM, the Auto Task Force, the Creditors' Committee, the PBGC, and the UAW participated in approximately twenty hours of mediation beginning on May 26, 2009. Unfortunately, this process did not result in a consensual resolution. On the night of Friday, May 29, the DIP lenders delivered a proposal seeking a 10% cash recovery and two-thirds of the equity in new Delphi.

50. Meanwhile, GM and the Auto Task Force continued negotiations with the two bidders. I understand that the other potential bidder withdrew from consideration because it was unwilling to support a plan of reorganization structure or to assume substantial administrative liabilities. Therefore, GM, the Auto Task Force, and Delphi completed negotiations with Platinum for entry into the Master Disposition Agreement dated June 1, 2009.

51. On May 26, 2009, Delphi received a letter from another potential bidder. Although we worked with this bidder's advisors over the next couple of days to sign an NDA required for due diligence, given the timing of the need to complete a transaction that bidder decided not to proceed. That bidder has not reengaged in the process under the Exhibit N procedures.

21

Business Judgment Regarding Platinum Expense Reimbursement

52. Delphi entered into the MDA transaction with Platinum on a

private sale basis, rather than incorporating bidding procedures, in part because Delphi has, in my opinion, been fully marketed to potential investors over the years that it has been in chapter 11. I have interacted with and provided Delphi's financial and business information to a multitude of potential investors. Accordingly, I believed that any interested parties were likely aware of and monitoring Delphi's situation. Moreover, Delphi was faced with significant liquidity issues. From the time the amendments to the GSA and MRA in September 2008 until Delphi filed its proposed supplemental plan modifications on June 1, 2009, GM provided \$600 million in additional liquidity to fund Delphi's operations. And in connection with the supplemental plan modifications, GM has agreed to provide an additional \$250 million in interim financing to support Delphi's operations through emergence form chapter 11. I considered it unlikely that an alternative transaction would emerge that would solve for Delphi's liquidity needs.

53. Although Delphi appreciates the DIP lenders' support under the Accommodation Agreement, the DIP lenders have not contributed incremental liquidity to support Delphi's operations during this time. Indeed, although the DIP lenders made approximately \$85 million in borrowing base collateral available to Delphi to fund operations, the Debtors have paid them more than \$500 million in principal repayments, interest, and fees as the price for the Accommodation Agreement and subsequent amendments. Thus, much of the interim funding providing by GM has effectively been used to pay down the DIP loan. More recently, the requisite DIP lenders have granted increasingly short extensions of the milestones in the Accommodation Agreement.

22

Pursuant to the Third Accommodation Agreement Amendment, the timeframe in which to deliver a Term Sheet was extended to May 21, 2009. Further, the Accommodation Period would have terminated on June 2, 2009 if the requisite DIP lenders did not affirmatively notify Delphi on or prior to June 1, 2009 that the Term Sheet was satisfactory. Five subsequent amendments each extended the June 2, 2009 termination date by a matter of a few days at a time, to June 9, June 13, June 20, and June 24, and June 27, respectively.

54. Since January 2009 (and in the case of the Auto Task Force, since March 2009), GM has consistently stated that it was not prepared to provide further preor post-emergence liquidity to Delphi without a full and final global resolution to Delphi's bankruptcy cases. Faced with the DIP lenders' refusal to provide liquidity to Delphi, and buoyed by the Auto Task Force's acknowledgment and support for GM's business judgment, Delphi negotiated a transaction that provides \$250 million in interim funding, billions in emergence capital, and a comprehensive resolution to Delphi's chapter 11 cases. Delphi persuaded GM and the Auto Task Force to proceed with a plan of reorganization, with the 363 sale only as a back-up alternative. The transaction with Platinum also allows Delphi to continue to operate and allows non-GM suppliers and customers to have confidence due to corporate governance control being placed in a non-GM third party.

55. Delphi expressed the view – and continues to believe – that a reorganization plan is superior to an asset sale because it provides a comprehensive resolution to these cases. Delphi has already substantially completed its restructuring. But for exit financing, the Debtors have been ready to emerge from chapter 11 for 14

23

months. The Modified Plan provides for the payment of all administrative claims. These administrative expenses are largely for the suppliers, customers, and employees who have provided the environment that has allowed Delphi to continue to operate day-to-day over the past 14 months. These expenses are necessary to preservation of value that otherwise would be pennies on liquidation basis.⁵

56. I am aware that certain DIP lenders now claim to potentially want to contribute new money to Delphi's emergence or to participate in a transaction outside the Exhibit N bidding process. Up to this point most of my interactions with the DIP Steering Committee were with the DIP Agent and with the leader of the Tranche C Collective. Very recently another DIP lender did come forward and increase significantly its investment in the DIP (the "New DIP Lender"), making the New DIP Lender Delphi's largest DIP lender today. Whereas the leader of the Tranche C Collective is an original, par holder of the DIP, the New DIP Lender purchased most of its Tranche C holdings as a distressed, speculative investment. Indeed, based upon information received from the DIP Agent, the New DIP Lender purchased more than two-thirds of the nominal amount of its holdings on or after June 1, 2009.⁶

57. Thus there has been an enormous amount of trading in the Tranche C DIP loan, most prominently reflecting the New DIP Lender's purchases and the leader of the Tranche C Collective's sales. Quite simply, the New DIP Lender is a willing speculator who bought into the DIP Loan at distressed levels and with a different agenda than the leader of the Tranche C Collective.

⁵ It is not true that Delphi prefers a plan of reorganization in order to enrich management. Under the MDA, change of control agreements terminate and are not replaced. Similarly, the \$18mm emergence cash bucket under the Confirmed Plan is eliminated.

⁶ As of June 19, 2009, the three-month average of the midpoint trading price for Delphi's Tranche C DIP loan was \$.20.

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58. I believe it is reasonable to obligate a winning bidder to reimburse Platinum's expenses given the implementation of the supplemental procedures. Platinum provided the path to a full and final global resolution to Delphi's bankruptcy cases, as required by GM, such that Delphi has been able to secure access to liquidity from GM to operate its businesses. The foregoing represents value that Platinum has brought to the estates and for which it should be reimbursed in the event Delphi consummates an alternate transaction. The amount is reasonable up to the \$30 million cap in connection with the overall transaction, and was proposed and accepted in good faith.

59. Platinum represented to me that as of May 31, 2009, it has thirdparty expenses of approximately \$20 million that are related to its overall due diligence in connection with a Delphi transaction.⁷ Platinum hired a number of consultants including Marakon Associates, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Answerport, Inc., and the law firms of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, and Foley & Lardner LLP, to assist them in their diligence efforts and negotiations. In addition, as of May 31, 2009, Platinum has approximately \$17 million of internal costs related to Delphi.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Executed on June 25, 2009.

> /s/ John D. Sheehan JOHN D. SHEEHAN

⁷ This amount includes, without limitation, out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with Platinum's consideration of the purchase of Delphi's steering division.

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		Page
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COUR	RT	
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YOP	RK .	
Chapter 11		
Case No. 04-44481 (RDD)		
Jointly Administered		
·		
In re:)	
DELPHI CORPORATION, et al)	
Debtors.)	
)	
HIGHLY CONFIDENT:	IAL	
DEPOSITION OF MATTHEW FELDM	AN	
Washington, D.C.		
July 21, 2009		
	:	
	•	
Reported by:		
MARY ANN PAYONK, RDR-CRR		
JOB NO. 23898		

TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

Page 2 Page 3 **1** APPEARANCES: 1 2 ON BEHALF OF OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED 2 З 3 CREDITORS: ROBERT J. MALIONEK, ESO, 4 4 5 July 21, 2009 5 ELIZABETH MARKS, ESQ. 6 10:00 a.m. 6 LATHAM & WATKINS 7 885 Third Avenue 7 Deposition of MATTHEW FELDMAN, held at 8 New York, NY 10022 8 the law offices of Latham & Watkins, 555 11th 9 9 Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., pursuant to 10 ON BEHALF OF DEBTORS: 10 11 GRETCHEN WOLF, ESQ. (By telephone) 11 Notice before Mary Ann Payonk, a Certified SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP 12 Realtime Reporter and notary public of the 12 13 District of Columbia. 155 North Wacker Drive 13 14 Chicago, Illinois 60606 14 15 15 16 ON BEHALF OF COLLECTIVE OF DIP LENDERS: 16 17 RICHARD MANCINO, ESQ. 17 18 WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER, LLP . 18 19 19 787 Seventh Avenue New York, NY 10019 20 20 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 25 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 4 Page 5 APPEARANCES (Cont'd.): 1 1 APPEARANCES (Cont'd.): ON BEHALF OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT: 2 2 ON BEHALF OF WILMINGTON TRUST COMPANY: PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ. З 3 AS AN INDENTURE TRUSTEE 4 ERIN F. LEWIS, ESQ 4 ERIC C. RUSNAK, ESQ. CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT, LLP 5 700 Sixth Street, N.W. 5 K&L GATES 6 Washington, D.C. 20001 7 6 1601 K Street, NW 8 7 Washington, D.C. 20006 MATTHEW L. SCHWARTZ, ESQ. 9 8 JOSEPH N. CORDARO, ESQ. 10 9 ON BEHALF OF GENERAL MOTORS: U.S. Department of Justice 11 JEREMY T. GRABILL, ESQUIRE 10 12 86 Chambers Street New York, NY 10007 13 11 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 14 767 Fifth Avenue 12 ON BEHALF OF JPMORGAN CHASE AS AGENT: 15 New York, NY 10153 13 RAJESH JAMES, ESQ. (By telephone) 16 14 17 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, LLP 15 ON BEHALF OF IUE-CWA: 18 450 Lexington Avenue 19 New York, NY 10007 16 ELIZABETH KENNEDY, ESQ. 20 17 KENNEDY, JENNIK & MURRAY 18 113 University Place 21 ON BEHALF OF PLATINUM EQUITIES: 19 New York, NY 10003 THERESA L. CONCEPCION, ESQ. 22 SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, LLP 20 919 Third Avenue 21 23 New York, NY 10022 22 23 24 24 25 25 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

Page 6	Page 7
1 APPEARANCES (Cont'd.):	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 ON BEHALF OF INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING	
3 ENGINEERS:	3 called as a witness, having been duly
4 BARBARA MEHLSACK, ESQ. (By telephone)	4 sworn, was examined and testified as
5 GORLICK, KRAVITZ & LISTHAUS, P.C.	5 follows:
6 17 State Street, 4th Floor	6 EXAMINATION
7 New York, NY 10004	7 BY MR. MALIONEK:
8	8 Q. Good morning.
9 ATTORNEY ADVISOR:	9 A. Good morning.
10 JOSEPH J. SAMARIAS, ESQ.	10 Q. My name is Robert Malionek. I'm
11 U.S. Department of the Treasury	11 from Latham & Watkins. We represent the
12 Office of Financial Stability	12 committee of unsecured creditors in this
13 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW	13 proceeding.
14 Washington, D.C. 20220	14 Can you state your home address,
15	15 please.
16 ALSO PRESENT:	16 MR. SCHWARTZ: No. He's a
17 Ms. Kathleen Ho	17 Treasury witness. You can state a
	 Treasury address. O. State your work address.
19 20	
20	 A. 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.
22	22 Q. Are you represented by counsel here
23	23 today?
24	24 A. Iam.
25	25 Q. Okay. Who is your counsel?
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Page 8	Page 9
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 A. It is Mr. Schwartz from the	2 A. Probably a dozen.
3 U.S. Attorney's Office.	3 Q. Quick ground rules. Let's just try
4 Q. Does he represent you personally?	4 not to talk over each other so that the court
5 A. I don't know the answer to that.	5 reporter can make a clean record. Is that
6 MR. MALIONEK: Do you know the	6 fair?
7 answer to that, Matt?	7 A. Yes.
8 MR. SCHWARTZ: Mr. Feldman isn't	8 Q. I'm not going to ask you about
9 here personally. He's here as a	9 privileged conversations. I don't want to go10 into that. Okay? I'll ask you about other
10 representative of the Treasury11 Department.	10 Into that. Okay? In ask you about other 11 conversations. I'll ask you about positions,
12 MR. MALIONEK: You represent	12 statements, communications, but I'm not going
13 Treasury in this?	13 to ask you about privileged communications
14 MR. SCHWARTZ: United States of	14 between Treasury and its counsel. Okay?
15 America.	15 A. Okay.
16 Q. Have you ever testified before,	16 MR. SCHWARTZ: I assume that also
17 Mr. Feldman?	17 encompasses the government's
18 A. Yes.	18 deliberative process privilege and
19 Q. In deposition?	19 internal Treasury communications,
20 A. Yes.	20 MR. MALIONEK: It depends on the
21 Q. How many times?	21 question.
The second	22 (Feldman Exhibit 1 was marked for
22 A. This will be my fourth time.	
23 Q. Have you ever taken a deposition?	23 identification.)
Q. Have you ever taken a deposition?A. Yes.	24 BY MR. MALIONEK:
23 Q. Have you ever taken a deposition?	,

ſ		Page 10		Page 1	11
	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
	2	marked as Feldman Exhibit 1. Can you take a	2	counsel.	
	3	look at that, please. Tell me if you recognize	3	Q. Anything else?	
	4	it.	4	A. I don't believe so.	
	5	A. Yes.	5	Q. Did you have any conversations with	
	6	Q. Okay. A few pages into the	6 7 ·	Mr. Wilson, Mr. Bloom, Mr. Ratner without	
	7 8	document, this is a subpoena for the testimony of a representative of Treasury; is that right?	8	counsel present regarding this deposition? A. I did.	
	° 9	A. That's what it appears to be.	9	Q. How many? How many conversations	
	10	Q. Okay. And then if you turn a few	10	did you have?	
	11	pages into the subpoena, I think it's page 3 of	11	A. Approximately ten in total.	
1	12	the subpoena itself, there's a list of	12	Q. Okay. Can you tell me generally	
	13	deposition subject matters. Do you see that?	13	what you discussed?	
	14	A. I do.	14	A. We discussed their memories of	
	15	Q. Are you prepared here today to	15	specific meetings and phone conversations and,	
	16 17	testify with respect to each of those subject matters?	16 17	in particular, those in which I was not present.	
	18.	A. I believe that I am.	18	Q. Did you meet with each of them	
	19	Q. Okay. What did you do to prepare	19	separately, Wilson, Bloom, Ratner?	
	20	for this deposition, if anything?	20	A. Yes.	
	21	A. I refreshed my memory with respect	21	Q. How many times each?	·
		to documents related to the Delphi cases. I	22	A. I met with Mr. Bloom and Mr. Ratner	
	23	spoke to my colleagues at Treasury who had been	23	one time each. I met with Mr. Wilson many	
		involved in Delphi, including Mr. Wilson,	24 25	times, you know, eight times, approximately. Q. Do you feel you're prepared to give	
		Mr. Bloom, and Mr. Ratner. I met with my SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580		Q. Do you feel you're prepared to give SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	h
		Page 12		Page	13
	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
	2	testimony with respect to each of the subject	2	Q. Okay. Other than Beijing e-Town,	
	3	matters that's listed in the subpoena that I	3	do you remember any other subject matters that	
	4 5	gave you to the best of your ability? A. Yes.	4 5	you talked about with Mr. Wilson regarding meetings that he had attended without you?	
	6	Q. Can you recall any particular	6	A. There was no subject matter that he	
	7	items, events, memories as you said that	7	and I were not involved in together. There may	
	8	Mr. Wilson had in your depo prep meetings with	8	have been specific meetings where I attended	
	9	him?	9	without him or he attended without me.	
	10	A. I'm sorry. I don't understand the	10	The one that comes most to mind is	
	11	question.	11	there was a meeting at Carl Icon's offices on I	
1	12	Q. Do you recall anything specific	12	believe May 1st, whatever that Friday was, that I only attended the first hour of, and the	
	13 14	that you discussed with Mr. Wilson about his memories? You said you met with him regarding	13 14		
	15	his memories of certain events that related to	15	That was a meeting that he had	
	16	this issue.		memories of that I did not. And the only other	
	17	A. Yes.	17	circumstance was there was a two-day mediation	
	18	Q. Okay. What are those?	18	conducted by Judge Morris that he attended and	
	19	A. I discussed with Mr. Wilson and	19	I did not.	
	20	asked him to recall his memories regarding	20	Q. All right. I want to make sure I	
	21 22	let me look at the list the Beijing e-Town term sheet as well as a number of conversations	21	understand your answer. Was it generally the case that as events were unfolding related to	
	22	and meetings that he and I attended together,	22	the Delphi bankruptcy and Treasury's role in	
		and mootings that no and r attended together,	1	that, you and Mr. Wilson would have real-time	
		as well as a small number that he participated	24	that, you and wir, whisen would have real-time	
	24 25	as well as a small number that he participated in without me.	24	discussions related to those issues?	
	24 25		25	· •	0

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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the	2 Q. The bankruptcy filings?
3 form.	3 A. Yes.
4 A. Correct.	4 Q. The
5 Q. Did you have any role in producing	5 A. I'm sorry. Was that a question,
6 documents responsive to this subpoena?	6 the bankruptcy filings?
7 A. I did.	7 Q. Yes.
8 Q. Did you review any documents before	8 A. I'm sorry. What's the question?
9 they were produced?	9 Q. Bankruptcy filings one of the
10 A. I did not.	10 things that you had reviewed before?
11 Q. Okay. You reviewed documents after	11 A. I had, yes.
12 they were produced by Treasury?	12 Q. Okay. The e-mails?
13 A. I did.	13 A. My e-mails, obviously, and anything
14 Q. Do you remember any particular	14 I was copied on I had seen before.
15 documents that you reviewed as you were	15 Q. So there were some e-mails that you
16 preparing for your deposition?	16 reviewed that you had not seen before. Did
17 A. I reviewed most, if not all, of the 18 e-mails that were produced. I reviewed copies	17 those in reviewing them to prepare for your18 deposition, did any of those refresh any
18 e-mails that were produced. I reviewed copies19 of documents that had been filed with the	19 recollections that you had about issues or
20 bankruptcy court, the Plan of Reorganization,	20 meetings or discussions that you had with
21 the transaction documents. Those are the ones	21 Mr. Wilson or others?
22 I remember best.	22 A. They were consistent with my
23 Q. Had you seen all those before?	23 memories and certainly refreshed my memories.
24 A. I believe that I had. If not all	24 Q. Okay. As you were preparing for
25 of them, nearly all of them.	25 your deposition, did you have any meetings or
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Page 16	Page 17
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 discussions with GM or any representatives of	2 A. No.
3 GM or their counsel?4 A. I'm sorry. Regarding this	3 Q. Can you give me a brief employment 4 history after law school?
4 A. I'm sorry. Regarding this 5 deposition?	5 A. From 1988 until the beginning of
6 Q. Yes.	6 1991, I was an associate at a law firm Lane &
7 A. No.	7 Altman. And from 1991 through March of 2009, I
8 Q. How about with Platinum or any of	8 was an attorney at Willkie, Farr & Gallagher
9 its advisors, lawyers?	9 LLP.
10 A. No.	10 Q. And after March '09?
11 Q. Anyone else, other than you	11 A. In March '09 I took a position with
12 mentioned Wilson, Bloom, Ratner, counsel, that	12 the Treasury Department and have been employed
13 you met with in preparation for your depo?	13 there since.
14 A. One of my colleagues, Paul	14 Q. What's your position with Treasury?
15 Nathanson, attended one of the prep sessions,	15 A. I am an attorney under the general
16 but I didn't meet with him separately.	16 counsel's in the general counsel's office.
117 () Where'd you go to college?	17 I don't actually know what my position is.
17 Q. Where'd you go to college?	
18 A. I went to Tufts University.	18 Q. Are you affiliated with the
18 A. I went to Tufts University.19 Q. When did you graduate?	19 Treasury's Auto Task Force?
 18 A. I went to Tufts University. 19 Q. When did you graduate? 20 A. 1985. 	19 Treasury's Auto Task Force?20 A. I'm a member of the auto team at
 18 A. I went to Tufts University. 19 Q. When did you graduate? 20 A. 1985. 21 Q. Law school? 	 19 Treasury's Auto Task Force? 20 A. I'm a member of the auto team at 21 Treasury, which has been charged with assisting
 18 A. I went to Tufts University. 19 Q. When did you graduate? 20 A. 1985. 21 Q. Law school? 22 A. I attended NYU Law School. 	 19 Treasury's Auto Task Force? 20 A. I'm a member of the auto team at 21 Treasury, which has been charged with assisting 22 the Auto Task Force.
 18 A. I went to Tufts University. 19 Q. When did you graduate? 20 A. 1985. 21 Q. Law school? 22 A. I attended NYU Law School. 23 Q. When did you graduate? 	 19 Treasury's Auto Task Force? 20 A. I'm a member of the auto team at 21 Treasury, which has been charged with assisting 22 the Auto Task Force. 23 Q. Who do you report to?
 18 A. I went to Tufts University. 19 Q. When did you graduate? 20 A. 1985. 21 Q. Law school? 22 A. I attended NYU Law School. 23 Q. When did you graduate? 24 A. 1988. 	 19 Treasury's Auto Task Force? 20 A. I'm a member of the auto team at 21 Treasury, which has been charged with assisting 22 the Auto Task Force. 23 Q. Who do you report to? 24 A. I report to George Madison, the
 18 A. I went to Tufts University. 19 Q. When did you graduate? 20 A. 1985. 21 Q. Law school? 22 A. I attended NYU Law School. 23 Q. When did you graduate? 	 19 Treasury's Auto Task Force? 20 A. I'm a member of the auto team at 21 Treasury, which has been charged with assisting 22 the Auto Task Force. 23 Q. Who do you report to?

Page 18	Page 19
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 general counsel of the Treasury.	2 have been involved in, including Chrysler
3 Q. You report to him directly?	3 Corporation, General Motors, GMAC, Chrysler
4 A. I do.	4 Financial, and Delphi. Those have been the
5 Q. Okay. Anyone report to you	5 companies that we have been most involved in.
6 directly?	6 On a day-to-day basis, I'm involved
7 A. I don't believe so.	7 in meetings and phone calls both with the
8 Q. What is Harry Wilson's position?	8 companies as well as with members of Congress
9 A. He's on the Auto Team. I don't	9 and the administration to try to implement the
10 know what his his title or position is	10 President's policy, which is to effect a
11 within the Treasury Department.	11 commercial restructuring of the U.Sbased OEMs
12 Q. In the hierarchy, are you above,	12 and support to the extent possible the supply
13 below Harry, or parallel, or neither?	 community in the of the autos. O. When you say support to the extent
14 MR. SCHWARTZ: Obviously never 15 worked for the government.	14 Q. When you say support to the extent 15 possible the supply community of the autos,
 15 worked for the government. 16 A. I think well, I would say, and I 	16 what do you mean?
17 believe he would say, that we are partners	17 A. I think the President has been
18 within the Auto Team.	18 pretty clear in his public statements that it
19 Q. What's his position? Do you know?	19 is not possible for the U.S. government to
20 A. No.	20 simply write checks to support the entire Auto
21 Q. Describe your day-to-day	21 industry, that the Treasury and the Auto Team
22 responsibilities with the Auto Team.	22 should act in a commercially responsible
A. I am the only lawyer who's a member	23 manner, which may in some cases mean that
24 of the Auto Team, so I have responsibilities	24 certain suppliers may not be successful in
25 across all of the various companies that we	25 restructuring, given the new sales paradigm
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	easily replaced, and some parts would be more	3	Q. Let me back up. You said today it would have almost no impact on General Motors.
3	difficult to replace. Q. How difficult?	4	What do you mean by that?
4 5	A. Again, I'm not sure I understand	5	A. General Motors has excessive
6	the question. Are you talking about money or	6	inventory in the market today. General Motors
7	are you talking about time or are you talking	7	is not up and running today. Its factories are
8	about I'm just not sure I understand the	8	shut down. It's not buying anything from
9	question.	9	Delphi or other suppliers, or buying very
10	Q. Any way you want to look at it from	10	little from Delphi or other suppliers today.
11	your perspective on the Auto Team.	11	Q. Is it the goal of Treasury to try
12	A. We think it would take several	12	to get General Motors back up and running?
13	months to replace Delphi's production for	13	A. I think it's the goal of General
14	General Motors.	14	Motors to get back up and running.
15	Q. What impact would that have on	15	Q. Is it not the policy of the
16	General Motors from Treasury's perspective to	16	Treasury to have to ensure GM's long-term
17	have a several-month delay in getting some	17	viability?
18	parts that it needs to manufacture autos?	18	A. It's not the policy of the Treasury
19	A. Well, today it would have almost no	19	
20	impact on General Motors.	20	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
21	Q. What about without the proposed		brought in to try to effect a restructuring of
22	deal that's put forth before the bankruptcy	22	General Motors, both balance sheet and
23	court in Delphi?	23	operations, and that is essentially complete at
24	A. I'm sorry. I just don't understand		this point.
	the question.	25	Q. Would you say that Delphi is
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	critical to GM's success going forward?	2	Q. You had said that I don't want
3	MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the	3	to interrupt you. Sorry.
4	form.	4	A. It's difficult to answer the
5	A. No, I wouldn't.	5	question without talking about at least the
6	Q. Why not?	6	category of parts.
7	A. GM needs parts. Delphi can provide	1 7	
		7	Q. The categories you used were that
8	them or others can provide them, but Delphi is	8	parts would be more easily obtainable for GM
9	no more critical to GM than Lear or any other	8 9	parts would be more easily obtainable for GM than others, some would be harder to obtain,
9 10	no more critical to GM than Lear or any other supplier is critical to GM or critical to Ford	8 9 10	parts would be more easily obtainable for GM than others, some would be harder to obtain, some would take several months to obtain. Do
9 10 11	no more critical to GM than Lear or any other supplier is critical to GM or critical to Ford or critical to Chrysler. Every supplier is	8 9 10 11	parts would be more easily obtainable for GM than others, some would be harder to obtain, some would take several months to obtain. Do you recall saying that?
9 10 11 12	no more critical to GM than Lear or any other supplier is critical to GM or critical to Ford or critical to Chrysler. Every supplier is important to the OEMs.	8 9 10 11 12	parts would be more easily obtainable for GM than others, some would be harder to obtain, some would take several months to obtain. Do you recall saying that? A. I do.
9 10 11 12 13	no more critical to GM than Lear or any other supplier is critical to GM or critical to Ford or critical to Chrysler. Every supplier is important to the OEMs. Q. If Delphi were to collapse, where	8 9 10 11 12 13	parts would be more easily obtainable for GM than others, some would be harder to obtain, some would take several months to obtain. Do you recall saying that? A. I do. Q. The ones that would be harder to
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2	parties.	2	approximately \$42 billion has been converted
3	Q. Has GM ever done that before?	3	into equity of General Motors, representing
4	A. I don't know.	4	approximately 60 percent of the equity of
5	Q. Ever?	5	General Motors.
6	A. I don't know.	6	Q. Does U.S. Treasury have some
7	MR. SCHWARTZ: With respect to	7	control over GM's finances?
8	steering?	8	MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the
9	Q. What was your role just a couple	9	form.
10	questions on this. What was your role in the	10	A. Again, I'm not sure what you mean
11	Chrysler bankruptcy?	11	by control.
12.		12	Q. Do you have an understanding what the word "control" means?
13	the structure, helping to negotiate the terms	13	
14	of the transaction with Fiat, and generally overseeing the bankruptcy process from the	14	A. I have lots of understandings of what the word "control" means.
15 16	government's perspective.	16	Q. Using the understanding that you
	Q. What is the U.S. Treasury's	17	
17 18	investment in General Motors today, if you	18	over does Treasury have any control over
19		19	GM's finances?
.20	A. We have lent General Motors I'm	20	MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the
	sorry. Strike that.	21	form.
22	The Treasury has made an investment	22	A. General Motors I'm sorry.
23		23	
24	\$8 billion is in the approximately	24	The Treasury is a lender to General
	\$8 billion is in the form of a loan and	25	Motors, and there are covenants that General
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2 3	· · ·		M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. MALIONEK: He said under the
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Motors must comply with in connection with that loan. Q. Is it Treasury's position that it can consent or object to the use of GM of its any of its money as financing for Delphi? A. Yes. Q. What? Consent? Object? A. Under the terms of the loan that existed prior to General Motors filing for bankruptcy, any transaction that General Motors wanted to undertake in excess of \$100 million or expected to be in excess of \$100 million required the consent of the Treasury. Q. And is there any similar type of provision after GM filing for bankruptcy? MR. SCHWARTZ: Do you mean in the postposition financing? MR. MALIONEK: I'm just using the answer that he gave in coming up with that. MR. SCHWARTZ: He said under the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. MALIONEK: He said under the terms of the loan that existed prior to GM's filing for bankruptcy. And I said after that. A. There are two periods of time after that. Do you mean during the DIP, or do you mean now, postemergence? Q. Now. A. There are covenants that would require General Motors to obtain Treasury's consent again with respect to certain transactions. There's no longer a \$100 million limit. The Delphi investment would be one in which they would need Treasury's consent. (Feldman Exhibit 2 was marked for identification.) BY MR. MALIONEK: Q. You've been handed what's been marked Exhibit 2. Do you recognize this document? A. I do. Q. Can you describe it for the record?

	
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 represents General Motors in connection with	2 Q. Okay. Can you describe for me what
3 the Delphi matter.	3 that objection was, then?
4 Q. What is Cadwalader's role with	4 A. I think it was an objection to
5 respect to Treasury?	5 increasing the commitment from 300 to
6 A. Cadwalader is special counsel to	6 \$450 million before Treasury had an opportunity
7 Treasury in connection with various bankruptcy	7 to review the transaction and the cash flows.
8 matters.	8 Q. Do you know why Treasury made that
9 Q. And Mr. Tanenbaum of Weil Gotshal,	9 objection?
10 do you know who he represents?	10 A. Yes.
11 A. I believe he represents General	11 Q. Why?
12 Motors.	12 A. Because we had just begun to hit
13 Q. Okay. In this letter,	13 the ground on March 23rd and didn't understand
 Mr. Rapisardi says that "I informed you, Mr. Tanenbaum" it's on the second line. Do 	14 what the background was on this transaction,
Mr. Tanenbaum" it's on the second line. Doyou see that?	15 what was going to be required going forward.16 Just simply didn't have enough information at
17 A. I do.	17 that time.
18 Q. "I informed you of the U.S.	18 Q. Okay. What steps did Treasury take
19 Treasury's objection to the increase in GM's	19 to try to get more information, if any?
20 Tranche B commitments under the GM arrangements	20 A. We began talking to General Motors
21 from 300 to 450 million." Do you see that?	21 immediately in understanding the background,
22 A. I do.	22 trying to understand the background of the
23 Q. So was that U.S. Treasury objecting	23 Delphi case, what the reason for the increase
24 to use of GM funding to support Delphi?	24 was, how much money had been spent, how much
25 A. No.	25 money was anticipated to be spent, what the
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Page 32	Page 33
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 overall solution for Delphi was expected to be,	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 the Delphi bankruptcy.
 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL overall solution for Delphi was expected to be, that sort of thing. 	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the Delphi bankruptcy. Q. What do you mean by that, assisted
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 Q. More than	2 Q. So maybe between 10, 20?
3 MR. SCHWARTZ: When you talk	3 A. Roughly 15 sounds right, feels
4 about Treasury, you're talking about	4 right.
5 Treasury officials as opposed to their	5 Q. In the period that you've been with
6 counsel?	6 the Auto Team, you started, what, in late
7 MR. MALIONEK: Talking about	7 March, early April?
8 Treasury.	8 A. One clarification from the prior
9 MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, Treasury	9 answer. That includes both meetings and
10 officials as opposed to their counsel?	10 telephone calls.
11 MR. MALIONEK: I'm talking about	1 Q. Uh-huh.
12 Treasury. If he understands, he	12 A. My official start date was
13 understands. If he doesn't, he doesn't.	13 April 1st, but by the third week of March, I
14 We can work through it.	14 was at Treasury, beginning to get up to speed.
-	15 Q. And about how many times do you
 15 Q. More than 20? 16 A. My answers relate to Treasury 	16 think Treasury had, meetings, phone calls,
17 officials. I have no idea how many times	17 etc., with GM with respect to the Delphi
18 counsel would have spoken to or met with their	18 bankruptcy? Looking for an overall number.
19 counterparts.	19 MR. SCHWARTZ: If you can't
20 Q. Okay.	20 estimate it, don't guess.
21 A. Was more than 20 the question?	21 A. Maybe 70 times.
22 Q. Yes.	22 Q. What was Treasury's goal, if you
23 A. Probably not.	23 could describe it, in that term? And tell me,
24 Q. More than ten?	if you understand, what was Treasury's goal in
25 A. Probably.	assisting GM with its thinking, as you had,
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 with respect to the Delphi bankruptcy?	2 going to liquidate, that's also fine.
3 A. We articulated certain principles	3 But there was a desire for it to
4 that we thought General Motors should focus on.	4 reach a conclusion sooner rather than later and
5 I think they agreed with us. And that was to	5 not linger for three more years in bankruptcy.
6 come up with a transaction that guaranteed	6 Q. And why was it important for
7 sanctity of supply to General Motors, that was	7 Treasury to see that General Motors had the
8 a speedy resolution to the Delphi bankruptcy	8 least amount of investment possible in Delphi?
1 · · · · · · · · ·	· · ·
9 that required the least amount of investment by	9 A. General Motors had already invested
10 General Motors possible.	 9 A. General Motors had already invested 10 and funded Delphi with literally billions of
 General Motors possible. Q. And why was it important to 	9 A. General Motors had already invested 10 and funded Delphi with literally billions of 11 dollars during Delphi's Chapter 11. It had
 10 General Motors possible. 11 Q. And why was it important to 12 Treasury to ensure a the supply to GM? 	 A. General Motors had already invested and funded Delphi with literally billions of dollars during Delphi's Chapter 11. It had spent that money and not gotten anywhere in the
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 10 General Motors possible. 11 Q. And why was it important to 12 Treasury to ensure a the supply to GM? 13 A. Because given everything that GM 14 had going on in its own restructuring, there 	 9 A. General Motors had already invested 10 and funded Delphi with literally billions of 11 dollars during Delphi's Chapter 11. It had 12 spent that money and not gotten anywhere in the 13 case. 14 The case was completely mired in a
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	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 confirmed plan.	2 consummate that plan.
3 Q. So was it Treasury's position that	3 Q. And is it your understanding that
4 as of the time that the Auto Task the Auto	4 at that point Delphi needed some liquidity
5 Team was getting involved in the Delphi	5 support in order to get through even a
 bankruptcy, that GM should not expend any more 	6 short-term period through its bankruptcy?
7 money to support a Delphi without that kind of	7 A. My understanding is Delphi said
8 an overall solution in place?	8 they needed liquidity support, yes.
9 A. That was one of the principles that	9 Q. Told you that?
10 we discussed with General Motors and General	10 A. Yes.
11 Motors articulated to Delphi.	11 Q. Did you tell who told you that?
12 Q. Were you aware that Delphi had a	12 Do you remember?
13 confirmed Plan of Reorganization prior to, you	13 A. Yeah. John Sheehan and Mr
14 know, the spring of 2009?	14 Mr. Tripp.
15 A. Was I aware prior to the spring or	15 MR. SCHWARTZ: Stipp.
16 was	16 A. Stipp. I apologize.
17 Q. No. Were you aware that it was in	17 [°] Q. When? Do you remember?
18 place prior to then?	18 A. It was a meeting we had with them
19 A. At what time was I aware?	19 in early April. I don't remember the exact
20 Q. Are you aware of that now?	20 date, but sometime in the first week of April.
21 A. Yes.	21 MR. SCHWARTZ: 2009?
22 Q. And at some point, that plan fell	22 A. I'm sorry. 2009.
23 apart; right?	23 (Feldman Exhibit 3 was marked for
A. Yeah, my understanding is they	24 identification.)
25 could not go effective. They could not	25 BY MR. MALIONEK:
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	A. We told him that and General Motors	2 subset of things we discussed with him.
3	told him that.	3 Q. Was it Treasury's position at the
4	Q. Did you offer any types of global	4 time that an asset sale would be in the best
5	solutions to Mr. Sheehan at the time?	5 interests of GM at the time?
6	A. At what time?	6 A. I no. I think our view was that
7	Q. The time of the meeting that we	7 the best opportunity for both General Motors
8	were just talking about, April 5.	8 and Delphi was for there to be existing
9	A. I think at that time we told him we	9 financing, but we just didn't see who was going
10	were just beginning to do our diligence on	10 to be a source for that existing financing.
11	Delphi, and we needed more time.	11 Q. You didn't think that was a viable 12 option?
12	Q. It goes on in this e-mail to talk	
13	about a range of options that Treasury sees,	 A. Sheehan thought the only potential provider of that liquidity was U.S. Treasury
14	either a regular way emergence it's the third bullet point, number 1 or a series of	15 directly to Delphi through TARP funds, and we
15 16	asset sales. It says that "Treasury's	16 explained to him that that was not possible.
17	preferred route is option 1. That's not	17 Q. Did Mr. Sheehan explain or say that
	realistic, and therefore U.S. Treasury sees	18 it I guess or push back with the idea that
19	•	19 if Delphi fails, it would be it would cause
20	Do you see that?	20 harm to General Motors?
21	A. I do.	21 A. Obnoxiously so.
22	Q. Were those all things that Treasury	22 Q. What do you mean?
	relayed to Mr. Sheehan and Delphi at the time?	23 A. He began and ended every
24	A. Yeah. I think I think more was	24 conversation with that until we told him to
	relayed to him, but those are that's a	25 stop.
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	Page 44	Page 45
1		Page 45 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Did you tell him that you didn't believe that that was the case?	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL find liquidity for his company in any place he could find it.
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	nan - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL view. I think it's I think it was an	
2 solution to I 3 O. Did	you tell Mr. Sheehan or Delphi	3	objectively clear path to emergence. I don't	
	easury was not going to allow	4	think it's just our view.	
	ig to provide or allow GM to provide	5	Q. When you say "objectively clear,"	
	g unless Treasury was happy with	6	what do you mean?	
7 the end deal		7	A. There needed to be signed	· · ·
	, financing above 100 million.	8	documents, there needed to be a court process,	
	under 100 million we didn't have any	9	whether it was through a plan or a 363 sale	
	didn't have any ability to be asked	10	that had that had a mechanism for the	
	ent or to stop it or to do anything	11	company to come out of bankruptcy.	
12 else.		12	Q. Now, in you understand that	
13 Soy	es, over 100 million we said as	13	Delphi, the debtors in the bankruptcy case,	
14 a lender to (General Motors, we're not prepared	14	have certain fiduciary duties?	1
15 to consent to	a transaction absent a clear path	15	A. Sure, I understand that.	
16 to emergend		16	Q. To various constituencies?	
	d Treasury's approval?	17	A. Sure, I understand that.	
	ink I said our consent, which	18	Q. Including the creditors?	
	required under the loan support	19	A. Among others, sure.	
	which we had with General Motors.	20	Q. And unsecured creditors?	
	d your consent was dependent on a	21	A. I agree.	
1 · · · ·	emergence?	22	Q. In the confirmed Plan of	
••••	at's correct.	23 24	Reorganization that we discussed earlier that	
	Freasury's view? u could say it's in Treasury's		was in place prior to the spring of 2009, do you know if the Unsecured Creditors Committee	
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156 Keporer				
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1 M. Feld	nan - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
2 was to obtai	n any kind of recovery?	2	until there was a clear path to emergence.	
	SCHWARTZ: Prior to the	3	Those were our principles and goals.	
4 spring of		4	Q. All to support GM's interests?	
	FRIEDMAN: The committee was	5	A. That's that's correct.	
	get recovery?	6	Q. Okay. You weren't taking on any	
	MALIONEK: Right.	7	fiduciary duties to the creditors at Delphi?	
1	AKER: The committee.	8	A. Correct.	
1	MALIONEK: The unsecured	9	Q. You didn't think that you owed the	
	represented by the committee. elieve I believe that I know		Unsecured Creditors Committee any duty to try to make sure that it got any recovery for the	
	firmed plan provided some		unsecured creditors?	i
	to unsecured creditors.	13	A. I'm sorry, I don't understand the	
· ·	w, it wasn't Treasury's goal in	14	•	·
	ient in the Delphi bankruptcy over	15	Q. You weren't trying to maximize the	
	months to try to ensure that any	16	recovery to the unsecured creditors for Delphi?	
	ors got a particular kind of	17	A. Who is the	
18 recovery, w		18	Q. Treasury.	·
	asury's role was solely with	19	A. I apologize. Who was the "you" in	
1	eneral Motors.	20	that sentence?	
	d solely to ensure that General	21	Q. Treasury.	
	the best deal that it could get?	22	A. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the	
23 A. To	go back to the principles that	23	question? I lost it.	
24 we articulat	ed, sanctity of supply; speed of	24	Q. Treasury has not, in its	
24 we articulat 25 emergence;	ed, sanctity of supply; speed of minimization of costs; no funding ing - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	25	Q. Treasury has not, in its involvement in the Delphi bankruptcy over the SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702	

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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 last few months, been trying to ensure the	2 what starts the e-mail chain, an e-mail from
3 maximum amount of recovery for the unsecured	3 Mr. Sheehan of Delphi to you talks about a
4 creditors of Delphi, has it?	4 meeting between Delphi's DIP lenders and
5 A. It has not.	5 Treasury. You see that?
6 Q. Or any other Delphi creditors?	6 A. Yes.
7 A. Other than General Motors?	7 Q. Okay. And Mr. Sheehan is asking to
8 Q. Correct.	8 attend the meeting; correct?
9 A. No, it has not.	9 A. That's correct.
10 MR. MALIONEK: Can we take a	10 Q. And you tell him no; right?
11 five-minute break?	11 A. You can characterize it that way.
12 (A recess was taken from 11:00 a.m.	12 Q. Could you characterize it as yes?
13 through 11:09 a.m.)	13 A. I told him I think it was
14 (Feldman Exhibit 4 was marked for	14 premature.
15 identification.)	15 Q. Why was it premature? Why did you
16 BY MR. MALIONEK:	16 tell him that?
17 Q. You've been shown what's been	17 A. Because, as I say in the e-mail,
18 marked Exhibit 4. Do you recognize this	18 John was concerned about being at the meeting
19 document?	19 so that if there was a deal to execute on, they
20 A. Yes.	20 could provide input to that execution.
21 Q. This is an e-mail chain from	21 I think my suggestion was it was
22 April 16 between you, John Sheehan, and others,	we were not at that point yet, so there was no.need, no reason, no benefit for him to attend.
23 correct? 24 A. That's correct.	24 Q. Was this this was to discuss
	24 Q. was this - this was to discuss25 financing options for Delphi, correct?
25 Q. And at the very bottom, which is TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 A. I think it was to discuss whether	2 A. I was on a number of phone calls
3 there could be an agreement between the DIP	3 with Delphi regarding how the information would
4 lenders and General Motors around a financing	4 flow, who was entitled to see the information
5 for Delphi, that's correct.	5 from the that Delphi was producing.
 5 for Delphi, that's correct. 6 Q. But you didn't think it was 	 5 from the that Delphi was producing. 6 Q. Did you discuss issues of
 for Delphi, that's correct. Q. But you didn't think it was productive to have Delphi there? 	 from the that Delphi was producing. Q. Did you discuss issues of confidentiality?
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	Page 54		Page 55
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	meeting with Treasury and the DIP lenders'	2	Does that refresh your recollection
3	representatives?	3	as to whether there actually was a phone call
4	A. I don't know for sure whether the	4	as opposed to a meeting on the 17th with
5	meeting actually took place. It certainly	5	respect to the DIP lenders?
6	didn't take place in New York, which I think is	6	A. I'm sorry. Where are you directing
7	referenced somewhere in the e-mail, which is	7	me in the exhibit?
8	making me question whether the meeting ever	8	Q. Bottom of page 1, top of page 2.
9	ever occurred.	9	There's an e-mail from you to Jeff Tanenbaum
10	(Feldman Exhibit 5 was marked for	10	dated April 16 at 2:19 p.m. Do you see that?
11	identification.)	11	A. From Jeff to me?
12	BY MR. MALIONEK:	.12	Q. Go to the bottom of page 1.
13	Q. You've been shown what's been	13	A. Oh, now I see it. I'm sorry.
14	marked Feldman Exhibit 5. Do you recognize	14	Q. That's okay. It says "I would"
15	this document?	15	you say, "I would encourage people not to
16	A. Yes.	16	travel. I think it's unnecessary."
17	Q. Okay. If you look at the bottom,	17	A. I see that, yes.
	there's an e-mail chain between Jeff Tanenbaum	18	Q. Does this refresh your recollection
19	and you with respect to Delphi and a meeting on	19	as to whether this was a call, not a meeting?
20	April 17. See that?	20	A. Yes.
21	A. Yes.	21	Q. Okay. You list the expected
22	Q. And you respond this is at the	22	attendees. Now, this goes into the top of page
23	bottom of page 1, top of page 2 saying that	23	2. A. Uh-huh.
24	"I would encourage people not to travel, so we could have a phone call."	24 25	A. Uh-huh. Q. Do you see that?
	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580		SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
-	Se Reporting worldwide (0777-702-5500		is reporting worldwide (0777702 5500
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Page 56		Page 57
1	Page 56 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	Page 57 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. I do.	1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Yes.
2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. I do. Q. Okay. And you list representatives	2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Yes. Q. Okay. Can you describe it for the
2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. I do. Q. Okay. And you list representatives from Treasury, you and Harry Wilson; right?	2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Yes. Q. Okay. Can you describe it for the record?
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 Q. On this e-mail chain starting on	2 this period in preparation for its discussions
3 page 2.	3 with Delphi, but not to but to have a let
4 A. That's correct.	4 me start that over.
5 Q. Okay. Why was this draft not sent	5 Was it the general practice of
6 to Delphi?	6 Treasury and GM at the time to have an internal
7 A. First of all, this was an internal	7 e-mail distribution list for most discussions
8 draft between not first of all. This was an	 8 related to the Delphi plan? 9 MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the
9 internal draft term sheet between General	9 MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the 10 form.
10 Motors and its lender, U.S. Treasury.	11 A. You did say at that time? Yes.
11 Q. So Delphi wasn't yet appropriate, 12 from Treasury's perspective, to include Delphi	12 Q. And generally not to include Delphi
13 in a review of this draft?	13 in those discussions?
14 A. It would be our position it wasn't	14 A. We did not include anyone in
15 appropriate to share it with anyone other than	15 discussions between ourselves and General
16 General Motors and its lenders at that point.	16 Motors around what General Motors' strategy
17 Q. And if you look at the bottom of	17 would be, that's correct.
18 page 1, the e-mail from Harry Wilson, there's a	18 Q. And also in Harry Wilson's e-mail,
19 statement here that "We are totally fine with	19 the second paragraph, this is his e-mail to
20 one distribution list, U.S. Treasury plus	20 various folks at General Motors and advisors,
21 advisors, GM plus advisors."	21 he says that as one of his comments is "We
22 Do you see that?	22 should have a cover letter."
23 A. Yes.	23 Do you know if that refers to a
24 Q. Was that the general practice with	24 cover letter of the proposal that's sent from
25 Treasury and GM, to exchange information during	25 GM to Delphi?
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	1090 01
1 M Foldman, LUCHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 A. I believe it refers to a cover	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 that General Motors has always been free to do
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2 chain or excuse me, the e-mail that starts	2 referring to?
3 at the bottom of page 3, Don Bernstein, do you	3 A. Yeah. I believe he is referring to
4 see that reference? At the bottom of the third	4 the term sheet dated, again, April 18, 17,
5 page.	5 something like that, from General created by
6 A. I'm sorry. It's from Don?	6 General Motors.
7 Q. From Don.	7 Q. Okay. And if you look at the
8 A. To Jeff Tanenbaum?	8 e-mail response from Jeff Tanenbaum sent to you
9 Q. To Jeff Tanenbaum. Do you see	9 and Harry Wilson and others now, this is on
10 that?	10 the middle of page 3. Do you see that? "The
11 A. The e-mail starts, "We just got	11 latest from the DIP lenders," it starts.
12 off"?	12 A. Page 3? Yes.
13 Q. "We just got off our initial call,"	13 Q. All right. Thanks. It's a little
14 correct.	14 confusing to follow through the e-mail chain,
15 A. Yes, I see it.	15 but I appreciate you following along.
16 Q. Who is Don Bernstein?	16 A. I agree with that.
17 A. Don is counsel to the DIP lender	17 Q. He says, "The latest from the DIP
18 agent, DIP lenders' agent.	18 lenders." And he goes on. He says, "Do we 19 care that Delphi receives our term sheet?"
19 Q. And what Don is saying to Jeff, if	20 Do you see that?
20 you look at the third paragraph, among other21 things, he says, "We expect to need Delphi's	21 A. I do.
22 input on a number of points, so we are	22 Q. The next e-mail, or next e-mail
23 providing Delphi with your draft term sheet to	23 from Jeff Tanenbaum here, so now it's on page
24 obtain their input."	24 2, says that he just got off the phone with
25 Do you know what term sheet he's	25 Don. Do you see that?
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2 A. Yes.	2 beneficial to getting a deal done.
3 Q. He says, "The issue is moot because	3 Q. Okay. And your e-mail response at
4 the term sheet has already gone over." Do you	4 the top of page 2 here, bottom of page 1, top
5 see that?	5 of page 2, do you see that?
6 A. I do.	6 A. Bottom of page 1, top of page 2?
7 Q. Now, we had discussed earlier that	7 Q. Starts "The early sharing."
8 Treasury's position at the time was that it	8 A. Yeah, I see it.
9 wasn't appropriate to be sharing these draft	9 Q. So your response was "The early
10 term sheets with Delphi. What was Treasury's	10 sharing was unfortunate." Was that about the
11 position at this point with respect to sharing	11 sharing of information with Delphi?
12 the draft term sheet?	12 A. It was about providing the term
13 A. At which point? Prior to seeing	13 sheet to Delphi at this early stage.14 Q. And you thought it was unfortunate?
14 this e-mail? Knowing that it had already gone,	14 Q. And you thought it was unfortunate? 15 A. Yes.
15 or reaction to the e-mail?16 Q. Reaction to the e-mail.	16 Q. And why?
17 A. Look at wasn't the end of the	17 A. I think, as I said, until there was
18 world, but we were of the view that it was not	18 a deal on economics between the DIP lenders and
19 going to be beneficial to involve Delphi at	19 General Motors to get into the weeds of
20 what was then a very early stage of discussions	20 implementation and IP and all the other points
21 with the DIP lenders.	21 that are raised in the other e-mails, just
	22 seemed premature to me and would divert the
22 Q. You didn't want the term sheet	23 parties from the main thrust of what we were
Q. You didn't want the term sheetTreasury did not want the term sheet sent at	
Q. You didn't want the term sheetTreasury did not want the term sheet sent at	23 parties from the main thrust of what we were

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2 DIP lenders.	2 changes you need to make to the deal.
3 Q. And Treasury wanted to wait for the	3 If you have five people in the
4 right time to share that the contours of	4 room, each espousing their own important issue,
5 that deal with Delphi; is that fair?	5 people never get to a deal.
6 A. I think we wanted to be to know	6 Q. Okay.
7 that we were at least within spitting distance,	7 A. And that was the challenge I was
8 for lack of a better way of saying it, of each	8 concerned about.
9 other before it made sense to make a bilateral	9 Q. When you say "trying to control the
10 discussion a tri- or quadrilateral discussion.	10 process," you were trying to control the
11 Q. Okay. You go on to say in your	11 process, who was trying to control the process?
12 e-mail, "It speaks volumes about the challenges	12 A. I think we and General Motors were
13 here." What did you mean by that?	13 trying to control the process.
14 A. There were a lot of parties to the	14 Q. Treasury and General Motors?
15 Delphi case. Everybody wants to play their	15 A. That's General Motors was trying
16 role, and trying to control the process was	16 to control the process, and we supported
17 going to be difficult and is difficult.	17 General Motors' position that a bilateral deal18 made sense first.
18 Q. When you say trying to control the19 process would be difficult, what do you mean?	18 made sense first.19 Q. You say "The idea that Delphi is
20 A. Again, in my experience, having two	20 not a critical piece goes out the window."
21 parties agree to something is a lot easier than	21 What did you mean by that?
22 getting three, four, and five parties to agree	22 A. Again, from a process perspective,
23 to something. And if you can get two parties	23 what we were trying to get to was let's get an
24 to agree to something, then typically you can	24 economic deal between the DIP lenders and
25 bring the others onboard with whatever modest	25 General Motors, and then we can fold Delphi
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2 into that deal.	2 window, what you mean is now Delphi is going to
3 But to the extent that they're	3 be a critical part of this?
4 going to be at the table, they have their own	4 A. Now Delphi's at the table, and
5 issues that they are going to espouse, and that	5 we're going to have to somehow figure out how
6 was inconsistent with the strategy that we were	6 to try to get a trilateral agreement in place.
7 trying to follow at that time.	7 Q. And that was unfortunate from
8 Q. I want to make sure that I	8 Treasury's and GM's perspective?
9 understand. You said the idea that Delphi is	9 A. I think it cost the deal a month,
10 not a critical piece goes out the window.	10 to be candid.
11 A. Uh-huh.	11 Q. It would have been better, from 12 Treasury's perspective, to continue to wait to
12 Q. Were you trying to espouse the idea 13 that Delphi was not a critical piece?	12 I reasury's perspective, to continue to wait to 13 share the contours of a term sheet until it was
14 A. GM's position, which Treasury	14 a month later perhaps?
15 supported to the DIP lenders, was that it was	
16 not critical to get Delphi on as at the	15 A. No, not at all. And by the way,16 this was General Motors' position which
17 moment we had a bilateral agreement. It was	17 Treasury supported, which was that it would be
18 more important to get the bilateral agreement	18 better to wait until we were at least in the
19 first and then bring Delphi into the tent.	19 same ZIP code, "we" being General Motors and
20 Obviously, the DIP lenders'	20 the DIP lenders, with each other before
21 decision to share and to get feedback from	21 bringing Delphi into the mix.
22 Delphi made it clear that that was not going to	22 If we could have gotten to if
23 be able to be pursued, that they did not share	23 General Motors could have gotten to the same
24 that view.	24. ZIP code in the next 48 hours with the DIP
24 that view.	
24 that view.	 24. ZIP code in the next 48 hours with the DIP 25 lenders, then it might have been able to bring TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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	Delphi in at that point, but it was it was	2	in Treasury's view?
	ot to be.	3	A. Well, irrelevant may be too harsh.
4	Q. Okay. So at that point, you said	4	It was untimely at that point.
	hat Delphi now was at the table. To what	5 6	Q. When would it have been timely?
6 e: 7	xtent was Delphi at the table starting now?	0 7	A. If there was an actual deal we were
	A. My recollection is within a day or wo, we got a I think the term sheet was two	8	negotiating around. O. So the draft term sheet was not an
	r three pages. We got a four or five-page	9	actual deal?
	nterlineation from Skadden about all the	10	A. As it turned out, we got a term
	roblems with the term sheet and the deal.	11	a i i a la muma la Talancia i
12	Q. And what was Treasury's reaction to		that suggested that General Motors and the DIP
	hat?	13	lenders remained very, very far apart on
14	A. It was irrelevant at that point,	14	economics.
15 b	ecause it was clear that economically we were	15	(Feldman Exhibit 8 was marked for
	00 miles apart from the DIP lenders. And	16	identification.)
	gain, consistent with what I've said earlier,	17	
	ve felt that was the most important first piece	18	Q. Before we turn to 8, I'm sorry, if
19 0	f the puzzle, not how the IP moves around the	19	you go back to 7, I had a couple of other
	Delphi chain.	20	questions on that.
21	Q. And just to be clear, Skadden is	21	After the e-mail from you to Jeff
	epresenting Delphi in this?		Tanenbaum and others saying that the early
23	A. That's correct.	23	0
24	Q. So Delphi's position at that point		Tanenbaum has a response to you that says in
	with respect to the term sheet was irrelevant	25	
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1 1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 tł	hat?	2	Q. Generally, just did you?
3	A. I do.	3	A. Generally, I'm I'm always
4	Q. "We need to be very careful about	4	concerned, although I think recent evidence
5 fi	uture e-mail traffic going forward." And he	5	would suggest I need to be more concerned about
	oes on to talk about the fact there's no	6	things I type in e-mails.
	orivilege between GM and contributory	· 7	Q. So you tried to be careful in the
	egligence. You see all that?	8	e-mail chains that you had going from you, from
9	A. I do.	9	Treasury over to GM or its advisors?
10	Q. Do you know what he's referring to	10	A. I I think my answer was that
11 th	A. I assume he's referring to the fact	11 12	I'm I try to always be careful about what I say in e-mails.
	A. I assume he's referring to the fact hat e-mails like this will be discoverable	13	
	subsequently, since there's no privilege	14	
	between Treasury and General Motors.	15	Treasury and GM?
16	Q. Did you have any discussion beyond	16	A, No.
	his e-mail chain with Jeff Tanenbaum about	17	Q. All right. Now, please, if you
	hat issue?	18	could turn to the next exhibit. All right,
19	A. No.	19	you've been shown what's been marked as
20	Q. Did you take any action to try to	20	Exhibit 8. Do you recognize this?
1	be careful about future e-mail traffic going	21	A. I do.
	forward?	22	Q. This is an April 30 e-mail from
23	A. Based on Jeff Tanenbaum's e-mail?	23	Jack Butler, again who represents Delphi, the
24	Q. No.	24	debtors, to John Rapisardi, who we talked about
		100	conting and others talking shout a chembers
25	A. Generally?	25	earlier, and others, talking about a chambers

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 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL conference that day and going on to say he says in his first his second paragraph that starts, "Well, Delphi understands." Do you see that? A. I do. Q. Third line he says, "The fact is there have been no substantive discussions between the Auto Task Force and Delphi and its stakeholders since U.S. Treasury acted to block 150 million in additional liquidity." Do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you see that? A. I do. Q. Do you see that there had been no substantive discussions between the Auto Team and Delphi as he describes here? A. No. Q. You think there had been substantive discussions? A. Yes. Q. What substantive discussions do you recall? A. Two things. One, as I think I said very early in the deposition, I also had responsibility for Chrysler, which Harry did 	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL not. And given the date of this e-mail, April 30, happened to have been the date that Chrysler filed for bankruptcy. So there was a period of time in the week or ten days preceding the Chrysler bankruptcy where I receded a little bit from the Delphi matters. But my understanding of what was taking place during that time I'm sorry. And one other point. There was also a point in time where Harry and I were being given sort of updated instructions as Treasury became more cognizant of our prior employers, and so there was a period of time when most of the conversations that we were having, instead of being with Delphi's lenders, began to be just with General Motors and just with Delphi. And we were talking and Harry was talking to John Sheehan at this time about a solution for Delphi that would include a third party, since it seemed clear based on the April 17, 18, 19 exchanges of e-mails that the DIP lenders and General Motors were very, very
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 Page 76 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL restructuring would look like. So there was some groundwork being laid and some discussions taking place during this time over the possibility that perhaps a third party could come in here and provide liquidity I'm sorry could provide exit funding and/or purchase the assets. Q. And were there you talked about discussions that Treasury was having with General Motors. Was Treasury also having discussions with Delphi at that point about those issues? A. Yes. Q. How many conversations did you have at that point? A. Clearly, things were less active during the ten days from April 20 to April 30. There were probably, you know, no more than three or four conversations during that time period. Q. Between Treasury and Delphi? A. And Delphi, correct. Q. You had talked about issues with respect to your prior employers, you and Harry TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	 Page 77 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Wilson; is that right? A. That's correct. Q. Can you explain those issues to me? A. Yeah. My prior employer was Willkie Farr, which represented I've forgotten what they called themselves, but a group of C Tranche lenders. And Harry's prior employment my employment by Willkie was immediately before joining the task force. Harry had a period of time where he was investing on his own, but his prior employer was Silver Point Capital, which is a DIP lender. And in working for the government, there are ethical constraints in terms of having interaction with your former employers. Q. Was there a conflict of interest, then, that you and Harry Wilson each had with respect to the DIP lenders or their counsel? A. Not a conflict of interest, but there are rules of what you're allowed and not allowed to do as a government employer that we were getting more direction on and more clarity on during this time period. Q. Ethical rules? TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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1 2	A. Correct.	2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 8 a.m. until midnight.
2	Q. In this e-mail that we were just	3	Q. So Jack Butler asked for a meeting
4	looking at from Jack Butler, in the	4	on May 1st, and that didn't happen?
5	second-to-last paragraph that starts	5	A. It did not happen on May 1st,
6	"Accordingly, Delphi respectfully requests," do	6	that's correct.
7	you see that?	7	(Feldman Exhibit 9 was marked for
8	A. Yes.	8	identification.)
9	Q. He asks for a meeting with the Auto	9	BY MR. MALIONEK:
10	Task Force coming up on Friday, that would be	10	Q. And you've been shown Exhibit 9.
11	May 1st, in New York. You see that?	11	Do you recognize this document?
12	A. Yes.	12	A. Yes.
13	Q. Was there such a meeting?	13	Q. This is an e-mail chain on May 3
14	A. No.	14	between Jack Butler, you, and others regarding
15	Q. Why not?	15	Delphi. And if you go to the first e-mail,
16	A. We had already scheduled an all-day		which starts on page 2, bottom of page 2, from
17	5	17	Jack Butler to you and others, he asks for a
18	with General Motors on both General Motors'	18	phone call that day, May 3rd, to follow up on
19		19	discussions.
	Delphi.	20	Do you see that?
21	And then there was an evening	21	A. Yes.
	meeting that night in Carl Icon's offices,	22	Q. And did that phone call happen?
23		23	A. I don't believe there was well,
24			let me think about that. Strike that. Sorry.
25		25	There was a phone call on that
r I	ISG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	T	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
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2	Sunday. I just don't recall whether Jack	2	clearly interested in coming in and trying to
3	participated in it.	3	buy or be a trying to buy Delphi's assets.
4	Q. Your e-mail response to Jack	4	We had talked and updated GM and
5	Butler, if you look above that on page 2	5	we had talked and updated Delphi's management
6	A. Uh-huh.	6	team about that. We and GM had talked to the
7	Q. You follow me?	7	
8	A. Yes,	8	need to do to allow diligence sessions to
9		9	
10		10	
		1	
		1	
1		1	
		1	
1			
	9	1	
1			
1			
	Federal-Mogul, is my recollection. They were	1	
25			
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 Q. You follow me? A. Yes. Q. You say we "Jack, we spent about four hours this weekend talking to Rod." Do you know who that's a reference to? A. Yes. Q. Who? A. Rod O'Neal, the chairman of the board of Delphi. Q. Okay. You go on and say in that e-mail, "In order to stay coordinated, we'd like to stick to the agreed-upon path." What were you referring to there? A. We had agreed with Rod and with John well, take a step back. We had met on Friday night with Federal-Mogul. This was the first meeting with a third party who was interested. It was the second meeting with 	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	management team about the things they would

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Page 86 Page 87 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 2 excuse me -- that Delphi could shut down? every vendor is in some sense a critical vendor 3 A. I'm not comfortable with the word 3 to some OEM, and you just cannot allow yourself "threat." What our position was was that we in this industry to look at one vendor as being 4 4 5 have zero cost of capital, unlimited funds, and more critical or less critical in terms of how 5 6 that, if necessary, we would continue to fund you approach the OEM. 6 Q. You said you're not comfortable 7 General Motors even if Delphi never shipped 7 with the word "threat." That's the word that's another part to General Motors. 8 8 described here in this GM e-mail about what 9 Q. Did Treasury consider as a 9 reasonable possibility that it would allow Harry Wilson indicated. Did anyone at 10 10 Delphi to shut down? Treasury, including Harry Wilson, use the word 11 11 12 Yes. 12 we need to have a credible threat -- threat on Α Okay. At what point in time? 13 this issue? 13 Q. At every point in time. 14 A. I -- I was not in every single 14 Α. Is that still Treasury's position 15 conversation or phone call, so I can't say 15 Ο. 16 at this point now? 16 unequivocally no, but I would find it to be Well, we'd like to see the deals 17 very unusual for that word to have been used. 17 Α. that are on the table or the deal that's on the 18 It goes on to say not just a 18 О. table get done, but if at the end of the day 19 credible threat of allowing Delphi to shut 19 Delphi is unable to operate, Treasury is 20 down, but it says GM going down also. Do you 20 21 prepared for that. 21 know what that refers to? 22 Treasury is prepared to have Delphi 22 Α. Yes Q. 23 What? Q. 23 shut down? 24 General Motors was planning its 24 Α. That's --- it's obviously not our Α. 25 summer shutdown at that point, and one of the 25 first choice, but as I said to you before, TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 88 Page 89 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL `2 2 stop operating itself because it would run out things we suggested they ought to take into 3 3 of cash, and therefore, they would no longer be consideration from a timing perspective was 4 supplied by Delphi. 4 their own restructuring, but to the extent that 5 5 Q. Okay. This point 3 goes on to say, Delphi's cash was going to run out at some 6 point and Delphi was going to potentially shut 6 "If the DIP lenders believe GM is not prepared 7 7 down, Delphi's potential shut down. to allow this to happen, the negotiation 8 I'm sorry. You said "Delphi was 8 dynamics totally change." О. 9 Do you see that? 9 going to potentially shut down, Delphi's 10 I see it. 10 potential shut down." I'm just reading from Α. the record. Can you explain what you mean? 11 Was it Treasury's view that GM was 11 О. 12 Α. Yes. 12 prepared to allow this to happen, a shutdown of 13 Q. Okay. 13 Delphi? MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the 14 As you've said, Delphi had limited 14 Α. 15 15 liquidity back in April of 2009. At some form. A. I don't know that we had a view as 16 point, unless either General Motors or the DIP 16 to what GM was allowed -- was going to allow or 17 lenders provided incremental additional 17 18 18 not allow liquidity, Delphi would have to cease 19 19 Q. Did you have any discussions with operating. 20 GM about that, what GM's view was on that? 20 We suggested to General Motors that 21 21 In April? as they determined when they would take their Α. Q. Yes. 22 22 summer shutdown this year, that they take into 23 I don't recall discussions in early 23 consideration not just their own potential Α. Chapter 11 case and restructuring, but that 24 April with General Motors about a Delphi 24 25 they also consider when Delphi might have to 25 shutdown other than a desire for them to TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

Page 90 Page 91 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL understand better what the impact would be and 2 to come back to us with their view of what a 2 3 the implications of it to their operations. 3 Delphi shutdown would mean to General Motors' 4 Q. Do you recall ever having -- you 4 business and operations. There was an analysis 5 don't remember it from early April. Do you 5 that General Motors did about how long they could operate if Delphi were to stop supplying б have any recollection of having discussions 6 7 7 with GM about a potential Delphi shutdown and them, how they would replace Delphi, what 8 the impact on GM then? 8 the -- in the real world would be likely to 9 A. Later in April or early May, yes, 9 happen. There were a series of conversations 1 -- we had conversations about that. 10 about that. 10 11 Who were involved in those 11 Q. What did GM tell you that it's view Q. 12 12 discussions? was with respect to a Delphi shutdown and the 13 I was involved, Harry was involved, 13 impact on GM? Rick Westenberg was involved, Walter Borst was 14 A. If GM had to resource every Delphi 14 involved, Bo Anderson was involved. Several 15 15 part, the, you know, shortest period to lawyers from Weil Gotshal were involved. I can resource would be like a week, but some of the 16 16 more complicated parts could take up to a year. 17 recall a conversation where Ray Young was 17 involved. There could have been others from 18 18 But both -- but General Motors did not believe 19 General Motors. 19 that that would be the likely way that this would play out if Delphi were to shut down or 20 Q. Many conversations between Treasury 20 21 and GM about this? 21 the case were to be converted to a Chapter 7. Several conversations about it. 22 GM did not believe that this would 22 Α. Q. 23 0. Can you describe the conversations 23 be the likely way it would play out? Did they 24 with me, these ones that you're describing now? 24 say what way they thought was likely? 25 Α. Yeah. We had asked General Motors 25 A. Yeah. General Motors believed that TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 92 Page 93 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 the Delphi plants have almost no value to a Correct. Α. 3 3 third party, and so following a conversion to Q. -- if Delphi shut down? 4 Chapter 7, a trustee would seek to sell those 4 And GM was not able to buy those Α. 5 5 plants, and it's likely that General Motors plants from a Chapter 7 trustee. 6 6 would be the buyer for the critical plants, Q. If a Chapter 7 liquidation 7 which would cause them to be shut down for 60 7 occurred? 8 or 90 days. 8 Let me take a step back. If GM had Α. 9 0. And if that did not happen -- I .9 to resource all of the parts that are currently 10 know that was GM's view of what was the more 10 supplied by Delphi, they might have to shut 11 likely scenario. But if that did not happen, 11 down their manufacturing of heavy trucks for up 12 GM's view was that it would take between a week 12 to a year. 13 and up to a year to replace some of the parts 13 Q. This e-mail goes on to say in that 14 that Delphi supplied? 14 same point number 3 that there's an assignment 15 That was -- that was my -- that's 15 from Harry Wilson -- or I'm sorry. "There's an Α. 16 my memory of it, that's correct. 16 assignment from Ray Young. We all need to stay 17 Would GM need to shut down during 17 on message regarding being willing to go dark,' Q. 18 that -- during any of that time? 18 quote-unquote, "go dark if the DIP lenders call A. GM would need to shut down certain 19 19 the loans. Harry does not believe the DIP 20 lines for all of that time. 20 lenders in reality would do this." Which lines? Do you know? 21 21 Q. Do you see that? 22 Α. The most -- the longest lead time 22 Α. I see it. 23 would be the trucks, the heavy trucks. 23 Q. · Do you know what that is referring 24 So the production of trucks would 24 to, we need to stay on message on this point? Ο. 25 need to shut down for up to a year --25 A. No. TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide

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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 Q. Did you ever hear Harry Wilson talk	2 A. I do.
3 about stay on message about willing to go dark?	3 Q. Who is he? 4 A. He's an employee of Platinum
4 A. No. 5 Q. Did Treasury ever indicate to	4 A. He's an employee of Platinum 5 Equity.
6 anyone that GM and Delphi were willing to	6 Q. Here's an e-mail from Dan Krasner
7 let me strike that.	7 to Johnny Lopez. Do you know who he is?
8 Do you remember Harry Wilson or	8 A. I do.
9 Treasury saying to anyone that GM or Delphi	9 Q. Who is he?
10 would be willing to go dark if the DIP lenders	10 A. Another employee of Platinum
11 call the loans?	11 Equity.
12 A. I'm sorry. I don't understand the	12 Q. He says in this e-mail he spoke to
13 question. Can you repeat it?	13 Sheehan, and here's the story, and it goes into
14 Q. Yeah. Let me try again. I'm	14 several different points. Point 3 says, "The
15 sorry.	15 Delphi negotiations are now being run by the
16 Do you remember Harry Wilson or	16 U.S. Treasury, a guy named Harry Wilson."
17 Treasury ever saying anything along the lines	17 Do you see that?
18 of being willing to go dark if the DIP lenders19 call the loans?	18 A. I see it. 19 Q. Do you think that was a true
20 A. No.	20 statement?
21 (Exhibit No. 11 was marked.)	21 A. No.
22 BY MR. MALIONEK:	22 Q. You don't think that U.S. Treasury
23 Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 11?	23 or Harry Wilson were running the Delphi
24 A. No.	24 negotiations?
25 Q. Do you know who Dan Krasner is?	25 A. Absolutely not.
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 Q. Why do you say "absolutely not"?	2 Q. That's just not a true statement?
3 A. There's a suggestion that we were	3 A. In my opinion, it's not a true
4 being more than supportive of General Motors	4 statement.
5 and interacting with General Motors as a lender	
6 and as a fufure equity holder and that's	5 Q. When did Treasury's involvement
6 and as a future equity holder, and that's	6 with Platinum first arise?
7 that suggestion does not appear to me to be	6 with Platinum first arise?7 A. You know, I don't recall the exact
7 that suggestion does not appear to me to be8 true.	 6 with Platinum first arise? 7 A. You know, I don't recall the exact 8 date, but I I would guess it was kind of the
 7 that suggestion does not appear to me to be 8 true. 9 Q. It goes on to say, "Ironically, 	 6 with Platinum first arise? 7 A. You know, I don't recall the exact 8 date, but I I would guess it was kind of the 9 very end of April or very beginning of May.
 7 that suggestion does not appear to me to be 8 true. 9 Q. It goes on to say, "Ironically, 10 Harry Wilson is a former partner of Silver 	 6 with Platinum first arise? 7 A. You know, I don't recall the exact 8 date, but I I would guess it was kind of the 9 very end of April or very beginning of May. 10 Q. And do you remember how Treasury
 7 that suggestion does not appear to me to be 8 true. 9 Q. It goes on to say, "Ironically, 10 Harry Wilson is a former partner of Silver 11 Point." You had referenced that earlier; 	 6 with Platinum first arise? 7 A. You know, I don't recall the exact 8 date, but I I would guess it was kind of the 9 very end of April or very beginning of May.
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 Q. The top e-mail from Lopez to Wilson	2 Q. Was Delphi invited to that meeting?
3 introduces himself, says he's founding partner	3 A. No, I don't believe so.
4 with Platinum and asks for a meeting with him.	4 Q. Why not?
5 Do you know if there was a meeting	5 A. Platinum requested the meeting.
6 as described here between Platinum and	6 They didn't indicate they wanted anyone else
7 Treasury?	7 there. We at Treasury meet with lots and lots
8 A. There was.	8 of different people involved in the auto
9 Q. When did that take place?	9 industry, and so we told them to come on in.
10 A. I believe it was Thursday afternoon	10 Q. And what do you recall being the
11 on April 23.	11 result of that meeting?
12 Q. And who participated in that?	12 A. I think we we urged Platinum
13 A. I was there, Harry was there for	13 to I think there were really three things.
14 Treasury. I don't recall whether anybody else	14 One, we urged Platinum to get us more
15 from Treasury attended. For Platinum it was	15 information about who they were. Neither one
16 Johnny Lopez, Dan Krasner. And there was a	16 of us had a lot of background or experience
17 third person. I just don't recall who it was.	17 with Platinum.
18 Q. And what was the purpose of the	18 Two, we urged them to connect with
19 meeting?	19 General Motors as quickly as possible, because
20 A. It was an introductory meeting	20 our view was that if General Motors wasn't
21 where Platinum introduced themselves to us,	21 comfortable with Platinum playing a role in
22 gave us their history with Delphi, and	22 Delphi, then we were not going to be
23 indicated that they were interested in taking a	23 comfortable with Platinum playing a role in
24 look at being an acquirer or plan sponsor for	24 Delphi.
25 Delphi.	25 And three, you know, we indicated
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 to them, consistent with our principles, that	2 Q. And at that point, did Platinum
3 speed of transaction was very, very important,	3 make a proposal not just to GM, but to
4 and so we urged them to connect with Delphi	4 Treasury?
5 directly and do whatever diligence they thought	5 A. There was no proposals to make to
6 they needed to be able to put a proposal	6 Treasury. Their proposals were to General
7 forward.	7 Motors.
8 Q. What was the next time you recall	8 Q. During this time that following
9 Treasury having a discussion or meeting with	9 that initial discussion with Platinum and as it
10 Platinum?	10 was preparing its term sheet or proposal, were
11 A. There wasn't a lot of meetings with	11 there discussions between Treasury and Delphi
12 Platinum, but we did speak to them relatively	12 about Platinum's involvement?
13 regularly over the phone. I don't recall	13 A. Yes.
14 whether we spoke to them that last week of	14 Q. How many times?
15 April or not, but certainly by the beginning of	15 A. At least once, maybe twice. 16 O. Were you involved?
16 May we either met with or had a call with them, 17 and they at some point put forward a proposal.	16 Q. Were you involved? 17 A. In at least one conversation I was
17 and they at some point put forward a proposal.18 I don't recall the exact date in early May.	18 involved, yes.
	19 Q. And who was involved from Delphi?
19 Q. And Platinum put that proposal 20 forward to who?	20 A. It was a call we had with John
21 A. To at least General Motors. I I	21 Sheehan and Harry and I. I don't remember if
22 don't know whether they put it forward to	22 anyone else was on the phone. And Rick
23 Delphi or to the DIP lenders or to the	23 Westenberg. I don't remember if anybody was on
24 creditors committee or to anyone else in the	24 the phone from Delphi beyond that. Maybe Keith
25 Delphi case.	25 Stipp. I just don't recall for sure.
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Page 102 Page 103 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 2 And what was discussed at that 2 that first meeting, but very quickly came to us Q. З meeting? 3 with a view that it would take 2 to \$3 billion 4 We told them that we had met with 4 of funding to make Delphi become economically Α. break-even postemergence. 5 Platinum Equity, that we doing some diligence 5 6 on Platinum Equity, that General Motors was Q. 2 to 3 billion of funding from 6 7 doing its own diligence on Platinum Equity, and whom? 7 8 8 we asked Delphi what their experience with A. Well, obviously, they were looking 9 9 Platinum Equity was and whether they thought for some of it to come from General Motors, and 10 10 Platinum Equity might be eligible to be a plan they were prepared to provide some of it. Q. And you say that Platinum had told 11 sponsor or a purchaser of assets. 11 Q. Before actually receiving a -- or you this very quickly. They came to you and 12 12 13 seeing a proposal, first proposal from 13 told you this. Put this in perspective of what 14 Platinum, were there any general terms 14 the initial meeting was. 15 discussed? 15 A. The 23rd. 16 A. The only -- no, there were no 16 О. The 23rd? general terms. The discussion was around what 17 They may have told us that at the 17 Α. 18 we viewed as the important principles for 18 23rd. I don't recall. Or if not, it would General Motors, speed of the transaction, 19 have been within a week. 19 minimized General Motors' investment, create a 20 Q. Did you share those terms or 20 21 clear path for emergence, but there was not an 21 general principles with Delphi when you 22 economic discussion with Platinum at that 22 discussed it with them? 23 Yes. 23 point. Α. 24 24 The one thing I would add is that And what was Delphi's reaction? Q. 25 25 Platinum, and I don't recall whether it was at I don't think they disagreed. They Α. (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide Page 104 Page 105 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 2 may have disagreed with the precise amount, but A: That's correct. 3 3 I think they recognized it was going to take, Q. Okay. And is there any -- did they 4 you know, at least around \$2 billion to -- of 4 send it to anybody from GM in that initial 5 funding to make Delphi break even 5 e-mail that you see? postemergence. 6 Not according to the e-mail. 6 Α. 7 7 (Feldman Exhibit 13 was marked for You had said before there's no Q. 8 8 proposal to make to Treasury. There was a identification.) 9 BY MR. MALIONEK: 9 proposal to make to GM. Do you know why this 10 Do you recognize Exhibit 13? 10 was sent to Treasury? Q. 11 11 You'd have to ask Platinum. Α. Yes. Α. 12 Can you describe it for the record? 12 О. So the answer's no, you don't know Q. 13 It's an e-mail from Harry to Rick 13 why? Α. 14 Westenberg attaching the draft Platinum term 14 Α. I don't know why. 15 15 sheet that Platinum had provided. The e-mail's Q. You have no idea why they would 16 16 send to it Treasury? dated May 4. 17 MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection. 17 Q. And it starts -- the e-mail chain 18 starts at the bottom of the first page, a May 3 18 I don't know why. Α. 19 And Harry Wilson asks Platinum in 19 e-mail from Dan Krasner to you, Harry Wilson, Q. | 20 20 and a couple others; right? response, "Can we have your permission to share 21 21 this with GM?" You see that? Α. Yes. 22 Q. Was this the -- Platinum's proposal 22 Α. Yes. 23 on Delphi? 23 Q. And did Treasury actually send it 24 The initial proposal, yes. 24 to GM? Α. 25 Q. This is the initial proposal? 25 A. I don't recall. TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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1M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL2Q. Do you remember at some point3discussing it with GM?4A. I think, as it says in the e-mail,5they met with us when Platinum presented this6proposal.7Q. I'm sorry. The "they" is GM?8A. Correct.9Q. So there was a meeting. Do you10know when the meeting was to discuss the11proposal? Was it on May 4?12A. It would have been May 4 or May 5.13Q. Was there anybody from Delphi at14that meeting?15A. I don't believe so.16Q. Okay. Why not?17A. Because this was a proposal being18made well, to take a step back, you know,19our view continues to be that it is beneficial20to bring more parties into the mix.22And this was the most important23part of what any third party could bring to the24table from General Motors' perspective was25sanctity of supply, and so to the extent they	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL were seeking money from General Motors, which this proposal clearly does, as did the Federal-Mogul proposal, then they had to work through their issues with General Motors first or there was no getting out of the starting gate, because we were their only source of funding, "we" being General Motors. Q. So Treasury's position as to both the Federal-Mogul proposal and the Platinum proposal was that these should be made and discussed with GM and Treasury first without Delphi; is that right? A. No, that's not correct. Our position with respect to Federal-Mogul and Platinum was if you want funding from General Motors, which has to be approved by Treasury, then we think it makes sense to start your negotiation with General Motors. Q. And did both of the initial proposals from Federal-Mogul and Platinum seek funding from Treasury and GM? A. Yes. Q. So was this proposal here that's attached to this May 3 e-mail, was that sent to
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 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Delphi? A. I don't know. Q. Did Treasury send it to Delphi? A. I don't recall. Q. And do you know if GM sent it to Delphi? A. I don't know. Q. Do you have any reason to believe that it was? A. Well, certainly Delphi ultimately saw proposals from Platinum Equity. Whether it was this one or a subsequent version, I don't know. MR. MALIONEK: All right. Why don't we take a five-minute break? (A recess was taken from 12:16 p.m. 	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Yes. Q. This is a May 5 letter from Cadwalader to Skadden on behalf of Delphi; correct? A. Yes. Q. And does this lay out the position of U.S. Treasury at that point with respect to the Delphi bankruptcy and a time frame for a global resolution? A. It does. Q. It says in the second paragraph that starts, "Despite our differences, we can all agree that time is of the essence." Do you see that? A. I do. Q. Four lines down, "During the past
 17 (A recess was taken from 12:16 p.m. 18 through 12:25 p.m.) 19 (Feldman Exhibit 14 was marked for 20 identification.) 21 BY MR. MALIONEK: 22 Q. Do you recognize this document? 23 Exhibit 14 is Bates stamped DPHUCCPM100553 to 24 4. And the question was, do you recognize this 25 document? TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	 Q. Four lines down, "During the past two weeks, Treasury and GM have received and begun negotiating proposals we received from two interested parties." Are those Federal-Mogul and Platinum? A. Yes. Q. It says it goes on to say, "Treasury has informed both that May 18 is the TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	target to finalize an asset purchase agreement	2	A. No. I think, as I said to you
3	with Delphi."	3	early on, one of our principles was that
4	Why does it say here that Treasury	4	General Motors was not going to provide funding
5	has informed them that that is the target? Is	5	for Delphi absent a clear path towards
6	that a target that Treasury set?	6	emergence. We believed that if we were able to
7	A. No. The date coincided with	7	sign definitive agreements on May 18, that
8	Delphi's cash flows, suggesting that they would	8	would allow General Motors to provide funding
9	run out of money on or about the 18th and the	9	to Delphi. And the the anticipated time
10	lender's accommodation agreement, which expired	10	line was based on how long we believed a 363
11 12	on May 18.	11 12	
13	Q. Okay. Did Treasury discuss the May 18 target date with Delphi before sending	12 13	Q. You go on to say that "We recognize
14	out this letter?	14^{13}	this time frame is aggressive. However, because Treasury is not prepared to offer
15	A. I believe so, yes.		Delphi additional liquidity without a signed
16	Q. And Delphi agreed?	16	
17	A. I I don't recall whether Delphi	17	without such a definitive deal, an expedited
18	agreed. Delphi agreed that the combination	18	sale process is Delphi's only realistic hope of
19	agreement would expire and that they would lack	19	exiting Chapter 11."
20	liquidity.	20	Do you see that?
21	Q. Okay. And the timetable that's	21	A. I.do.
22		22	Q. When you say "a signed deal," what
23	targeted for mid-June, all that, again, is that	23	do you mean?
24		24	A. I think, as I said in my prior
1	liquidity?	25	answer, we were expecting there to be a signed
T	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	Т	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
	Page 112		Page 113
1	Page 112 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	Page 113 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18.	1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of
2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18. Q. It was Treasury's position at this		M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of which contemplates a 363 sale. That's one
2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18. Q. It was Treasury's position at this point that it would not offer Delphi any extra	2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of which contemplates a 363 sale. That's one option. If we had reached an agreement if
2 3 4 5	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18. Q. It was Treasury's position at this point that it would not offer Delphi any extra liquidity unless that was actually a signed,	2 3 4 5	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of which contemplates a 363 sale. That's one option. If we had reached an agreement if General Motors had reached an agreement with
2 3 4 5 6	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18. Q. It was Treasury's position at this point that it would not offer Delphi any extra liquidity unless that was actually a signed, executed deal by May 18?	2 3 4 5 6	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of which contemplates a 363 sale. That's one option. If we had reached an agreement if General Motors had reached an agreement with the DIP lenders, perhaps that agreement could
2 3 4 5 6 7	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18. Q. It was Treasury's position at this point that it would not offer Delphi any extra liquidity unless that was actually a signed, executed deal by May 18? A. That had been the position of	2 3 4 5 6 7	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of which contemplates a 363 sale. That's one option. If we had reached an agreement if General Motors had reached an agreement with the DIP lenders, perhaps that agreement could have been effected through revisions to the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18. Q. It was Treasury's position at this point that it would not offer Delphi any extra liquidity unless that was actually a signed, executed deal by May 18? A. That had been the position of General Motors and Treasury from the beginning	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of which contemplates a 363 sale. That's one option. If we had reached an agreement if General Motors had reached an agreement with the DIP lenders, perhaps that agreement could have been effected through revisions to the Plan of Reorganization.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL asset purchase agreement on or before May 18. Q. It was Treasury's position at this point that it would not offer Delphi any extra liquidity unless that was actually a signed, executed deal by May 18? A. That had been the position of General Motors and Treasury from the beginning of our involvement in the transaction at the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL are two proposals being negotiated, each of which contemplates a 363 sale. That's one option. If we had reached an agreement if General Motors had reached an agreement with the DIP lenders, perhaps that agreement could have been effected through revisions to the Plan of Reorganization. So a newly filed Plan of
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	Page 114		Page 11
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 7	Treasury and GM is reached."	2	Q. And Jeff Tanenbaum's May 9 e-mail
3	Is that just another way of saying	3	at the bottom refers to a potential meeting
4 V	what you've been saying here, that Treasury	4	with Delphi and other constituents in D.C. for
	won't provide any more funding to Delphi or	5	the following week, on Monday and Tuesday of
	allow any more funding to Delphi unless	6	the following week. Do you see that?
	Treasury okays a deal?	7	A. Yes.
8	A. It's another way of saying that	8	Q. Do you know what that's referring
	until there's a clear path, we would not allow	9	to?
	GM to provide more funding to Delphi, yes.	10	A. I believe that Skadden and Jack
11	Q. A clear path that Treasury	11	
	approves?	12	get together and meet to try to reach a
13	A. A clear path that is acceptable to	13	resolution for the case.
	General Motors and that Treasury consents to,	14	Q. And what was Treasury's position as
	yes.	15	to whether such a meeting should take place at
16	Q. Okay.	16	that time?
17	(Feldman Exhibit 15 was marked for	17	A. We were willing to meet.
18	identification.)	18	Q. And it's Oren is it Haker?
	BY MR. MALIONEK:	19	A. Yes.
20		20	• • • • • • • •
	Q. Do you recognize this Exhibit 15 Bates numbered GMMDAE41301 to 3?		Q Haker has an e-mail in response to Jeff Tanenbaum, saying, "We've made it very
	A. Yes.		
22			clear to Jack that Treasury's not prepared for
23	Q. Can you describe it for the record?	23	negotiations with stakeholders next Monday or
24	A. It is an e-mail between Oren Haker	24	Tuesday in D.C."
	and Jeff Tanenbaum on or about May 9.	25	Is that an accurate statement?
TSC	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	Ч.	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
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1		1	-
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15 A. In our meeting with the creditors 15 he was looking for was I think his words	
16 committee, they were in for the entire time. 16 were "schmuck insurance," but he did not	
17 We had a subsequent meeting with the company. 17 clearly define what that was other than to stay	
18Q.Okay. And what was were there18that he thought it would be appropriate for the	
19 any meetings that Treasury had with the UCC or19 creditors to receive, you know, warrants or20 their advisors prior to this?20 other contingent value rights in connection	1
20 their advisors prior to this?20 other contingent value rights in connection21 A. No, I don't believe so.21 with any transaction or plan.	
22 Q. And what was your reaction?	
23 A. Bob Rosenberg articulated his view 23 A. I don't recall whether we told Bob	
24 of the claims that the creditors committee 24 this directly during his portion of the meeting	
25 could, would, might assert against General 25 or whether we communicated to it Delphi	0500
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	
2 afterwards but we thought, you know, if that 3 could be folded into a transaction in the right 3 discussions between Treasury and the UCC or its	
3could be folded into a transaction in the right3discussions between Treasury and the UCC or its4amount at the right value level, that made4advisors during that mediation?	
5 sense. 5 A. I I do not believe there were	
6 Q. Why did it make sense? 6 any direct negotiations between Treasury or the	
7 A. Because it's always better to have 7 advisors.	
8 more people supportive rather than less people 8 Q. Do you remember what was strike 9 supportive. 9 that.	
9 supportive.9 that.10Q. In a bankruptcy restructure?1010(Feldman Exhibit 16 was marked for	
11 A. Correct. And I think in any 11 identification.)	,
12 transaction, but particularly in a bankruptcy. 12 BY MR. MALIONEK:	
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1 M. Foldman	1 - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	Harry and then a forwarding of	2	centered on two things: One, sort of General
	General Motors, to Rick	3	Motors' preference that Federal-Mogul be the
4 Westenberg and		4	acquirer or the stalking horse acquirer, and
	a May 14 e-mail, May 13 to	5	two, that General Motors consider a 363 sale as
	exchange. The May 13 e-mail from	6	opposed to a plan, which Delphi was very much
	and others says, "We're	7	in favor of, meaning Delphi was very much in
	a and omens says, we need	8	favor of a plan.
9 Delphi today."	asset purchase agreement to	9	At some time right around here, it
10 You see	that?	10	became evident to General Motors, to Treasury,
10 I OU SOC 11 A. Yes.	, mat:	11	and I think to Delphi that Federal-Mogul was
	u know if any kind of proposal	12	going to present more challenges to getting to
	reement was sent to Delphi with		the finish line, and we began to take we
	latinum deal before then?	14	collectively, meaning Delphi, General Motors
	at form? In the form of an	15	and Treasury, began to take Platinum Equity's
16 asset purchase		16	proposal more seriously.
	orm. Any type of draft	17	So my memory of discussions
18 proposal.		18	following this were that we really all needed
	recall for sure.		to spend time seeing if we could get Platinum
	discussions after this		Equity to the finish line.
	what discussions do you recall	21	Q. You said there was a preference
	lphi with respect to the Platinum		that Federal-Mogul would be the acquirer.
23 proposal?		23	Whose preference?
	now, leading up to this point	24	A. Clearly, General Motors'
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 2 was clearly Ge 3 Platinum I'm 4 the acquirer. 5 Q. Did Th 6 A. Our pr 7 Motors' prefered 8 Q. And w 9 preferred acqui 10 A. There 11 Federal-Mogul 12 there were chard 13 had that raised 14 Federal 15 Federal-Mogul 16 Motors, and the 17 supplier. Fede 18 from its own C 19 therefore very 20 company from 21 And, yo 22 distress world 23 Icon knows that 24 an investment 	h - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL neral Motors' preference that sorry that Federal-Mogul be reasury have a preference? reference was whatever General ence was. why was Federal-Mogul the rer? were characteristics that had which made them better, and racteristics that Platinum Equity issues with us. -Mogul was already was already a supplier to General ey were considered a very good ral-Mogul had recently emerged hapter 11 case, and they were de-levered and a very strong a balance sheet perspective. bu know, those of us in the who have a history with Carl at Carl was rarely willing to make	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL know, half a billion dollars of his own money, we thought he would work very hard to make that successful. In contrast, Platinum Equity was a private equity firm that had come, you know, highly recommended, but they had a history with Delphi where they tried to buy Delphi's steering business and ultimately pulled out. They did not have a lot of investments in the auto supply space. This would be by an order of magnitude or two or three the largest investment they had ever made, and Delphi was and is a very troubled company that still required some operational turnaround. And Federal-Mogul has a track record and its management team has a track record of successfully turning around Federal-Mogul, and we had concerns about whether Platinum Equity could rise to the challenge. Q. Did Treasury or GM, to your

Page 126	Page 127
 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And is it your memory that Delphi also shared those views about Federal-Mogul versus Platinum? A. At least in part, Delphi clearly shared those views, because they were the ones to express the greater concern with Platinum Equity based on their prior experience in trying to sell the steering business to Platinum Equity. Whether they shared every view or not, I don't know. Q. Do you recall when the Federal-Mogul proposal was first shared with Delphi? A. I don't. Q. Was it before or after the Platinum proposal was shared with Delphi, if you recall? A. My memory is that we met with Icon on May 1st. We had extensive conversations with Delphi about that meeting over the weekend, on the 2nd and 3rd. I suspect but don't recall specifically whether we shared any written proposals with Delphi at that time, but we certainly shared the substance of the 	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Federal-Mogul proposal and I think, if I recall correctly, the first Delphi. I'm sorry. The first Platinum Equity proposal didn't come in until, you know, the 4th or 5th I'm sorry, the 4th. So it is my memory that we shared the Federal-Mogul proposal with Delphi before we even received the first Platinum proposal. Q. Which you think was around so it was before May 4 or 5, you think? A. Correct. I know we shared the substance of the proposal over the weekend of May 2 and 3. I just don't recall whether there was a document to share and whether that itself got shared. But I know the details of the rproposal were clearly shared during that weekend. (Feldman Exhibit 17 was marked for identification.) BY MR. MALIONEK: Q. The details of the proposal were shared during that weekend at least orally, you think?
TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
Page 128 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Okay. A. I don't recall whether there was a written term sheet at that time. I just don't recall. Q. You've been handed what's been marked as Exhibit 17. Do you recognize this? A. Yes. Q. Okay. What is it, for the record? A. An e-mail from Ronald Landen at Weil Gotshal to people at Skadden and Delphi. Q. And copying you and others; right? A. That's correct. Q. This is dated May 17, and it stataches what's called an indicative term sheet related to a joint proposal among GM, Federal-Mogul, and Icon Enterprises with	Page 129 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL draft or subsequent proposal. This is not the first. Q. This relates to, in essence, a changed deal or a modified deal from what was discussed in early May as you were talking about? A. That's correct. Q. Do you know if there was any term sheet related to a GM Federal-Mogul Icon proposal that was sent to Delphi before this? A. I just don't recall. Q. Okay. This is sent on May 17, and there's a reference in the at the bottom of the first page in Weil Gotshal sending this to Kadden saying, "Please confirm no later than May 20 that Delphi is willing to proceed with
 18 support from Treasury; is that right? 19 A. That's what it says, yes. 20 Q. And this is a term sheet related to 21 the Federal-Mogul proposal; right? 22 A. Yes, although if you notice, this 23 has as a party to it, Icon Enterprises. The 24 original proposal was just a Federal-Mogul 25 proposal, so this is, you know, a subsequent TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	 18 this proposal." 19 Do you see that? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. So Weil Gotshal was giving Delphi 22 three days to respond whether it agreed to this 23 proposal or not? Does that sound reasonable to 24 you? 25 MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection. TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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1 1	A. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	. I don't think that's what that	2	first page?
1	ns, but so I'm not sure I can answer the	3	A. Yes.
	nd question.	4	Q. It talks about certain assets
	What do you think that means?	5	except as those set forth in Exhibit A.
6 A		6	There's another listing of particular assets
	ns is that they have three days to say	7	referenced in Exhibit B and then on the next
	her they're willing to negotiate around	8	page, more assets referenced in Exhibit C. You
	deal. That's what it says to me, is	9	see those?
	ng to proceed with the proposal.	10	A. I see the references, yeah.
11 Q 12 A	 And what was the deal? The deal was that Icon Enterprise 	11 12	Q. Okay. And for those on the phone,
	d make an investment along with a loan from	13	I'm sorry, the Bates is GMMDAE 28116 through 28128.
	eral Motors into a an entity to acquire	14	Those attachments that the
	ssets of Delphi through a 363 sale.	15	
	. What assets of Delphi?		this proposal; right?
17 A		17	A. I don't see it.
	hi other than those specifically left	18	Q. So was Delphi expected to respond,
	nd. And obviously, there are you know,	19	as you say, as to whether it was willing to
20 there	s's a whole list of, I don't know, seven or	20	negotiate around this proposal without seeing
	t open items that still needed to be	21	the exhibits?
	ussed and negotiated.	22	MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection.
	. And the term sheet itself on the	23	A. Yes.
	page talks about what assets would be	24	Q. In three days?
	hased. You see those references in the	25	MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection.
TSG Re	eporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	T	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
	Page 132		Page 133
1 N	Page 132 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	Page 133 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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2 A 3 nego	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Whether they're willing to tiate around it? Yeah, I think three days		M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL drafts of the e-mail. Q. And what about the term sheet?
2 A 3 nego 4 is ple	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Whether they're willing to tiate around it? Yeah, I think three days enty of time to decide whether you're	2 3 4	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL drafts of the e-mail. Q. And what about the term sheet? A. Yes, we had seen drafts of the term
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 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Later in the month of May. Q. Was it around the time of the mediation? A. Yes. I don't recall whether it was immediately before or immediately after, but it was in that week. Q. Sometime around the mediation was started May 26, so around that time frame, I think you had talked about it earlier, there was a decision to focus more on Platinum; is that right? A. It evolved to that, but yes. Q. Now, earlier Treasury's position was there needed to be a signed deal by May 18. Remember we talked about that? Yes? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And there was no signed deal by May 18? A. That's correct. Q. Do you recall why? A. Well, nobody got to the finish line by May 18 is obviously the most important reason. Q. As of the time of the mediation on 	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 May 26, what was Treasury's position as to how 3 soon a deal had to get done for Delphi? 4 A. I think our position has always 5 been the same, which is if Delphi wanted 6 funding from General Motors, there needed to be 7 a signed deal that could lead to emergence from 8 Chapter 11. 9 If Delphi had other sources of 10 funding from the DIP lenders, from some third 11 party, you know, the timing was up to them. 12 Q. What was Treasury's involvement or 13 role during the mediation? 14 MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection. 15 A. We were compelled to attend the 16 mediation by Judge Morris, and we acted as 17 lender to and advisor to General Motors. 18 Q. Would you say that Treasury was 19 actively involved in discussions regarding a 20 Delphi resolution during the mediation? 21 A. With Judge Morris, we were active. 22 (Feldman Exhibit 18 was marked for 23 identification.)
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1M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL2This is, for the record, Bates PLAT1471. The3question was, do you recognize it?4A. No.5Q. This is a May 26 e-mail among6members of Platinum Equity that's discussing a7meeting with GM and Delphi lawyers. There's a8reference in there, in the second paragraph,9that says, "This morning, May 26, the lead10counsel for Delphi told me the following:11Harry Wilson is making the final decision."12Do you have any understanding what13that's referring to?14A. No.15Q. Did Treasury indicate that it would16make a final decision as to a particular Delphi17deal around this time that would involve18Treasury financing or Treasury approval of19financial?20A. No. I guess two things. One, we21always at Treasury thought the best strategy22was to keep more rather than less parties	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL was approximately five or six days after this e-mail. So we were clearly coming to the end of the line. But I don't have any knowledge of us making any final decisions on anything. We were happy to frankly, if both Platinum and Federal-Mogul were, you know, at the table and in the auction, we would not have you know, we would not have said we're going to fund one or not the other. I mean, if the deals met our principles, we were prepared to fund anybody. Q. Did Treasury you mentioned the papers that Delphi filed as of June 1st with respect to the Platinum deal; right? A. Correct. Q. Did Treasury give a final approval to the proposal laid out in those papers? A. Final approval to who? Q. To GM. A. GM sought our consent to that deal and we approved it.
 23 interested in the deal. But if you go back in 24 time, the company wound up filing its modified 25 plan and 363 papers I think on June 1st, which TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	 Q. Can you tell me, describe for me the final discussions leading up to Treasury's approval of that plan, discussions with GM and TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

1 2 3 4	Page 139 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know what that would be
2 3 4	Q. Do you know what that would be
4	
	referring to?
	A. Again, if you go back to no, I
5	actually don't.
6.	Q. At some point in the final days of
7	the negotiations before the June 1st plan was
8	filed, did Treasury take a position that a
9	potentially a different deal could be worked
10	out that would not involve Platinum or
	Federal-Mogul?
12	A. There were negotiations at the
13	
14	,
	standalone deal. I don't recall whether the
1	mediation started on the 26th or whether it was
1	immediately after that. 1 just I don't
1	remember the exact dates as I sit here.
	Q. Can you describe the standalone
	deal proposal at all? A. You want me to disclose what
1	happened at the mediation? Is that the
	question?
1	Q. Right.
	MR. SCHWARTZ: We should talk
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	mediation.
1	MR. SCHWARTZ: These are
	proposals that went from GM, I guess, to
	the DIP lenders during the mediation.
	MR. MALIONEK: As described in
	this exhibit.
-	MR. MANCINO: Pursuant to the
	judge's order, I believe are both
1	confidential and ought not to be discovered. And I think here we are
	talking about communications within the
	mediation process. Right?
1	MR. MALIONEK: Right, I mean, as
	referenced in Exhibit 19, which was
	already produced to all the parties.
17	MR. MANCINO: What, Exhibit 19?
18	I don't see disclosing anything that
19	MR. MALIONEK: Harry is seeking
20	to eliminate both PE and Federal-Mogul
21	from the deal.
22	MR. SCHWARTZ: Yeah, this is an
23	exhibit to which we're not a party. We
24	didn't produce it. If a party receiving
25	an offer from another party in the
T	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
	$\begin{array}{c} 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 9\\ 20\\ 12\\ 23\\ 24\\ 25\\ 1\\ 23\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 23\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 9\\ 20\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ 25\\ \end{array}$

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 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL context of a mediation is telling us that we shouldn't disclose this 	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. SCHWARTZ: Right. I think that's not appropriate. We should move
 material, I think that's what Judge Drain's mediation order says, and I'm not comfortable with us disclosing the 	 4 on. 5 MR. MALIONEK: You say it's not 6 appropriate. Are you instructing him
 7 contents of offers traded during the 8 mediation. 9 If you want to examine on what 	 7 not to answer? 8 MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, again, I 9 heard someone who was a party to that
 the document says, to the extent he knows about it, he can answer, but of course he was not no one from 	 discussion who received the offer say that they're invoking the protections of Judge Drain's order.
 Treasury was involved in this document. But he won't disclose offers that were made during the mediation. MR. MALIONEK: The witness has 	 MR. MALIONEK: Who is that? MR. SCHWARTZ: I heard MR. MANCINO: That's me, I believe.
 17 said during the mediation there was a 18 discussion of a standalone deal. Put 19 this document aside. 	 17 MR. MALIONEK: Are you saying 18 don't go into this? 19 MR. MANCINO: Yeah.
 20 MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, which is 21 different from asking the terms of the 22 proposal. 	 20 MR. SCHWARTZ: Yeah. 21 MR. MALIONEK: That's fine, then. 22 I won't go into that. I didn't hear you
 23 MR. MALIONEK: And now I'm asking 24 him to talk generally about the details 25 of that. TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	 say that. MR. MANCINO: No, in the context of discussions within the mediation, I TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
Page 144	TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 145
 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL think we ought to abide by the judge's mediation order. MR. MALIONEK: That's fine. MR. MANCINO: There may be other instances in which there were discussions outside of the mediation. MR. MALIONEK: That's what I'll ask, and let me just ask that question. BY MR. MALIONEK: Q. Outside the context of the mediation, do you recall in the final days before the June 1st plan was filed any discussion of a potential standalone deal that wouldn't involve Platinum or Federal-Mogul? A. Not that I recall. Q. Okay. That's fine. I'm not going to go into it any more. 	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL e-mail from Harry Wilson to folks at GM and you and others. And he says in the top paragraph, as he's addressing this to the team, "I believe we're finally near the end," related to the Delphi negotiations; correct? A. I believe so, yes. Q. All right. He said he was thinking through the next 24 to 48 hours and he had a few thoughts. On Delphi, towards the bottom of page 1, he has as his second bullet "Weil, Matt and Harry to press Skadden to communicate to a 363 in the event the lenders don't agree to best and final offer." Do you understand what that's referring to? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Can you describe that?
 (Feldman Exhibit 20 was marked for identification.) BY MR. MALIONEK: Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 20? This is Bates stam ped GMMDAE178 through 180. A. Yes. Q. All right. This is a May 28, 2009, 	 A. Yeah. Skadden's position and Delphi's position had been that the only way for Delphi to move forward was with a Plan of Reorganization. That was one of the main reasons that Federal-Mogul dropped out of the running, because they weren't prepared to acquire the assets through a plan, and we were
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL		man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	pressing to have the company, Delphi, go down a		nkruptcy in four days. I was
3	dual path.		hours on General Motors and 10
4	Q. When you say "we were pressing," GM		ay on Delphi. I didn't follow up
5	and Treasury? A. Correct.	about.	n what they were talking to Jack
6	Q. So what did you do to pressure		ring that time leading up to
8	I'm sorry, to press Skadden to commit to a 363?		ose last few days, understanding
9	A. Me personally?		re busy on other things, were
10	Q. Treasury.		you know anything about the
11	A. I don't think we did anything		with Delphi over whether there
12	following this e-mail.		363 sale alternative as part of the
13	Q. Did GM do anything, to your	plan?	
14	knowledge?		ould get an e-mail I would
15	A. I'm sure that Weil had		updates from my counsel as to where
	conversations with Skadden about it.	things stood	
17	Q. And do you know do you		ay. And what did you understand
18	understand what those negotiations or		updates that Delphi's position was?
19	discussions entailed with Delphi?		phi wanted to complete a
20	A. Between Weil and Skadden?	transaction	through a plan, and I think
21	Q. Correct.	ultimately th	hey agreed to an alternative
22	A. No.	structure of	the 363 sale if the plan was
23	Q. No, that wasn't explained to you or		complish the transaction because of
24	discussed with you?	the rights of	the DIP lenders under their
25	A. On May 28, General Motors was	various doc	•
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₁ '	-	M. Feld	
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL		man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
· 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which		man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s.
	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to	Q. Ye: A. No	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s.
· 2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it?	Q. Ye: A. No Q. Wh	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s.
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2 3 4 5 6 7	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack 	Q. Yes A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly eas Q. Wh A. De	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s. hen do you recall the issue of t coming up? bbably back in if not March, rly April. no raised it? lphi.
·2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack had been very adamant that he thought a plan 	Q. Yes A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly ea Q. Wh A. De Q. An	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack had been very adamant that he thought a plan was preferable and made more sense for Delphi 	Q. Ye: A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly ea Q. Wh A. De Q. An want? Wha	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s. hen do you recall the issue of t coming up? bbably back in if not March, rly April. ho raised it? lphi. d what specifically did they tt kind of releases?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack had been very adamant that he thought a plan was preferable and made more sense for Delphi and its constituents and was pretty dug in on that. Q. And that a 363 sale would not make as much sense? A. 363 sale would not accomplish the things he wanted to accomplish for his board, for his management team, and for his case. 	Q. Ye: A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly ea Q. Wh A. De Q. An want? Wha A. Jac for his boar you know, a Q. Wa discussions A. No Q. As	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s. hen do you recall the issue of t coming up? bbably back in if not March, rly April. ho raised it? lphi. d what specifically did they tt kind of releases? k wanted releases? k wanted releases under the plan d and management team as part of, as part of a plan process. as Treasury involved in any related to that issue?
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack had been very adamant that he thought a plan was preferable and made more sense for Delphi and its constituents and was pretty dug in on that. Q. And that a 363 sale would not make as much sense? A. 363 sale would not accomplish the things he wanted to accomplish for his board, for his management team, and for his case. Q. Which was what? A. Among other things, releases. Q. In these final discussions leading up to the June 1st filing, do you recall this 	Q. Ye: A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly ea Q. Wh A. De Q. An want? Wha A. Jac for his boar you know, a Q. Wa discussions A. No Q. Wa discussions A. No g. As leading to th any demand other terms g. Sue of relea	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s. hen do you recall the issue of t coming up? bbably back in if not March, rly April. ho raised it? lphi. d what specifically did they tt kind of releases? k wanted releases under the plan d and management team as part of, as part of a plan process. as Treasury involved in any related to that issue? part of the final negotiations he June 1st filing, did Delphi make ds or requests of anything of any to be put into the plan beyond the eases?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack had been very adamant that he thought a plan was preferable and made more sense for Delphi and its constituents and was pretty dug in on that. Q. And that a 363 sale would not make as much sense? A. 363 sale would not accomplish the things he wanted to accomplish for his board, for his management team, and for his case. Q. Which was what? A. Among other things, releases. Q. In these final discussions leading up to the June 1st filing, do you recall this issue of releases being discussed? 	Q. Ye: A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly ea Q. Wh A. De Q. Wh A. De Q. An want? Wha A. Jac for his boar you know, a discussions A. No Q. Wa discussions A. No g. As leading to th any demand other terms issue of release MR.	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s. hen do you recall the issue of t coming up? bably back in if not March, rly April. ho raised it? lphi. d what specifically did they t kind of releases? k wanted releases? k wanted releases under the plan d and management team as part of, as part of a plan process. as Treasury involved in any related to that issue? part of the final negotiations he June 1st filing, did Delphi make ds or requests of anything of any to be put into the plan beyond the eases? . SCHWARTZ: Demands of whom?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack had been very adamant that he thought a plan was preferable and made more sense for Delphi and its constituents and was pretty dug in on that. Q. And that a 363 sale would not make as much sense? A. 363 sale would not accomplish the things he wanted to accomplish for his board, for his management team, and for his case. Q. Which was what? A. Among other things, releases. Q. In these final discussions leading up to the June 1st filing, do you recall this issue of releases being discussed? A. From the 28th to the 1st, in that 	Q. Ye: A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly ea Q. Wh A. De Q. Wh A. De Q. An want? Wha A. Jac for his boar you know, a Q. Wa discussions A. No Q. Wa discussions A. No g. As leading to th any demand other terms issue of release MR.	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s. hen do you recall the issue of t coming up? bably back in if not March, rly April. ho raised it? lphi. d what specifically did they t kind of releases? k wanted releases? k wanted releases under the plan d and management team as part of, as part of a plan process. as Treasury involved in any related to that issue? part of the final negotiations he June 1st filing, did Delphi make ds or requests of anything of any to be put into the plan beyond the eases? . SCHWARTZ: Demands of whom? . MALIONEK: Anyone.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. Do you know the extent to which Delphi pushed back on this issue of whether to accept the 363 as part of it? A. During that time period? Q. Right. A. No, I don't know. Q. Before that time period? A. Yeah, before that time period, Jack had been very adamant that he thought a plan was preferable and made more sense for Delphi and its constituents and was pretty dug in on that. Q. And that a 363 sale would not make as much sense? A. 363 sale would not accomplish the things he wanted to accomplish for his board, for his management team, and for his case. Q. Which was what? A. Among other things, releases. Q. In these final discussions leading up to the June 1st filing, do you recall this issue of releases being discussed? 	Q. Ye: A. No Q. Wh releases firs A. Pro certainly ea Q. Wh A. De Q. Wh A. De Q. An want? Wha A. Jac for his boar you know, a Q. Wa discussions A. No Q. Wa discussions A. No g. As leading to th any demand other terms issue of release MR A. I	man - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL s. hen do you recall the issue of t coming up? bably back in if not March, rly April. ho raised it? lphi. d what specifically did they t kind of releases? k wanted releases? k wanted releases under the plan d and management team as part of, as part of a plan process. as Treasury involved in any related to that issue? part of the final negotiations he June 1st filing, did Delphi make ds or requests of anything of any to be put into the plan beyond the eases? . SCHWARTZ: Demands of whom?

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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 Q. At that point in those final	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 issue; right?
3 negotiations, do you know if Mr. Sheehan or	3 A. That's what it appears to be, yes.
4 others at Delphi were continuing to make the	4 Q. And the e-mail above that from Jack
5 argument that if Delphi goes under, it would	5 Butler back to Jeff Tanenbaum indicates that
6 cause problems for GM?	6 Delphi is prepared to accept that provision;
7 A. They never stopped making that	7 correct?
8 argument, so without actually knowing, would	8 A. Jack indicates Delphi's prepared to
9 I I feel relatively confident saying I'm	9 accept a provision. Whether it's exactly what
10 sure they continued to make that argument.	10 GM wanted or not, I can't tell from the e-mail.
11 (Feldman Exhibit 21 was marked for	11 Q. Okay. Now, if you go to the first
12 identification.)	12 e-mail here from Harry Wilson to Jeff Tanenbaum
13 BY MR. MALIONEK:	13 and others at Weil and GM, he says, "I think we
14 Q. Do you recognize this Exhibit 21,	14 jointly, company, GM, Treasury, should tell
15 Bates stamped GMMDAE9681 through 84?	15 lenders that they will get X under a plan and
16 A. Yes. 17 O. Okay. Can you describe it?	16 something less than X in a 363." 17 Do you see that?
17 Q. Okay. Can you describe it? 18 A. It starts as an e-mail to Jeff	17Do you see that?18A.Yes, I see it.
19 Tanenbaum from Jack Butler, and conversation	19 Q. Was that Treasury's position at the
20 concludes with an e-mail from Harry Wilson to	20 point at that point? Is that that's what
21 some parties at Weil, including Jeff and Rick	21 GM and Treasury together should tell lenders?
22 Westenberg from GM.	22 MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the
23 Q. And the initial e-mail from Jeff	23 form.
24 Tanenbaum to Jack Butler is discussing the need	24 A. First of all, I think Harry's
25 for a response from Delphi regarding the 363	25 referencing that should be GM, Treasury, and
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 Delphi, not just GM and Treasury. And it looks	2 - AFTERNOON SESSION -
3 like he's floating an idea. I don't know that	3
4 I would say it's a position, but it's certainly	4 EXAMINATION
5 a suggestion.	5 BY MS. KENNEDY:
6 Q. Do you know if that's actually what	6 Q. Hi, Mr. Feldman. I'm Elizabeth
7 was done?	7 Kennedy. I'm an attorney representing the
8 A. I believe that's what was done,	8 IUE-CWA today. If at any time you have any
9 yes. 10 Q. And it was Treasury's idea?	 9 questions or don't understand a question that 10 I've asked, please ask me to repeat it. I'll
10 Q. And it was Treasury's idea? 11 A. Unless there's another e-mail	10 I've asked, please ask me to repeat it. I'll11 be happy to.
12 showing someone else suggesting it first, it	12 So, Mr. Feldman, are you aware that
13 looks like we were the first to suggest it.	13 the IUE-CWA represents workers that had worked
14 MR. MALIONEK: Okay. All right.	14 at Delphi?
15 Should we stop now and take our lunch	15 A. Yes.
16 break?	16 Q. And has, pursuant to collective
17 MR. SCHWARTZ: That's fine. This	17 bargaining agreement represents them and has
18 is a good place to stop.	18 collective bargaining agreements between the
19 (A luncheon recess was taken from	19 IUE-CWA and Delphi?
20 1:21 p.m. through 2:27 p.m.)	20 A. Yes.
21 22	21 Q. Are you aware of the IUE-CWA
22	22 Delphi/GM implementation agreement that was23 reached in September of 2008?
23	 23 reached in September of 2008? 24 A. Yes, I'm aware of its existence,
25	25 yes.
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	(Feldman Exhibit 22 was marked for	2	of part of the Delphi pension obligations to GM
3	identification.)	3	in September of last year?
4	BY MS. KENNEDY:	4	A. Yeah, I just to be clear, I'm
5	Q. And are you aware that please	5	not an expert on benefits and collective
6	take your time to review, particularly the	6	bargaining agreements and union issues, but I
7	first pages of this. Are you aware that in	7	was aware that there had been a transfer in
8	1999, the IUE-CWA and GM entered into a benefit	8	September of '08, yes.
9	guarantee?	9	Q. Let's talk about what were you
10	A. I'm aware that they did, or I've	10	involved in discussions regarding Delphi's
11	been told that they did.	11	pensions?
12	Q. Okay. And then that that benefit	12	A. In discussions with whom?
13	guarantee was triggered in 2007?	13	Q. In discussions with Delphi and with
14	A. I'm sorry, I don't know what you	14	F
15	mean by "triggered."	15	A. I have been involved in discussions
16	Q. That the understanding		with General Motors about Delphi's pensions.
	reflecting if you look at 5 in the top	17	I've not had substantive discussions I don't
18	paragraph, the guarantee that had been entered	18	believe as I sit here that I can recall any
	between IUE, GM, and Delphi regarding the benefits that had occurred to its members was	20	substantive discussions with Delphi about it. Q. How would you characterize your
	triggered in the August 5, 2007, restructuring		role in those discussions with GM and with the
	memorandum of understanding.		PBGC?
23	A. I am I guess I am now aware of	23	A. I've acted as sort of facilitator
24		24	
25	Q. Were you aware of the 414L transfer	25	
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	·l	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And when did you start speaking,	2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL currently unaware what's going to happen with?
2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And when did you start speaking, you or were there other people in Treasury	2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL currently unaware what's going to happen with? A. I've seen numbers, but I don't
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And when did you start speaking, you or were there other people in Treasury that were also involved in the pension issues? Or would you consider yourself the lead facilitator on the issue of pensions? A. With respect to the autos, I have been the lead person at Treasury on the pension issues. Q. Okay. And when did you start speaking when did pensions start coming up as a topic you were discussing with either GM or the PBGC? A. Because I've been speaking to the PBGC about the Chrysler case and the General Motors case, the conversation regarding the Delphi pensions with the PBGC was probably first raised in maybe April of 2009. With General Motors, I probably didn't begin to discuss the Delphi pension issues with them until, you know, the middle of 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL currently unaware what's going to happen with? A. I've seen numbers, but I don't recall what it is. But my memory is it's something like 60,000, but I don't recall the exact number. Q. 60,000 would probably be the total. I will refresh your recollection. (Feldman Exhibit 23 was marked for identification.) BY MS. KENNEDY: Q. This is and for the people on the phone, this is now DPHIUECWA tons of zeros 371 through 372. And it's the hourly employees by union with the traditional Delphi pension plan showing that, on the second page it's row 7 continues to be the IUE, that there are approximately 8900 total IUE workers left in Delphi and only 733 that actually transferred over through the 414 transfer. Does that sound have you seen anything like
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And when did you start speaking, you or were there other people in Treasury that were also involved in the pension issues? Or would you consider yourself the lead facilitator on the issue of pensions? A. With respect to the autos, I have been the lead person at Treasury on the pension issues. Q. Okay. And when did you start speaking when did pensions start coming up as a topic you were discussing with either GM or the PBGC? A. Because I've been speaking to the PBGC about the Chrysler case and the General Motors case, the conversation regarding the Delphi pensions with the PBGC was probably first raised in maybe April of 2009. With General Motors, I probably didn't begin to discuss the Delphi pension issues with them until, you know, the middle of May or even the last half of May of 2009. Q. Okay. And are you aware of the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL currently unaware what's going to happen with? A. I've seen numbers, but I don't recall what it is. But my memory is it's something like 60,000, but I don't recall the exact number. Q. 60,000 would probably be the total. I will refresh your recollection. (Feldman Exhibit 23 was marked for identification.) BY MS. KENNEDY: Q. This is and for the people on the phone, this is now DPHIUECWA tons of zeros 371 through 372. And it's the hourly employees by union with the traditional Delphi pension plan showing that, on the second page it's row 7 continues to be the IUE, that there are approximately 8900 total IUE workers left in Delphi and only 733 that actually transferred over through the 414 transfer. Does that sound have you seen anything like this? A. I have. You know, I probably have
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. And when did you start speaking, you or were there other people in Treasury that were also involved in the pension issues? Or would you consider yourself the lead facilitator on the issue of pensions? A. With respect to the autos, I have been the lead person at Treasury on the pension issues. Q. Okay. And when did you start speaking when did pensions start coming up as a topic you were discussing with either GM or the PBGC? A. Because I've been speaking to the PBGC about the Chrysler case and the General Motors case, the conversation regarding the Delphi pensions with the PBGC was probably first raised in maybe April of 2009. With General Motors, I probably didn't begin to discuss the Delphi pension issues with them until, you know, the middle of May or even the last half of May of 2009. Q. Okay. And are you aware of the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL currently unaware what's going to happen with? A. I've seen numbers, but I don't recall what it is. But my memory is it's something like 60,000, but I don't recall the exact number. Q. 60,000 would probably be the total. I will refresh your recollection. (Feldman Exhibit 23 was marked for identification.) BY MS. KENNEDY: Q. This is and for the people on the phone, this is now DPHIUECWA tons of zeros 371 through 372. And it's the hourly employees by union with the traditional Delphi pension plan showing that, on the second page it's row 7 continues to be the IUE, that there are approximately 8900 total IUE workers left in Delphi and only 733 that actually transferred over through the 414 transfer. Does that sound have you seen anything like this? A. I have. You know, I probably have

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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 I had not in my own mind separated out the IUE,	2 agreement where the salaried Delphi plans would
	3 be terminated and General Motors would assume
3 but I do see that number, yes.	4 the hourly pension plans.
4 Q. In this document, which we'll mark	
5 24, this is a the May 20 update for the DIP	
6 lenders steering committee. And it's in	6 thrust of the discussions with the PBGC and
7 which they talk about various	7 with General Motors to the extent I had
8 (Feldman Exhibit 24 was marked for	8 discussions with General Motors about it in
9 identification.)	9 April and then in May with General Motors.
10 BY MS. KENNEDY:	10 Q. So at this point you were still
11 Q. So I'm specifically looking at page	11 what you see referred to as the Delphi
12 5. Now, have you seen this document before?	12 Preferred, that the GM would assume the Delphi
13 A. No.	13 hourly was the position that Treasury was
14 Q. When you started discussing	14 supporting?
15 pensions with GM or with the PBGE specifically	15 MR. SCHWARTZ: What's "at this
16 the Delphi IUE hourly retirement plan when I	16 point"?
17 say "pension," I'm going to be generally	17 MS. KENNEDY: At this point of
18 referring to the IUE hourly retirement plan	18 the May 20 emergence update for DIP
19 unless otherwise qualified. Were these the	19 lender steering committee document.
20 likely outcomes that you were discussing when	20 A. Again, to say Treasury was
21 you started discussing pensions in April?	21 supporting it suggests a role that I don't
22 MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the	22 think we were playing. But we were trying to
23 form.	23 facilitate an agreement where the salaried plan
A. In my initial discussions with the	24 would get terminated and taken over by the PBGC
25 PBGC, they centered around trying to reach an	25 and General Motors would assume liability for
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 the hourly plans. That was clearly the	2 the Treasury regarding the pensions at that
3 direction things were still going in the middle	3 point was, "that point" being May 13, 14?
4 of May of '09.	4 A. Yeah, I think at that point, we
5 Q. And that was the outcome you were	5 were still hoping to reach a resolution between
6 attempting to facilitate. That's what I mean	6 the PBGC and General Motors where the salary
7 by that was Treasury's position you were	7 plan would get terminated but the hourly plans
8 A. That's that's correct, that's	8 would salary plans would get terminated and
9 correct.	9 the hourly plans would get assumed by General
10 Q. Okay. So then to go through these,	10 Motors.
11 on page 6, it says, "Throughout May, Delphi had	11 Q. And why was that your position?
12 a series of meetings with its primary	12 A. Well, again, I don't know that it
13 stakeholders and other third parties. On	13 was our position. I think we were trying to
14 May 4, Delphi and GM met with U.S. Treasury in	14 facilitate a resolution.
15 Washington, D.C." Were you part of that	15 Q. Why was that the outcome you were
16 meeting?	16 supporting?
17 A. Yes.	17 A. We thought that trying to strike
18 Q. And do you recall the issue of the	18 that.
19 hourly pension plan being raised?	19 We thought there was a reasonable
20 A. I don't recall specifically.	20 argument for General Motors, particularly on
	21 the UAW side, that since most of the likely
	22 outcomes would have some of the UAW plans
	23 coming back to General Motors, that it would be
23 with representatives of the Treasury and spoke	24 problematic for General Motors to sort of push
124 again on May 13 and 14	
24 again on May 13 and 14.	
 24 again on May 13 and 14. 25 Do you recall what the position of TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	25 the termination of the hourly plan related to TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL the UAW.	1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL perspective, the fact that they were subject to
3	We were not as focused on the IEU	3	collective bargaining meant you had less
4	[sic] or other IUE or other of what I'll	4	flexibility in terms of what how to achieve
5	call the splinter unions, but we had concerns	5	an outcome, but I'm not sure that had a real
6	about the UAW role in coming back into the	6	that played a real role in the decision-making.
7	fold.	7	Q. Less flexibility in what sense?
8	When the plans got transferred to	8	A. Well, in the sense that the
9	Delphi in '99, the hourly plan was a fully	9	company, if Delphi wanted to try to terminate
10	funded plan at that point. We didn't think it	10	the plans, they would have to go through a core
11	made sense for General Motors to take that plan	11	process that not only would impact their you
12	back under its umbrella. And the hourly plans were not fully funded at that time, so we	12 13	know, the pension plan, but might impact the collective bargaining agreements themselves.
14	thought it was a little bit after different	14	
15	circumstance.	15	deal with collectively bargained pensions.
16	Q. And was the fact that these plans	16	Q. And
17	had been subject to collective bargaining	17	(Feldman Exhibit 25 was marked for
18	agreements a factor at all in segregating what	18	identification.)
19	you thought the outcome for the salary plan	19	MS. KENNEDY: So this is an
20	should be versus the outcome for the hourly	20	e-mail from Jack Butler to yourself
21		21	inquiring as to and I'll show you
22	A. Well, obviously from a process	22	both of these at the same time.
23 24	perspective, the fact that they were subject to collective bargaining. The fact that they were	23 24	(Feldman Exhibit 26 was marked for identification.)
25		25	MS. MEHLSACK: This is Barbara.
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Could you speak up, please? And also,	2	Q. And so at May 28, what if you
3	if you could read the Bates numbers on	3	recall, what was the progress on the on
4	the document.	4	resolving the pension plan issues?
5	MS. KENNEDY: 25 is	5	A. I think on May 28, if General
6	DPHUCCPM00025687 through 88.	6	Motors had been willing to take the hourly
. 7	MS. MEHLSACK: Thank you.	7	plans, there was a general agreement with the
8	MS. KENNEDY: And what will be	8	PBGC that they would that the salaried plan
9	marked as 26 is DPHUCCPM00141579.	9	would get terminated. Exactly how that would
10	BY MS. KENNEDY: Q. So let's go to 26 first actually,	10	happen had not really been worked out, but that the salary plan would get terminated, the PBGC
	if you don't mind, since that's chronologically	12	would have a \$30 million administrative claim
	in you don't mind, since that's emenologically		
13	earlier.	13	to be paid consummation of a bian of closing of
13		13	to be paid consummation of a plan or closing of a transaction. In exchange, they would release
	earlier.		a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on
14 15 16	earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson?	14 15 16	a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an
14 15 16 17	earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so.	14 15 16 17	a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to
14 15 16 17 18	earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so. Q said to reach out to you on the	14 15 16 17 18	a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to order of magnitude.
14 15 16 17 18 19	 earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so. Q said to reach out to you on the PBGC settlement issues and indicates who the 	14 15 16 17 18 19	a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to order of magnitude. Q. So at that point, it was still
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so. Q said to reach out to you on the PBGC settlement issues and indicates who the PBGC representation at the mediation was, 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to order of magnitude. Q. So at that point, it was still undefined?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so. Q said to reach out to you on the PBGC settlement issues and indicates who the PBGC representation at the mediation was, representative at the mediation. 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to order of magnitude. Q. So at that point, it was still undefined? A. Correct.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so. Q said to reach out to you on the PBGC settlement issues and indicates who the PBGC representation at the mediation was, representative at the mediation. You'd been in touch with the PBGC, 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to order of magnitude. Q. So at that point, it was still undefined? A. Correct. Q. And who at GM were you facilitating
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so. Q said to reach out to you on the PBGC settlement issues and indicates who the PBGC representation at the mediation was, representative at the mediation. You'd been in touch with the PBGC, though, prior to May 28 on the Delphi pension 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to order of magnitude. Q. So at that point, it was still undefined? A. Correct. Q. And who at GM were you facilitating contact with regarding the taking on of the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 earlier. On May 28, Jack wrote you an e-mail saying that Harry whom I assume is Harry Wilson? A. I assume so. Q said to reach out to you on the PBGC settlement issues and indicates who the PBGC representation at the mediation was, representative at the mediation. You'd been in touch with the PBGC, 	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 a transaction. In exchange, they would release their liens PBGC would release its liens on the foreign assets, and it would have an unsecured claim at that point undefined as to order of magnitude. Q. So at that point, it was still undefined? A. Correct. Q. And who at GM were you facilitating

Page 166 Page 167 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 gee, taking the hourly plan would be a problem 2 were with Walter Borst, although from time to time I would talk to Rick Westenberg about it 3 or what the problem might be. ٦ 4 So towards the end of May, I was of 4 as well. 5 O. How would you characterize your 5 the view that there was going to be a 6 conversations in May? You said if they had 6 transaction around termination of the salary 7 7 been willing to take on the hourly plan. plan, not the hourly plan with, you know, 8 claims and lien releases consistent with what I 8 You know, the -- again, the issue Α. 9 just said. 9 is that towards the end of May, effectively all 10 10 of General Motors' time was taken up with their Q. So to clarify, you had not heard own Chapter 11 preparations. So one of the 11 from GM at that time that they weren't going to 11 12 take on the hourly plan and, to your 12 unfortunate things is we did not have a lot of 13 substantive conversations -- "we" being 13 understanding, in that those were the contours of the deal you thought you were facilitating, 14 Treasury and General Motors -- in that last 14 15 your impression was that they were going to 15 week prior to General Motors' filing about 16 General Motors' position vis-a-vis the Delphi 16 take on the hourly plan? 17 hourly plan. 17 A. Well, I don't think I said the last part. That's the critical piece. I had not 18 And we didn't have a lot of 18 heard from them that they could not, would not 19 conversations immediately after the filing. It 19 take it on. But in fairness to General Motors. 20 probably took until the end of first week of 20 I had not heard from them a deal where they 21 June before we sort of picked that ball up 21 again and began discussing it in earnest. 22 would take the hourly plan on was acceptable to 22 23 So I don't know that I can 23 them. 24 characterize discussions. In general, at that 24 Okay. And then on Sunday, May 31, О. 25 25 point, no one from General Motors said to me, which is Exhibit 25, Jack is asking you again (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide Page 168 Page 169 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 what the status of the hourly plan was. And 2 Q. And --3 3 you'll see in that second -- well, the second Α. Later that week, whether it was 4 full paragraph that apparently that conclusion 4 Wednesday or Thursday, I don't recall exactly. 5 And what were those concerns? 5 came into question over that period. And then Q. he points out again, "So you'll see that during 6 6 The concern was that they had not Α. 7 built into their business plan sufficient 7 this weekend's drafting session, this 8 funding to take on the hourly plans, and they 8 conclusion has come into question"? 9 9 were concerned about the impact of that on Yeah. · A. 10 10 Q. Is that -- by May 31, had it come their own reorganization. So to be clear, they had not built into question? Had GM indicated something to 11 Q. 11 12 into their business plans for the new GM going 12 you that raised a question in your mind as to whether they would be able to take on the HRP? 13 forward? 13 14 Α. Not to me they had not at that 14 Α. That's correct. point. They had not. 15 15 Q. And is perhaps that something that When I saw this e-mail, which was 16 was part of -- you mentioned earlier that you 16 17 Sunday the 31st, I was in Weil's offices all 17 wish you had been able to talk to them either 18 day and all night that night and I tried to get 18 the week prior to their filing or immediately 19 time with Walter Borst, but we did not connect 19 after and that you hadn't gotten to address it 20 until the first full week of June. Do you feel 20 that day. 21 like --And it probably was Wednesday, 21 22 MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the 22 June 3 or something like that that was the 23 23 first time I had a discussion with General form. 24 BY MS. KENNEDY: 24 Motors where they indicated that they had real 25 Q. So when they first told you that 25 concerns about taking on the hourly plan. TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	they might not be able to take it on, do you	2	of the next week within Treasury about it.
3	feel that delay in fact impacted their ability	3	Ultimately spoke to the PBGC about it, and then
4	to adopt the HRP?	4	probably after that went back to Delphi, which
5	A. I don't know if the delay impacted	5	probably was 10 days or two weeks later.
6	it. I was concerned about it because I sort of	6	Q. And how would you characterize your
7	pride myself on transparency and telling people	7	conversations within Treasury when you heard
8	what I know when I know it, and I felt like it	8	that GM was now talking about not taking on the
9	would have been more appropriate to talk to	9	Delphi HRP?
10	Delphi and its counsel about this before the	10	A. People were concerned about it and
11	June 1st plan filing. That's what upset me and	11	wanted to understand, you know, why they had
12	concerned me at that time.	12	that position, what it would mean to the
13	Q. Okay. In this May 31 e-mail when	13	business, what it would mean to the company.
14	Jack writes "This is a labor MOU question since	14	Q. What it would mean to the Delphi
15	the HRP is collectively bargained," what did	15	business?
16	you understand him to mean by that?	16	A. No, to the General Motors business.
17	A. I mean, "MOU" I assume meant	17	Q. To not take on the HRP?
18	memorandum of understanding. What he meant by	18	A. Or to take it on.
19	that sentence, I have no idea.	19	Q. And what kind of concerns were
20	Q. Okay. And how did you respond to	20	people voicing?
21		21	A. Obviously, as a future lender, then
22	A. Again, I didn't respond to Jack at		current lender to General Motors Treasury was
23	that time. I talked to General Motors a few	23	concerned about where this liability was within
24	days later about it, got their sense of where		the General Motors business plan, whether
25		25	
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1	Page 172 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	
1 2		1 2	Page 173
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL		Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles.
2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered	2	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender,
2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would	2 3	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for
2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward.	2 3 4	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds?
2 3 4 5	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward.	2 3 4 5	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging
2 3 4 5 6	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I	2 3 4 5 6	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds?
2 3 4 5 6 7	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it	2 3 4 5 6 7	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern about 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern about concern about a lot of different employee 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern about concern about a lot of different employee benefit issues related to General Motors more 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC when you went back to them on or around
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern about concern about a lot of different employee benefit issues related to General Motors more generally, not just the Delphi piece. I mean, 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC when you went back to them on or around somewhere after May 31, beginning of June with
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern about concern about a lot of different employee benefit issues related to General Motors more generally, not just the Delphi piece. I mean, General Motors itself has enormous legacy 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC when you went back to them on or around somewhere after May 31, beginning of June with this new understanding that GM would not be
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern about concern about a lot of different employee benefit issues related to General Motors more generally, not just the Delphi piece. I mean, General Motors itself has enormous legacy liability. That was part of what the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC when you went back to them on or around somewhere after May 31, beginning of June with this new understanding that GM would not be taking on or had significant concerns about
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern about concern about a lot of different employee benefit issues related to General Motors more generally, not just the Delphi piece. I mean, General Motors itself has enormous legacy liability. That was part of what the bankruptcy was trying to address. So the fact 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC when you went back to them on or around somewhere after May 31, beginning of June with this new understanding that GM would not be taking on the Delphi HRP?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern aboutconcern about a lot of different employee benefit issues related to General Motors more generally, not just the Delphi piece. I mean, General Motors itself has enormous legacy liability. That was part of what the bankruptcy was trying to address. So the fact that there was a relatively large piece that 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC when you went back to them on or around somewhere after May 31, beginning of June with this new understanding that GM would not be taking on the Delphi HRP? A. Just to be clear, I think I also
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 112\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ 25\end{array}$	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL kind of a liability. It sort of centered around that discussion in terms of what General Motors' business new General Motors would look like going forward. Q. Because the way GM had explained it to you, they hadn't built in this what I believe is approximately a 3 billion-dollar liability, but whatever the the underfunding of the HRP. And so suddenly to now take it on without having built it into their emerging business plan you thought might throw a wrench in the works? A. Yeah. There was a concern about that, and frankly, there was a concern aboutconcern about a lot of different employee benefit issues related to General Motors more generally, not just the Delphi piece. I mean, General Motors itself has enormous legacy liability. That was part of what the bankruptcy was trying to address. So the fact that there was a relatively large piece that had not been thought about, had not been 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Page 173 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Q. We share those troubles. As General Motors DIP lender, though, would it have been possible for Treasury to step in with the necessary funds? I mean, they were giving you their emerging business plan and you were helping to fund that emerging business. MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Obviously, if you assume Treasury has unlimited money, Treasury could have solved every liability in General Motors. In theory, that's correct. Q. Okay. So when you how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC when you went back to them on or around somewhere after May 31, beginning of June with this new understanding that GM would not be taking on the Delphi HRP? A. Just to be clear, I think I also said that it probably took a week to two weeks

	Page 174		Page 17
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	probably not until the end of the third week or	2	they employ.
	even the fourth week of June before I spoke to	3	So there were a whole host of
	the PBGC about it.	4	conversations with General Motors about it, and
5 ·	PBGC was upset, surprised, but not	5	General Motors was pretty dug in that they did
6	surprised. They have a healthy mistrust of	6	not want to, you know, bring the Delphi hourly
	General Motors. They were you know, they	7	plan or salary plan, you know, sort of back to
	were basically unhappy about it.	8	General Motors, given that they had spun Delphi
Э	Q. Did they push you to try to resolve	9	off in '99.
0	the issue in a different fashion?	10	Q. Did the did the memorandum of
1	A. Not in these words, but they asked	11	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
2	us whether we would force General Motors to	12	guarantee come up during these conversations at
	take the plan on.	13	all?
4	Q. And how would you be able to force	14	A. There was a discussion about the
5	General Motors to take the plan on?	15	benefit guarantee. There were a lot of
6	A. That's what we said.	16	discussions about the benefit guarantee both
7	Q. Okay. Did you go back to General	17	with General Motors and then separately with
8	Motors to attempt to force them to take the	18	PBGC.
	plan on?	19	Q. And how would you characterize the
0	A. There were a series of discussions	20	conversations first with GM and then with the
1	about whether they could afford it, what would	21	PBGC?
	be the impact to their business of not	22	A. You know, with GM, GM had taken the
	affording it, what would be the impact of	23	position that with respect to the top what I
	leaving behind the hourly pension plan, given	24	call the top-up guarantee or benefit guarantee
	the number of, you know, union workers that	25	with respect to the UAW, that that was the
5	the number of, you know, union workers that G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580		with respect to the UAW, that that was the SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
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5 TS	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 176		SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 17
5 TS	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 176 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	T	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 17 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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5 TS 1 2 3 4 5	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 176 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL number that they had built into their plan. And so their position had was that they had assumed the plan would get terminated but that they would honor the top-up	T 1 2 3 4	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 17 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL know where that came out, because we at Treasury were not focused on that during the bargaining between General Motors and the UAW, because frankly, as I said earlier, we had
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5 TS L 2315573901234567	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 176 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL number that they had built into their plan. And so their position had was that they had assumed the plan would get terminated but that they would honor the top-up guarantee with respect to the UAW, and that that was something that, in their bargaining with the UAW around the General Motors bankruptcy and the new UAW agreement, that they had agreed to bring that across to new General Motors and that they were prepared to honor that obligation. Q. So, in fact, they had given thought to the termination of the hourly retirement plan but as it pertained to the hourly workers represented by the UAW?	T: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 17 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL know where that came out, because we at Treasury were not focused on that during the bargaining between General Motors and the UAW, because frankly, as I said earlier, we had assumed at that point that they were going to take on the hourly plan at Delphi. Q. But, in effect, when they characterized to you in these discussions about what are the consequences of what we've now decided will be the termination of the or the or not taking on the HRP, don't worry about its effect on our business because we have built this into the UAW agreement? A. I don't know that they said, "Don't
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5 TS 123456789012345678901234	G Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 176 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL number that they had built into their plan. And so their position had was that they had assumed the plan would get terminated but that they would honor the top-up guarantee with respect to the UAW, and that that was something that, in their bargaining with the UAW around the General Motors bankruptcy and the new UAW agreement, that they had agreed to bring that across to new General Motors and that they were prepared to honor that obligation. Q. So, in fact, they had given thought to the termination of the hourly retirement plan but as it pertained to the hourly workers represented by the UAW? A. You know, I don't want to disagree with what you said. The truth is I have no idea whether they had given thought to it and brought this agreement across purposely, whether the UAW had said, hey, if in the future, therefore we want to you bring this agreement across and we want that protection, I	T: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	EG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 17 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL know where that came out, because we at Treasury were not focused on that during the bargaining between General Motors and the UAW, because frankly, as I said earlier, we had assumed at that point that they were going to take on the hourly plan at Delphi. Q. But, in effect, when they characterized to you in these discussions about what are the consequences of what we've now decided will be the termination of the or the or not taking on the HRP, don't worry about its effect on our business because we have built this into the UAW agreement? A. I don't know that they said, "Don't worry about this effect on our agreement." They said we have we have a contractual obligation to the UAW to pay the benefits guarantee, and that is an obligation of new General Motors, and we're prepared to honor it. Q. Okay. And how would you characterize your conversations with the PBGC

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2 benefit guarantees. They have a real issue	2 sections you'll see on page 2, which is the
3 with whether they're appropriate, in what	3 second page, the key emergence issues to
4 context they're appropriate, you know, kind of	4 resolve. We talked a lot about funding this
5 how they work. And so from the PBGC's	5 morning, but pension is one of the top three
6 perspective, they basically said, look it, we	6 things to resolve for Delphi's emergence. Is
7 don't we don't want to be involved in any	7 that
8 benefit guarantees. That's not our role.	8 A. I see it.
9 That's not our mandate. We will talk about,	9 Q. Agree with that characterization?
10 you know, what options we have, what options	10 But in at the end of May or
11 Delphi has in terms of taking the you know,	11 at on May 20, that wasn't something that had
12 assuming the pensions and not seeing them get	12 risen to that had actually really been
13 terminated.	13 spelled out and discussed between the parties,
14 PBGC recognized they can't force	14 between Delphi, Treasury, and GM, how to handle
15 General Motors to take those pension plans if	15 these pensions?
16 General Motors is not going to or not willing	16 A. Again, I think on May 20, it was at
17 to, and so the PBGC was much more focused on	17 least Treasury's expectation and I think
18 their own relationship with Delphi and the	18 probably Delphi's expectation that the path
19 Delphi pension plans.	19 forward would result in the termination of the
20 Q. Okay. If you could just look at 24	20 salary plan and General Motors assuming the
21 for a second. This is, again, not a document	21 hourly plan.
22 that you've seen before?	22 Q. Did Treasury have a position
23 A. Correct. I've not seen this	23 you're aware that the second 414 transfer did
24 before.	24 not go forward?
25 Q. Okay. But in several different	25 A. In nontechnical terms, I'm aware of
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 that.	2 this appears to be it attaches handwritten
3 Q. Do you know why that was the case?	3 notes from Weil. Have you seen this markup of
4 A. I have no idea.	4 the supplement to the first amended disclosure
5 Q. And therefore, Treasury probably	
	5 statement before?
6 didn't have a position as to whether it should	6 A. I have not.
7 or shouldn't go forward?	 A. I have not. Q. You'll notice for the benefit of
 7 or shouldn't go forward? 8 A. It yeah, I mean, by the time the 	 A. I have not. Q. You'll notice for the benefit of 8 the people on the phone, this is
 7 or shouldn't go forward? 8 A. It yeah, I mean, by the time the 9 Auto Team became involved in these companies, 	 A. I have not. Q. You'll notice for the benefit of 8 the people on the phone, this is 9 DPHUCCPM00005801 to 5812. And I believe for
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2	June 1st at 2:09 a.m., and as I said, I had		and they were looking for alternatives. But
3	seen Jack's e-mail from the prior day, from	3	that was a euphemism for "we'd like to see the
4	that Sunday. This was sort of the same day,	4	plans terminated."
5	since we were all still awake, but from the	5	Q. So, in fact, even at you're
6	prior day. And I did not have a chance to	6	saying let's say the end of the first week of
7	catch up with Walter Borst until later this	7	June was when you had this point clarified for
8	week.	8	you in your discussions with GM, you understood
9	Q. I guess I'm focused on the phrase	9	and, in fact, it was pretty clear that they
10	"addressed by," and wherever you had seen that	10	intended not to take the plans on and therefore
11	come up.		accepted that the plans would be terminated?
12	Was your impression that because	12	A. Well, again, that was their
13	the plan documents also say "addressed," "will	13	position, but, you know, there was work that we
14	be addressed by GM" was there a period of	14	wanted to do at Treasury to understand what the
15	time between hearing that it would be addressed	15	rationale was, whether they really had not put
16	by and then understanding that they, in fact,	16	the numbers in, what the impact of the numbers
17	would not take it on where "addressed by"	17	would be, and that sort of thing.
18	was they still didn't know what they were	18	Q. What kind of work did you do at
19	doing with it?	19	Treasury to understand it?
20	MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the	20	A. You know, we went back to their
21	form.	21	
22	A. Not for me. For me, it was it	22	
23	went from my thinking that they were going to	23	explain to us what the timing of payments would
24	assume the obligations under the hourly plan to	24	be for the underfunding. We wanted to compare
25	they had not built it into their business plan		that if they honored the top-up guarantee when
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1		1	M Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	those payments would be made.	2	President is to try to act in a commercially
2 3	those payments would be made. We wanted to understand how many	2 3	President is to try to act in a commercially reasonable manner vis-a-vis the OEMs, and this
2 3 4	those payments would be made. We wanted to understand how many employees we were talking about, where they	2 3 4	President is to try to act in a commercially reasonable manner vis-a-vis the OEMs, and this is what made the most sense commercially for
2 3 4 5	those payments would be made. We wanted to understand how many employees we were talking about, where they were located, how many were retired, how many	2 3 4 5	President is to try to act in a commercially reasonable manner vis-a-vis the OEMs, and this is what made the most sense commercially for General Motors.
2 3 4 5 6	those payments would be made. We wanted to understand how many employees we were talking about, where they were located, how many were retired, how many were between 62 and 65, how many were past the	2 3 4 5 6	President is to try to act in a commercially reasonable manner vis-a-vis the OEMs, and this is what made the most sense commercially for General Motors. Q. And was there a time during your
2 3 4 5 6 7	those payments would be made. We wanted to understand how many employees we were talking about, where they were located, how many were retired, how many were between 62 and 65, how many were past the age of 65. So there was a fair amount of work	2 3 4 5 6 7	President is to try to act in a commercially reasonable manner vis-a-vis the OEMs, and this is what made the most sense commercially for General Motors. Q. And was there a time during your calculations of looking at the their
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	that was	2	right around the time that I was talking to the
3	(Feldman Exhibit 28 was marked for	3	PBGC, or started talking to the PBGC about the
4	identification.)	4	fact that General Motors was not prepared to
5	Q. Okay. So this is, for those on the	5	take on the hourly plan.
6	phone, DPHUCCPM00137193 to 137275. And it is a	6	Q. So about June 25 is when you recall
7	presentation for the meeting of the Official	7	you first approached the PBGC with the bad
8	Committee of Unsecured Creditors. This is	8	news?
9	where I direct your attention to page 31,	9	A. With the news was right around this
10	where you'll see the handwritten markup has now	10	date, maybe a day or two before, maybe that
11	made its way into the creditors' committee	11	day, maybe a day after. I don't recall the
12	notes. And on the second paragraph on the	12	exact date, but right around that time.
13	right-hand column it says, "Upon consummation	13	Q. Okay. Given that at least that
14		14	so many of the major players at that point
15	liabilities of Delphi's hourly pension plan	15	GM, Treasury, PBGC understood that "will be
16	will no longer be the responsibility of the	16	addressed by" really meant "was going to be
17	debtors and will be addressed by GM."	17	terminated," is there to your knowledge a
18	So this now is you see that?	18	reason why this euphemism is still in place,
19	A. I do.	19	being used to describe the resolution of the
20	Q. This now is June 25. If according	20	plan?
	to your reckoning well, had Treasury run	21	A. Well, the only thing I'll say is I
22	through its calculations and come to the point	22 23	had not had any conversations, and I don't think anyone had any conversations with Skadden
23 24	where it supported GM's position on not taking the HRP?	24	or Delphi at this point in time.
24	A. The answer is yes. And this was	25	Q. So you think that as of June 25,
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1	Page 188		Page 189
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	Page 190	Page 191
	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2 ·	negotiation with the PBGC over what that would	2 Q. And what would those terms be?
3	look like.	3 MR. SCHWARTZ: I don't know if
4	But it was right in this time	4 it's appropriate for him to testify
	period that the PBGC came back and said, you	 about developing settlements.
5 6	know, they would be prepared to be cooperative,	6 MS. KENNEDY: Are you making a
ъ 7	not force the company to go through an 1113,	7 privilege
8	1114 process if it didn't have to. And we also	8 MR. SCHWARTZ: I mean, again,
	informed Delphi at that time what people's, you	9 we're not party to those discussions
9	know, current thinking was.	10 either, but we I assume obtained the
10		10 entire, but we rassume obtained the 11 material pursuant to Rule 408 and other
ł	Q. Are you still in talks in you're	12 applicable protections. So I think you
12	still in settlement negotiations with the PBGC?	
13	A. I haven't had any involvement in	13 would have to get the consent of the
14	the last week.	14 parties to that settlement before we
15	Q. Have you come to have you signed	15 disclose those discussions.
16	a settlement with the PBGC?	16 MS. KENNEDY: Okay. Well, let's
17	A. First of all, Treasury wouldn't	17 do this, then.
18		18 (Feldman Exhibit 29 was marked for
19		19 identification.)
20	understanding is they're in the very late	20 BY MS. KENNEDY:
21	stages of negotiating a deal with the PBGC.	21 Q. This is a July 10 working draft of
22	Q. And are you currently aware of what	22 the settlement agreement of the PBGC. Have you
23	5	23 seen this before?
24		A. I'm sure I have.
25	A. Yes.	25 Q. Given that this has been disclosed
T	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
	Page 192	Page 193
1	Page 192 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to us, can we	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the
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2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL to us, can we MS. KENNEDY: Do you withdraw your objection to discussing the terms	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MR. SCHWARTZ: Object to the form. A. Again, I don't think it's up to GM
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Dago 194	
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 of the things, if you turn to page 2, that	2 A. I guess if you're asking my
3 they	3 opinion, 1 1 it's just hard to answer the
4 A. Do you want to tell everybody the	4 question in the context of one sentence.
5 Bates? 6 Q. I sure will. DPHIUEWCA00001301 to	5 Q. And it's hard to judge the plan on
6 Q. I sure will. DPHIUEWCA00001301 to 7 1306.	6 the context of the words "the plan will be 7 addressed"?
8 So page 2 of their statement makes	8 MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection.
9 the point that the plan ambiguously describes	9 A. It is hard in the context of "will
10 the disposition of Delphi's hourly pension	10 be addressed."
11 plan.	11 Q. On July 5
12 Å. I see that.	12 (Feldman Exhibit 31 was marked for
13 Q. Because they were still using the	13 identification.)
14 phrase and it's quoted on page 3 that "GM	14 BY MS. KENNEDY:
15 will address the hourly plan's liabilities"?	15 Q. On July 5, this is the second
16 A. I see that.	16 e-mail down in the chain, counsel from
17 Q. In your opinion, does the phrase	17 Cadwalader was arranging a call that they were
18 "GM will address the hourly plan's liabilities"	18 hoping to have you on.
19 give enough information for people to	19 A. Yes.
20 understand the true content of the plan?	20 Q. And this is the first place that
21 MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection.	21 you'll see he writes, "We should assume GM will
A. I think only the judge can tell me	22 pay out of operating funds and that it will
23 that.	23 make the payments directly to the hourly plan
24 Q. Only the judge can tell you your	24 participants and not through the PBGC."
25 opinion?	25 Do you know what they're referring
TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
Page 196	Page 197
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 to, what GM will be paying out of operating	2 pension plan to fund top-up guarantee payments
3 funds directly to the hourly plan participants?	3 but, rather, that come out of corporate funds
4 A. Ido.	4 earnings, if you will.
5 Q. What's that?	5 And so this is referencing that
6 A. Any top-up guarantee payments,	6 General Motors, to the extent they are legally
7 benefit guarantee payments.	7 obligated to pay benefit guarantee payments or
8 Q. Okay. But the next sentence says,	8 top-up guarantee payments, they will do it out
9 "And we should assume the hourly plan is being	9 of their operating funds directly to the plan
10 terminated."	10 participants and not make the payment over to
11 So when you say so can you tell	11 the PBGC to then fund to the plan participants.
12 me who they would be paying the top-up	12 Q. And when you say "to the extent
me who they would be paying the top-upguarantee payments to, to whom they would be	12 Q. And when you say "to the extent13 they're legally obligated to pay the top-up
me who they would be paying the top-upguarantee payments to, to whom they would bepaying it?	 12 Q. And when you say "to the extent 13 they're legally obligated to pay the top-up 14 guarantee benefits," you mean because new GM
 me who they would be paying the top-up guarantee payments to, to whom they would be paying it? A. Yeah, I mean, the discussions at 	 Q. And when you say "to the extent they're legally obligated to pay the top-up guarantee benefits," you mean because new GM has chosen to take on that obligation?
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	Q. Forward from when you heard they	2 Q. And when was the most recent
3	were terminating the plan, they were not taking	3 conversation?
	on the hourly plan assumption for all of the	4 A. I spoke to Frank Jaworski last
4		
5	workers that were part of the hourly plan.	5 night about this.
6	A. Within the last few weeks, I've had	6 Q. And what are the contents of that
7	conversations with General Motors about which	7 conversation?
8	unions they intend to honor the top-up	8 A. My understanding is that there's a
9	guarantee to, and I know that others at	9 bargaining session going on between the
10	Treasury and the White House have had	10 splinter unions and General Motors about a
11	conversations with them.	11 variety of issues, including this issue.
12	Q. How would you characterize those	12 Q. Including the assumption of any
13	conversations?	13 kind of payment of old Delphi hourly plan
14	A. How would I characterize those	14 obligations?
15	conversations? Businesslike.	15 A. No, including the top-up guarantee.
16	Q. Okay. With whom out at Treasury or	16 Q. Well, when you say "the top-up
17		
	at the White House has GM had a conversation	17 guarantee," explain to me what you mean.
18	about honoring their top-up guarantee?	18 A. My understanding is there is a
19	A. Steve Ratner has spoken to Fritz	19 there is an agreement between General Motors
20		20 and I think it's just well, there may be
21		21 more than one agreement. There's an agreement
22	it at General Motors.	22 between General Motors and the UAW that if the
23	Q. And when were those conversations?	23 Delphi hourly plan were terminated, General
24	A. There have been multiple	24 Motors would guarantee the payment to the
25	conversations in the last two to three weeks.	25 beneficiaries between the amount the PBGC is
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	and the second	
	Page 200	Page 201
1		-
1 2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL legally obligated to pay and the amount those	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 in the bargaining. It's between General Motors
2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL legally obligated to pay and the amount those beneficiaries would otherwise receive had the	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 in the bargaining. It's between General Motors 3 and the unions.
2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL legally obligated to pay and the amount those beneficiaries would otherwise receive had the plan not been terminated.	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the bargaining. It's between General Motors and the unions. Q. You referred earlier to discussions
2 3 4 5	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL legally obligated to pay and the amount those beneficiaries would otherwise receive had the plan not been terminated. My understanding is there may be	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the bargaining. It's between General Motors and the unions. Q. You referred earlier to discussions with Steve Deese Ratner and Deese and those
2 3 4 5 6	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL legally obligated to pay and the amount those beneficiaries would otherwise receive had the plan not been terminated. My understanding is there may be one or more agreements between the union that	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the bargaining. It's between General Motors and the unions. Q. You referred earlier to discussions with Steve Deese Ratner and Deese and those conversations I was referring back to.
2 3 4 5 6 7	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL legally obligated to pay and the amount those beneficiaries would otherwise receive had the plan not been terminated. My understanding is there may be one or more agreements between the union that you represent and General Motors and perhaps	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL in the bargaining. It's between General Motors and the unions. Q. You referred earlier to discussions with Steve Deese Ratner and Deese and those conversations I was referring back to. A. That's correct. But our
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Page 202	Page 203
 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL not just an assumption at that point but essentially an established, understood fact for as far as you were concerned? A. No, I don't think that's a fair characterization. I think it's clear General Motors wasn't going to take on the plan. You know, whether Delphi could have convinced Platinum or the DIP lenders or, you know, someone else to come in here and buy Delphi and, you know, take on the plan, I guess in theory was still an open point. It was clear General Motors was not going to take on the plan. Q. Okay. Fair enough. So then 32, which is Bates DPHIUECWA00001276 to 1278, the you received the last message, and on the first page, so the third message down came out from GM's counsel, and you were copied? Feel free to peruse the whole thing. A. Okay. Q. Okay. So you'll see that on 	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Were you aware of any communications to the IUE or any of the or any of the unions in June regarding the treatment of the hourly retirement plan? A. No. Q. Were you aware that the unions had not been contacted? I can speak only for the IUE, but were you aware that the IUE had not been contacted in June regarding the hourly retirement plan's disposition? A. The Delphi hourly plan, you mean? Q. Correct. A. I wasn't aware of it or unaware of it. I didn't I didn't think about it at that time. Q. Okay. So then you received this e-mail on July 6 saying GM has now spoken to the UAW regarding the PBGC settlement. At that point, in the first week in July, when while a DIP lender could have ridden to the rescue, it
 23 July 6, Weil communicated that GM has now 24 spoken to the UAW regarding the PBGC 25 settlement. TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	 had certainly been decided that GM was not assuming the obligation for the HRP, were you involved in any discussions regarding TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
Page 2041M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL2communicating the dispositions of the HRP to3the unions?4MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection.5A. Just to address the first part of6the question first, there were certainly still7scenarios in the beginning of July where it8would have been possible that General Motors or9someone else would have wound up having to take10the hourly plan.11It didn't play out that way, and I12think the, you know, overwhelming likelihood at13that time was it wouldn't play out that way,14but I don't think on July 6 it was a completely15foregone conclusion.16So I'll say it this time and I17won't say it again, but that was clearly my	Page 205 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL PBGC, and it would have taken 3 months to terminate the pension plan, would have had you would have had to weigh that delay in Delphi emergence against whatever economic benefits you had against in not taking on the liability. So I think there was a range of possibilities that could have happened at that time. They didn't, and General Motors' strong bias was not to take on the hourly plan. But I just don't think it was a foregone conclusion in the first week of July that that was how this was going to play out. Q. Okay. The second part of the question was about though it may not have been a foregone conclusion, it was certainly what
 17 won't say it again, but that was clearly my 18 view at that time, that the second part of the 19 question, I now have forgotten, I'm sorry. 20 Q. No problem at all. 21 What are the scenarios in which the 22 hourly plan would have been taken on by GM even 23 up to the beginning of July? 24 A. If I understand, if there could not 25 have been a consensual resolution with the TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 	 a foregone conclusion, it was certainly what people expected to happen, was that GM would not take on this plan. A. It was the path people were beginning to walk down, yes. Q. And had been walking down since a month prior. You learned about it in the beginning of June? A. At least exploring and then walking TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

1M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL2down, yes.3Q. The when were you first aware4that people were talking that when did5you have conversations about telling the unions6that this was the likely resolution of their7hourly retirement plans?8A. I I think on July 5, the call9that was referenced in the prior e-mail, I10raised with General Motors the need for them to11make sure that they had a communication plan in12place with their unions.13Q. And so you're saying that you14raised that to them. Did GM raise that to you15at all?16A. GfM said we understand we need to17talk to them, and I said my memory is I18said, well, now seems like the right time.19Q. And is your memory that you brought20Q. And is you memory that you brought21to their pensions to the unions?22A. Yes.23Q. And do you know when GM then did24speak to the unions?25spoken to the unions?26Q. And do you know when GM then did24spoken to the unions?25regorting - Worldwide (877) 702-958026TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	[Page 206		Page 207		
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18 call?18 on it sort of degenerating into places they19 A. Yes.19 didn't really want it to go.	4					
19 A. Yes. 19 didn't really want it to go.						
			1			
			1			
21 this e-mail about when to announce these plans? 21 if you know?	1					
22 A. To take a step back, this e-mail 22 A. I don't know.			•			
23 was prompted by a call I made to Oren asking 23 Q. And do you know well, did you			1			
24 him to send it. I had had a conversation with 24 think that the announcement of the termination	1		1			
25 the PBGC where they wanted to very much control 25 of the plans should happen in advance of the						
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2 auction and sale hearing?	2 you know, no one would take them on. And we
3 A. No, I definitely didn't, because	3 didn't want to send that signal to the
4 again, at least my hope was that maybe somebody	4 marketplace.
5 would show up here to buy Delphi who would be	5 Q. But you felt like that was a real
6 willing to do it without terminating the plan.	6 possibility?
7 Why should we you know, why should we assume	7 A. At that time, yes.
8 that there's no buyer here who would keep the	8 Q. Okay. At this time yeah, at
9 hourly plan in place? And why should we create	9 this time, GM had already spoken to UAW,
10 an opportunity for a buyer to not have the	10 though, about the PBGC settlement, so some of
11 hourly plan in place? So we very much wanted	11 the unions had been contacted?
12 to delay any announcements to see whether	12 A. GM had spoken to the UAW about the
13 somebody might show up that would be willing to	13 possibility that the plan would be terminated,
14 do this deal with the plans in place.	14 that is right.
15 Q. Did you balance that with the	15 Q. But you still felt like it was the
16 against the need for the unions to know what	16 right choice to not communicate that to the
17 was going to be happening with their plans?	17 other unions? 18 A. No. I I think I said that I
18 A. It's not an obvious decision, if	18 A. No, I I think I said that I 19 wasn't sure whether it had been communicated to
19 that's the question, which which is the20 right thing do. But at that time, you know, we	20 the other unions, and I didn't follow up, which
21 were still hoping and hearing that maybe there	21 is true.
22 were people interested and coming forward. And	22 Q. I'm not trying to trip you up.
23 if someone had been willing to come forward and	23 The
24 take the plans on that had previously announced	24 A. You can try to trip me up. That's
25 a willingness by the PBGC to terminate them,	25 okay.
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 Q. It's more fun that way. The no,	2 ultimately.
3 my understanding of what you said about how the	3 Q. Okay, okay. That was much more of
4 PBGC wanted to stage-manage the this phone	4 a multiparty call.
5 call because you didn't want word going out to	5 A. Yeah.
6 the marketplace about maybe the Delphi hourly	
1.7 might a gain a to be terminated any you as you can	6 Q. Okay. What did happen on that
7 plan's going to be terminated anyway so you can	7 morning call, focusing on how did Delphi, GM,
8 step in and buy it, and we don't want to tell	7 morning call, focusing on how did Delphi, GM,8 PBGC communicate the terms of the settlement to
8 step in and buy it, and we don't want to tell9 people actually there's a problem there, that's	 7 morning call, focusing on how did Delphi, GM, 8 PBGC communicate the terms of the settlement to 9 the public?
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2 this is a note that includes a letter from	2 apparently just produced to us. So I'm
3 Senator Schumer dated July 6. Have you seen	3 just looking at it for a moment to see
4 it went to Fritz Henderson. Have you seen this	4 if there's anything I want to question
5 at all?	5 on.
6 A. The letter, yes. Yeah, I've seen	6 I think what we'll do is we have
7 it.	7 one copy of this. We will have further
8 Q. So when did you see it?	8 copies made this afternoon. Why don't
9 A. Probably on July 6.	9 we just mark this copy so we have the
10 Q. And you'll see on the 196767 page	10 official copy, then I'm going to just
11 that Senator Schumer indicates in July that he	11 ask you if you've seen it before and
12 was pleased to learn that as part of your	12 what that particular paragraph means,
13 restructuring agreement this is to new GM,	13 keeping in mind I don't have a copy in
14 to Fritz Henderson restructuring agreement	14 front of me.
15 with the Treasury Department, you will assume	15 (Feldman Exhibit 35 was marked for
16 the pension obligations of Delphi's hourly17 workers.	16 identification.) 17 BY MS. KENNEDY:
17 workers. 18 A. I see it.	18 Q. So can you tell me that's a
19 Q. So the news that GM had for five	19 July 19 now working draft of the PBGC
20 weeks been contemplating not doing that had not	20 settlement?
21 made it out to the senator?	21 A. That's what it appears to be.
22 A. Apparently not.	22 Q. Have you seen that before?
23 MS. KENNEDY: I'm sorry, this is	23 A. I believe I have.
24 another working draft of the settlement	24 Q. There's a paragraph in bold on the
agreement with the PBGC that was	25 page Bates number ending 147. Can you tell me
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2 what your understanding again, as you	2 certain pension assets and accrued benefit
 3 skimmed it, can you tell me what your 4 understanding of that paragraph is regarding 	 3 liabilities to true up the final pension assets 4 and accrued benefit liabilities pursuant to the
 4 understanding of that paragraph is regarding 5 the truing up of various benefits? You also 	5 414L transfers," do you understand that to be
6 see it refers to the 414 transfers. And	6 referring to things they have done in the past,
7 obviously, take your time to read it.	7 or forward-looking parts of their settlement
8 MR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I mean, this	8 agreement?
9 paragraph refers to another settlement	9 A. I have no idea.
10 agreement, which I take it you don't	10 Q. That's fine. So this isn't you
11 have.	11 haven't gone over this copy such that you
12 MS. KENNEDY: Unless someone	12 understand what they're talking about in this
13 would like to bring it in the room to	13 paragraph?
14 me.	14 A. I have not.
14 me. 15 MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're not	14A.I have not.15Q.Without having okay.
15 MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're not	15 Q. Without having okay.
15MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're not16asking him what's in that contemplated	 Q. Without having okay. MS. KENNEDY: Thank you very much, Mr. Feldman. A. Thank you.
 MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're not asking him what's in that contemplated settlement agreement? MS. KENNEDY: No, I'm not asking him what's in that contemplated 	 Q. Without having okay. MS. KENNEDY: Thank you very much, Mr. Feldman. A. Thank you. (Discussion held off the record.)
 MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're not asking him what's in that contemplated settlement agreement? MS. KENNEDY: No, I'm not asking him what's in that contemplated settlement agreement. 	 Q. Without having okay. MS. KENNEDY: Thank you very much, Mr. Feldman. A. Thank you. (Discussion held off the record.) EXAMINATION
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 MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're not asking him what's in that contemplated settlement agreement? MS. KENNEDY: No, I'm not asking him what's in that contemplated settlement agreement. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, what was the question? Do you want to see it? MS. KENNEDY: Yeah. Thank you. Q. Yeah, well, when they say "Delphi 	 Q. Without having okay. MS. KENNEDY: Thank you very much, Mr. Feldman. A. Thank you. (Discussion held off the record.) EXAMINATION BY MR. MANCINO: Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Feldman. You're part of the Auto Team. Is that how you described it?
 MR. SCHWARTZ: So you're not asking him what's in that contemplated settlement agreement? MS. KENNEDY: No, I'm not asking him what's in that contemplated settlement agreement. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, what was the question? Do you want to see it? MS. KENNEDY: Yeah. Thank you. 	 Q. Without having okay. MS. KENNEDY: Thank you very much, Mr. Feldman. A. Thank you. (Discussion held off the record.) EXAMINATION BY MR. MANCINO: Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Feldman. You're part of the Auto Team. Is that how you

Page 218 Page 219 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 O. How is that different from the Auto 2 O. Was that a concern that was 3 3 Task Force? expressed to you by anyone at Delphi? Or on 4 A. The Auto Task Force was appointed 4 behalf of Delphi? 5 by President Obama back in January of 2009 and 5 A. It was communicated to me and to 6 is comprised of cabinet-level secretaries. 6 Treasury by Federal-Mogul's senior management 7 And the Auto Team is there to 7 based on their diligence and discussions with Q. support the Auto Task Force? 8 8 Delphi's senior management. q 9 Q. Okay. I want to go back also to A. Yes. 10 Okay. I want to go back to the 10 the discussion -- I believe it centered around Q. Exhibit 7. And you were telling us how you 11 discussion you had previously about the 11 wanted to be within spitting distance before Federal-Mogul proposal. You mentioned that --12 12 and I'm paraphrasing -- the management team turning a bilateral process into a trilateral 13 13 expressed some concerns about their own futures 14 process. Do you remember that? 14 A. I do. 15 as potential employees of a Federal-Mogul-led 15 16 company. Do you recall that testimony? 16 Q. And when you mentioned a bilateral process, you meant discussions that were going 17 Α. Yes. 17 18 on between General Motors and whom? Q. What concerns did they express? 18 19 Α. Well, Federal-Mogul as a strategic 19 A. The -- the DIP lenders. 20 buyer of Delphi likely would not have needed 20 Okay. But at some point, perhaps Q. most of the management team; and therefore, it 21 prematurely from your perspective, those 21 22 is likely that some or all the members of 2.2 bilateral discussions became trilateral 23 senior management would have been terminated, 23 discussions? 24 and I think that was a concern for Delphi's 24 A. As I think I testified before, it 25 management team. 25 quickly became irrelevant, because the parties, TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 221 Page 220 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 2 meaning General Motors and the DIP lenders, 2 Delphi may have shared them. 3 3 were so far apart on value that the But they had to do with the size of 4 negotiation/discussions never really bore 4 the transaction being larger than anything 5 5 Delphi had done before, the fact that -- I'm fruit. 6 But you thought that the fact that 6 sorry, larger than any Platinum had done Q. 7 Delphi was brought into the table -- to the 7 before; the fact that Delphi required a 8 table prematurely cost the deal a month? Is .8 significant operational turnaround following 9 9 that right? any closing, and that that was going to be a 10 10 challenge for Platinum, or we were concerned A. I think I said I thought it 11 would -- it would cost the deal a month, yes. 11 about it being a challenge for Platinum. 12 Q. Okay. And what did you mean by 12 And we were just concerned about, 13 "cost the deal a month"? 13 and I think Delphi was concerned about whether A. I thought it could delay things 14 Platinum had the resources to do an acquisition 14 15 materially for up to a month if we had too many 15 of this type. Q. And Platinum had been involved as a 16 parties trying to negotiate around the same 16 17 possible purchaser of Delphi's steering 17 deal. business; is that correct? 18 Okay. Turning now to Platinum, you 18 О. 19 mentioned that Delphi had expressed some 19 A. That's correct. And that concerns about Platinum. What concerns did 20 20 transaction was not consummated, which I know gave Delphi's management pause and concern. 21 they have with respect to Platinum as a 21 potential acquisition partner as those were 22 Q. Okay. Do you know or have you 22 23 conveyed to you? 23 heard why that transaction was not consummated 24 A. I don't know if I said Delphi had 24 with Platinum concerning the steering business? You know, I knew at one time, and 25 concerns. I think General Motors had concerns. 25 Α. TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 (877) 702-9580

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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
	I don't recall specifically why. I knew	2 3	there were some parts with respect to which it
	t had to do with a falling SARS rate, or I believe it had to do with a falling SARS rate,	4	might take GM only a week or so to resource. Do you recall that?
	and sort of the profitability of the business,	5	A. Yes.
	but I don't recall specifically why it didn't	6	Q. Okay. And that's a view that you
	lose then.	7	held?
8	Q. Okay. And for the record, what is	8	A. It's a view that was communicated
	SARS rate?	9	to me and others at Treasury by General Motors.
10	A. I've forgotten what the acronym	10	Q. Okay. And do you have any examples
	tands for, but essentially SARS is the annual	11	of the kinds of parts that General Motors might
	ar sales rate, rate of the rate that all of	12	have been able to resource in a matter of a
	he OEMs sell cars at.	13	week or so in the event of a Delphi shutdown or
14	Q. Okay.	14	cessation of supplying parts to GM?
15	A. Still may not have articulated it	15	A. General Motors produced a very
16 r	ight.	16	······································
17	Q. If I could take you back to the	17	has been produced because I've seen it, and I
	arly discussion that you had concerning		just don't recall the specific parts from that
	Delphi's importance or not as a supplier to		document. But it exists.
	General Motors and again, not quoting, not	20	Q. Okay. Fair enough. And I think
	rying to quote what you said, but just trying		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	o bring us into a context here where I can ask	22	parts that it could take General Motors up to a
	nome follow-up questions I think you	23 24	year to resource. Right? A. That's correct.
	expressed the view that if Delphi shut down and	24 25	
	topped supplying parts to General Motors, 3 Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580		Q. Okay. And is that something that SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
130	g Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-5500	1.	be reporting - wortdwide (877) 702-3380
	Page 224		Page 225
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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2 \ 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL was expressed to you by General Motors? A. Yes.	2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL might have to be shut down, trucks was one of those?
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Page 226 Page 227 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M: Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 A. General Motors would not be able to 2 Q. And then -- and explain for me why 2 produce cars in lines that were shut down. 3 you felt that there would not be a lengthy 3 O. Okay. And would that have an 4 shutdown if Delphi stopped supplying and the 4 5 impact on the employees who worked in those 5 case converted. A. Because the only buyer for the 6 6 lines producing whatever vehicles those lines 7 critical sites that -- where Delphi produces produced? 7 8 A. It would depend on how long that parts is General Motors. And so a Chapter 7 8 shutdown was for. 9 trustee, in an attempt to maximize value, would 9 10 have to sell those sites to General Motors, 10 Okay. And if the shutdown was for Ο. a fairly lengthy period of time, would it have because every day that goes by where General 11 11 12 Motors is able to resource a part eviscerates 12 any impact on those employees? MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection. 13 the value of that plant in a sale and that's 13 14 inconsistent with the trustee's obligations. 14 Yes. Α. Okay. And did you have a view at 15 Q. Okay. And did you or did Treasury 15 Q. 16 any time during your involvement with the 16 have that same view as to what would happen if 17 Delphi bankruptcy as to what that impact might 17 Delphi stopped -- shut down and stopped 18 be? 18 supplying parts if a lender foreclosed on the 19 19 Α. Treasury's view was that there plants? 20 would be no impact on General Motors or its 20 Yes, we -- we had a view. Α. employees, because we don't believe and -- and 21 And what was that view? 21 0. General Motors doesn't believe that a shut ---22 The view was that the lenders also 22 Α. 23 that there would be a lengthy shutdown if 23 would have to sell to General Motors or watch 24 the value of their collateral evaporate. 24 Delphi stopped supplying and the case 25 25 converted. Q. Okay. So is it fair to say that TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 (877) 702-9580 Page 229 Page 228 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 the more likely shutdown scenario from General 2 Q. And what was your understanding of 3 Motors' perspective, at least as you at 3 what a cold shutdown would entail, at least as envisioned by Delphi in their analysis? 4 Treasury saw it, was that in the event that 4 5 A. Essentially closing the facilities 5 Delphi did stop supplying parts and shut down, that GM could acquire the plants it needed to 6 6 without -- not just closing the facilities, but 7 taking all the machinery down so that it would 7 continue operating either from a Chapter 7 trustee or from a lender who may have 8 take a period of days or weeks or perhaps a 8 foreclosed on the plants? 9 month to bring them back up to speed and 9 10 Α. Either we could acquire those 10 operational. facilities or if we couldn't, then those Q. Okay. And in that cold shutdown 11 11 facilities would have no value and a lot of 12 scenario, at least as you understood it, in --12 liabilities to whoever continued to own them. 13 based on your communications with Delphi, would 13 14 Have you ever heard of the term 14 Delphi not supply parts to General Motors? 0. 15 "cold shutdown"? 15 Α. Correct. They would not. 16 Okay. Now, is that something that 16 Α. Yes. О. 17 Q. In what context have you heard that 17 you thought was a realistic scenario? 18 term used? 18 Α. Yes. 19 19 A. I've heard it used in context of Q. In what respect? 20 We thought that if the case 20 Delphi; I've heard it used in the context of Α. converted, there would be a cold shutdown. 21 21 other manufacturing companies. 22 And how has it been used in your 22 And you also thought that if the Q. | Q. | 23 case converted, a Chapter 7 trustee would more 23 experience in the context of Delphi? or less feel compelled to sell those plants and 24 A. Delphi, in doing their liquidation 24 25 analysis, they contemplated a cold shutdown. 25 the equipment in them to General Motors if TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

Page 230 Page 231 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 2 General Motors made an offer to buy them? 2 And so, you know, there was not a 3 We thought a couple things. We 3 whole lot of rush to acquire those plants if Α. thought that the Chapter 7 trustee would be the Delphi case converted. But at some point, 4 4 5 unlikely to operate those plants because he 5 General Motors would likely acquire them where 6 doesn't have a source of funding. We thought б they couldn't resource the parts and resource 7 7 that the plants had very little value in the where they could. 8 8 hands of anyone other than General Motors, Okay. Because at some point, they 0. 9 basically the most important sites to General would run out of inventory, would need parts? 9 10 Motors. And so, you know, our view was that 10 At some point. Α. over some period of time, General Motors would Right. And did anyone do an 11 11 Q. 12 evaluation for you as to how much it would cost 12 acquire those sites from a Chapter 7 trustee. Okay. And would do so in -- with in total General Motors to resource the parts 13 Q. 13 whatever speed it thought was appropriate in 14 that Delphi supplies for it, including things 14 order to avoid harm to its business? 15 like the steering parts that you talked about? 15 There wasn't a need for a lot of 16 To resource 100 percent of the 16 A. A 17 speed. General Motors itself was about to shut 17 parts? 18 down for 90 days. General Motors has inventory 18 Yeah Q. 19 in the market that would -- of its cars 19 Α No, not that I'm aware of. 20 between, you know, sort of 70 days on the low 20 Okay. Now, if GM did have to shut Ο. 21 side and, you know, as much as 180 days on the 21 down any of its plants with respect to certain lines of vehicles that are produced in the 22 high side. So, you know, General Motors' 22 23 inventory is enormously bloated, or it was 23 event that, for example, Delphi stopped 24 before it shut down itself for the summer this 24 supplying steering components to General year. 25 Motors, could that have an effect on other 25 (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 232 Page 233 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 2 suppliers other than Delphi --2 firm called OHorizons? 3 MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection. 3 Yes. Α. 4 -- who supplied General Motors? 4 Q. Who do you understand them to be? Q. 5 5 Α. If -- General Motors is shut down Α. They are a firm run by previously right now with the exception of the Camaro employed, now unemployed, GM and Delphi 6 -6 7 7 line. executives. And when you say "now unemployed GM 8 8 If -- really, what you're asking is О. 9 and Delphi executives," you mean they used to 9 if General Motors was not able to come back up at some point consistent with its plan, would 10 be employed by GM and Delphi but are now 10 it have an effect, and the answer is yes. 11 employed with OHorizons? 11 12 And what would that effect be? 12 That's what I mean. Q. Α. Okay. Did OHorizons make a 13 Presumably some suppliers would be 13 Α. Q. 14 negatively impacted by that. Earnings would be 14 presentation to you and other members of the 15 lower. Revenues would be lower. 15 Auto Team? Okay. And, I mean, is it your 16 16 О. Α. Yes. understanding that Delphi itself relies on 17 Q. And what was the nature of that 17 other suppliers for parts that it uses to build 18 18 presentation? 19 component parts for General Motors? 19 They wanted to explain to us how Α. 20 Α. Yes. 20 | much General Motors would be harmed if Delphi 21 Q. And those other suppliers might be 21 shut them down. 22 Okay. Do you recall anything 22 affected if there were a Delphi shutdown? Q. Presumably, they would be very 23 specific from their presentation? 23 Α. 24 24 negatively affected. Α. Nothing specific. 25 Okay. Do you recall a discussion 25 Okay. Have you ever heard of a Q. Q. TSG Reporting - Worldwide TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 (877) 702-9580

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_	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1		⊥ 2	A. No, not no. I think I answered
2	of the steering business? A. Yes.	3	previously we never looked at what the costs
3 4	A. Yes. Q. Okay. What was your reaction to	4	would be to resource all of the Delphi parts.
5	that presentation?	5	Q. Not all of them, but I'm not
6	A. Thought it was pretty shoddy.	6	talking about all of them. But some of them.
7	Q. Why?	7.	A. Yes. We strike that. Can you
8	A. I thought it was very superficial.	8	reask the question? I'm sorry.
9	I thought it relied on old paradigms that	9	Q. I'm going back to what you had said
10	didn't exist. It didn't even take into	10	about GM made a presentation to Treasury, and I
11	consideration the fact that General Motors	11	thought that was a presentation concerning
12	itself was going to shut down. They never took		resourcing.
13	a look at what General Motors' inventory of the	13	A. That's correct.
	various lines were. I thought it was I	14	Q. Okay. Did that follow the meeting
15	thought, look it, I'm not an expert on the auto	15	with OHorizons?
	industry, but I have been immersed in it for	16	A. I don't recall whether it was
17		17	before or after. It was in that same time
18	everything wrong about the way people think	18	frame, though.
19	about autos.	19	Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned the
20	Q. Did you ask GM to react to that	20	let me go back. You say that it represented
	presentation?	21	
22	A. Not specifically, no.	22	about autos. What do you mean by that?
23	Q. Did the U.S. Treasury ask GM to	23	A. The OHorizons guys came in and
	make a study of what it of what the impact		said, well, if you had to resource, you'd have
	would be on it if it had to resource Delphi?		an RFP and people would have insist on four
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1	Page 236 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	Page 237 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
1 2	· · · ·	2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL no pressure to do anything.
1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL weeks to do that and then you'd have to build new tools.	2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL no pressure to do anything. Q. Right, right. Now, have they
2	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL weeks to do that and then you'd have to build new tools. I mean, they basically took an	2 3 4	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL no pressure to do anything. Q. Right, right. Now, have they completed that transformation that you're
2 3	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL weeks to do that and then you'd have to build new tools. I mean, they basically took an approach that ignores what's happening in other	2 3 4 5	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL no pressure to do anything. Q. Right, right. Now, have they completed that transformation that you're describing, General Motors?
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Page 238	Page 239
1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 2 current circumstances of General Motors and	 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL A. Yes.
 2 current circumstances of General Motors and 3 what the circumstances would be if Delphi had 	2 A. Yes.3 Q. What do you know about that?
4 shut General Motors down.	4 A. Well, when American Axle struck
5 Q. Okay. Circumstances that might	5 when the American Axle workers struck American
6 happen in the future; right?	6 Axle, General Motors over a relatively short
7 A. Well, if GM had to resource parts	7 period of time had their line shut down, and
8 because Delphi had shut it down, then those	8 they acceded to the union demands and basically
9 would be the current circumstances.	9 caved to the union.
10 Q. Okay. And GM would then have to 11 transform itself from the old-line OEM that it	10 Q. And approximately 30 plants were 11 idled?
12 is into at least what you view as the paradigm	12 A. I don't recall the details.
13 of a modern OEM; is that right?	13 Q. And how long was that shutdown?
14 A. GM is in the process of	14 A. My memory is like four to six
15 transforming itself. Hopefully, it will be	15 weeks, somewhere in that range.
16 able to continue that process. These guys have	16 Q. 11 weeks sound
17 been employed at General Motors years past and	17 A. That could be right.
18 had no idea what was happening within General	18 Q. Okay. Do you remember that being
19 Motors. 20 Q. All right. That was your opinion?	19 discussed in the OHorizons report, the 11 20 weeks?
20 Q. All right. That was your opinion?21 A. That was my opinion.	21 A. Not specifically.
22 Q. Okay. Have you had any discussions	22 Q. Do you know what that shutdown cost
23 with anyone at General Motors as about about	23 General Motors?
24 what the impact of the American Axle strike had	A. Billions of dollars.
25 on General Motors?	25 Q. Okay.
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 A. And that's true about every part of	2 done that.
3 General Motors and every part of Chrysler and	3 Q. Okay, okay. So that that is
 every part of Ford and every part of Fiat and every part of Toyota and every part of Honda, 	4 a that's what you view as the likely outcome5 if Delphi had shut down?
6 and on and on.	6 A. I think it's the only outcome.
7 Q. I'm not sure I follow.	7 Q. Okay. With respect to the proposed
8 A. The bottom line is every part in	8 transaction with General Motors, Platinum and
9 this industry is critical to every OEM, so OEMs	9 Parnassus, and also known as the MDA, is it
10 have to make a decision as to how they're going	10 your understanding that that proposed
11 to operate. 12 Q. Okay. So you're not suggesting	11 transaction in the context of a 363 sale was12 proposed by the debtors as a private sale?
12 Q. Okay. So you're not suggesting 13 that if Delphi were to stop supplying parts to	13 A. That's my understanding.
14 GM, it would have no impact, no cost to General	14 Q. Okay. Did the U.S. Treasury demand
15 Motors?	15 that that transaction be put forward as a
16 A. Not zero, no.	16 private 363 sale?
17 Q. Okay. And they would have to	17 A. No.
18 they would have to transform themselves and	18 Q. Do you know who did?
19 Iook to change their way of building cars?	 A. I don't know who did. O. Okay. But it wasn't a requirement
20 A. No, that's not what I've said. 21 That's not at all what I've said.	20 Q. Okay. But it wasn't a requirement 21 coming from the U.S. Treasury?
22 I said they'd buy the plants out of	22 A. Nor was it a requirement coming
23 the converted case or from the lenders, because	23 from General Motors. Neither Treasury nor
24 the lenders would otherwise be sitting on a	24 General Motors made that demand.
25 goose egg, and none of those lenders would have	25 Q. Can you turn to Exhibit 7? And
2.5 goose egg, and none of those fenders would have	

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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL		
2 looking at the second page of the exhibit, and	2 objective? If you recall. 3 A. I don't recall the specifics but		
3 the part of the e-mail that's from Jeff 4 Tanenbaum dated April 19 that starts "I just	A. I don't recall the specifics, but 4 there was sort of minority control over certain		
4 Tanenbaum dated April 19 that starts "I just 5 got off the phone with Don." Do you see that?	5 transactions. They had to keep the commercial		
6 A. I do.	6 relationships with General Motors in place, but		
7 Q. If you can feel free to read the	7 I don't recall the details of it.		
8 whole thing to yourself, but toward just	8 Q. And under that initial GM term		
9 below you know, about halfway down, a little	9 sheet, what was it that the DIP lenders were		
10 more than halfway down, it says, "As we	10 going to get in terms of an interest in the new		
11 expected, they are having issues with a company	11 company?		
12 with control the way we proposed." Do you know	12 A. I believe my memory is they were		
13 what that is a reference to?	13 going to own two-thirds of it.		
14 A. Yes.	14 Q. Have an equity interest in		
15 Q. And what is that?	15 two-thirds of the company?		
16 A. As I've said, one of the primary	16 A. There were other things they were		
17 principles for General Motors and Treasury was	17 getting. The As and the Bs were getting paid		
18 sanctity of supply, and so in the initial term	18 off in full. I believe the hedges were getting		
19 sheet to the DIP lenders from a governance	19 paid off or assumed, and the C Tranche lenders		
20 perspective, General Motors made it clear that	20 were going to own two-thirds of the reorganized		
21 the DIP lenders as majority owners of the	21 company.		
22 company could not take actions that would	22 Q. Okay. Now, do you recall whether		
23 interrupt sanctity of supply.	23 at some point, probably less than a couple		
24 Q. Okay. And how, in that term sheet,	24 weeks later, the DIP lenders providing a		
25 was that going to be accomplished, that TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	25 marked-up term sheet in response to the GM term TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580		
iso Reporting - workdwide (877, 702-9580	156 Reporting Worldwide (877) 702-9500		
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1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL		
2 sheet?	2 received a term sheet markup from the Delphi		
3 A. I recall that a day later, they	3 DIP lenders. They appear to have consented to		
4 provided their own term sheet, and then a	4 GM's control of the new Delphi entity; however,		
5 couple weeks later, they provided a marked-up	5 they did they did not make a new proposal		
6 term sheet with a lot of blanks in it. I do	6 for the settlement of the C Tranche, left		
7 recall that.	7 blank." Do you see that?		
8 Q. Okay. And do you remember with			
	8 A. Ido.		
9 respect to that later term sheet there being	9 Q. Is that do you recall did you		
10 a at least a perception that there may have	9 Q. Is that do you recall did you 10 see the new term sheet that the DIP lenders		
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[.] 1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL			
2	with a proposed transaction involving Delphi?	2	credit agreement, if you recall?			
3	A. Not in the legal bankruptcy sense	3	A. I just don't recall.			
4	of "cram down," no.	4	Q. Okay. Now, the Delphi DIP lenders			
5	Q. Right. In what sense?	5	are post petition lenders; is that right?			
6	A. There were discussions, really,	6 7	A. That's my understanding.			
•7	questions, we asked of Skadden as to whether a		Q. Okay. And they have secured			
8	transaction could be completed without, you	8 9	claims. Is that your understanding? A. That's my understanding.			
9 10	know, the majority of the DIP lenders supporting it.	9 10	Q. And that they also have allowed			
11	Q. Okay. And what was that	11	certain secured claims. Is that your			
	discussion? What do you remember about that	12	understanding as well?			
	discussion?	13	A. I don't know that, but it wouldn't			
14	A. We asked Skadden and Jack Butler in	1	surprise me.			
	particular whether a transaction could be	15	Q. Is it your understanding that under			
	completed without the support of the DIP	1	the DIP credit agreement, there are certain			
17		17	rights that the lenders have with respect to			
18	DIP lenders.	18	the sale of assets by Delphi?			
19	Q. And what did he tell you?	19	A. Yeah, I've never looked at the DIP			
20	A. You know, I recall Jack had some	20	credit agreement. My understanding is they've			
21	theories on how that might be able to be	21	asserted that they have those rights, yes.			
22	accomplished, but I don't recall the details of	22	Q. And have you had any conversations			
23			with Skadden about the about whether,			
24	Q. Okay. Was one of those theories	24	without the support of a of whatever the			
25	involving collective action under the DIP	25	requisite majority is of lenders under the			
г	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	T.	SG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580			
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1	Page 248 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	Page 249 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL			
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	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL credit agreement, Delphi can sell substantially all of its assets?	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL Chinese automotive company? A. I was involved in internal			
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2 testify here today?	2 limitations. And there was a concern around
3 A. I do.	3 whether or not that buyer would qualify, be
4 Q. Okay. And can you tell me what	4 eligible to receive funding.
5 discussions, to the extent you know, that	5 Q. And what was it about the buyer
6 Mr. Wilson had concerning that Chinese	6 that raised questions about its eligibility?
7 automotive company?	7 A. It's a foreign buyer, which is
8 A. Yeah, I believe that he had two	8 generally not eligible for TARP funds.
9 discussions with John Sheehan where he in	9 Q. Okay. So did Mr. Wilson say
10 substance said to John that if they were	10 they're welcome to submit a bid but they've got
11 interested, they ought to get involved and move	11 to act quickly and they can't count on us for
12 quickly, but that because of some internal	12 financing?
13 deliberations that we had had, we would not be	13 A. I think he was probably a little
14 able to provide financing to that company.	14 more encouraging than that, but substantively,
15 Q. Did you explain did Harry Wilson	15 yes.
16 explain why you could not provide financing to	16 Q. Okay. Going back to something that
17 that company?	17 we touched on a little bit, with respect to
18 A. I don't believe so.	18 this question of Delphi shutting down and
19 Q. Okay. And what were the concerns	19 seizing supplies to General Motors, you
20 about providing financing to that company?	20 mentioned that one response that General Motors
21 A. There are certain limitations in	21 could have to that is simply to shut down. Do
22 terms of how TARP funds can be used, and any	22 you remember that testimony?
23 financing that would have been provided by	23 A. I think what I testified to was
24 General Motors, which would have really been	24 that General Motors had planned a shutdown and
25 the provider of financing, are subject to those	25 that if Delphi were to shut down because of the
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2 look of funda, it was likely that these two	1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
2 lack of funds, it was likely that those two	2 would have to go up the chain of command. It's
3 shutdowns would coincide.	 would have to go up the chain of command. It's not something that the individuals on the Auto
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	rrect.	2	Silver Point and he could speak to Willke.
	Q. Okay. And so did it get broadened	3	We were then told that, no, we had
	encompass dealings with all of the DIP	4	defined "matter" incorrectly, that neither of
	ders and their representatives?	5	us could speak to either of our former
6	A. Just to be clear, it didn't	6	employers and that, in fact, we couldn't speak
	baden, it's that it's that.	7	directly with any of the DIP lenders as
8	MR. SCHWARTZ: Why don't you step	8	creditors.
	back and explain what the what the	9	And then over a period of a week or
	rule is?	10	10 days, based on additional conversations with
11	THE WITNESS: To the extent I	11	the people within Treasury that sort of help us
	understand it.	12	with these things, the definition was, you
13	MR. SCHWARTZ: To the extent you	13	
	understand it.	14	view that "the matter" included all of the DIP
15	A. Harry and I are prohibited from	15	lenders and their professionals, and that our
	orking on any matter that involves our former		interactions should not be with any of them.
	ployers. And as we got into this, it was not	17	And not just us, but the entire Auto Team,
18 cle	ar how Treasury would define "the matter."	18	because if you define "the matter" in that way,
19	And our initial understanding was	19	
	e matter" was not having any interaction	20	professionals are allowed to have direct
	th our former employers directly. So I would		interactions with anybody who we can't have
22 no	t be in a position to speak to Willke, and	22	interactions with, which, as they define
23 Ha	arry would not be in a position to speak to	23	"matter," it included all of the DIP lenders
24 Sil	ver Point. But at least initially, we	24	and their professionals.
25 thc	ought we could cross, and I could speak to	25	Q. Right. And that would have an
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1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL	1	M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
4	pact on the ability of the DIP lenders or	2	lenders?
	ir representatives to deal directly, say,	3	A. I'm aware of that, yes.
	th you or Harry Wilson concerning the Delphi	4	Q. Okay. And that that inability
	nkruptcy?	5	of the DIP lenders to deal directly with
6	A. Correct, and vice versa.	6	Treasury concerning Delphi still exists?
7	Q. Okay. Did that have an impact on	7	A. Still exists today.
	process from your perspective? Did it make	8	Q. Okay. All right. Why don't we
	easier or more difficult for you to deal	9	just pause for a minute?
	th the Delphi situation?	10	(Discussion held off the record.)
11	A. Probably both.	11	EXAMINATION
	Q. In what ways did it make it more	12	BY MR. SCHWARTZ:
	ficult?	13	Q. How did Platinum Equity first come
14	A. Well, obviously, there are times	14	to Treasury's attention as a potential party in
	hen being in direct communications and direct	15	a purchase of Delphi's assets?
1	gotiations can be beneficial.	16	A. John I think I testified earlier
17	Q. Okay. Did you or Harry Wilson or	17	John Sheehan put Platinum in contact with
	y member of the Auto Team ever designate Jack	18	Treasury, and specifically with Harry.
	ther to be your intermediary in dealing with	19	Q. And how did Federal-Mogul come to
	e DIP lenders in any quasiofficial capacity?	20	Treasury's attention?
21	A. Not that I recall, no.	21	A. I think really in two ways. I
22	Q. And are you aware that at least	22	think John put the CEO of Federal-Mogul, Jose
	me representatives of DIP lenders have raised	23	Maria, in touch, and Jose Maria also is
باد. بي سه د			friendly with and had a dinner with Xavier I
	sues about the Treasury's unwillingness or	124	
24 iss	sues about the Treasury's unwillingness or about to deal directly with the DIP	24 25	
24 iss 25 ina	sues about the Treasury's unwillingness or ability to deal directly with the DIP Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580	25	

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Page 258 Page 259 1 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 principal person at Boston Consulting Group 2 deal or close to a deal with the DIP lenders 2 3 before bringing the company and others into the 3 who's our financial advisor in connection with Delphi. So I know both Xavier and Sheehan 4 negotiations. 4 5 So I think if I said Treasury was helped put Federal-Mogul in contact with us. 5 Q. I want to direct your attention to 6 controlling the process, I think what -- more 6 7 Exhibit 7 again. Now, this morning when 7 accurately, General Motors was trying to get to 8 counsel for the creditors' committee was 8 a bilateral deal and Treasury was supportive of 9 questioning you about this exhibit, you were that strategy. 9 10 MR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you. discussing the timing of the first GM term 10 sheet to the DIP lenders being shared with 11 Time noted: 4:48 p.m. 11 12 12 Delphi. Do you recall that conversation? A. Generally, yes. 13 13 MATTHEW FELDMAN And you testified that Treasury was 14 14 0. 15 trying to, quote, control the process. Do you 15 16 recall that? 16 Subscribed and sworn to before me 17 17 this day of , 2009. Α. Yes. 18 What did you mean when you said 18 О. 19 19 that Treasury was trying to control the 20 20 process? 21 Α. Well, I think what I meant was that 21 22 22 Treasury had a view, General Motors had a view, 23 23 that a bilateral discussion or an agreement on 24 a bilateral deal made sense first, and so, you 24 25 25 know, General Motors was seeking to get to a TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 Page 260 Page 261 M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL M. Feldman - HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 1 1 CERTIFICATE 2 ----- INDEX ------2 EXAMINATION BY PAGE 3 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 3 WITNESS MATTHEW FELDMAN 4 4 5 I, MARY ANN PAYONK, CRR-RDR, CBC, CCP, 5 By Mr. Malionek 7 6 CLR, shorthand reporter, do hereby certify: 6 By Ms. Kennedy 153 7 That the witness whose deposition is 7 By Mr. Mancino 217 8 hereinbefore set forth was duly sworn, and that 8 By Mr. Schwartz 257 9 such deposition is a true record of the 9 EXHIBITS 10 testimony given by such witness. 10 NO. MARKED 11 I further certify that I am not related 11 9 12 to any of the parties to this action by blood 12 Exhibit 1 29 Exhibit 2 13 or marriage, and that I am in no way interested 13 Exhibit 3 39 in the outcome of this matter. 14 14 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 15 Exhibit 4 50 15 16 my hand this 21st day of July, 2009. 16 Exhibit 5 54 17 17 Exhibit 6 56 18 18 Exhibit 7 61 19 MARY ANN PAYONK, CRR-RDR, CBC, CCP, CLR 19 Exhibit 8 71 20 20 Exhibit 9 79 Shorthand Reporter 21 Exhibit 10 83 21 22 22 Exhibit 11 94 97 23 23 Exhibit 12 24 24 Exhibit 13 104 108 25 25 Exhibit 14 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580 TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580

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25	Exhibit 37 SG Reporting - World	248	702-9580	24 (Notary Public) 25 My Commission expires: TSG Reporting - Worldwide (877) 702-9580
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


Key Emergence Issues

March 20, 2009

Confidential – Material Non-Public Information DIP Steering Committee – Agent-Level Information


Key Issues To Resolve



Key Emergence Issues – March 20, 2009

Page 2

Amended GSA/MRA Issues



Major Amended GSA/MRA Issues

Original GM Position	Original Delphi Position	Current Status: Resolution/Open Issues
	Acquired Sites	
GM to buy all North American sites, including Mexican sites	Delphi to retain all North American sites and parties to adopt cash-flow break-even structure	Resolved: -GM to purchase all four UAW sites -Delphi to retain balance of North American sites, including Mexican sites -No cash-flow break-even structure
-Net working capital after implementing GM \$300M PTAP -Liquidation value for real property/ fixed assets	"Fill the hole" approach where GM provides funding necessary for Delphi to emerge	Open Issue : Purchase price to be resolved following discussions among Delphi, GM and DIP lender representatives
GM to receive "bulletproof" access rights for all non-purchased N/A sites, including Mexican sites	GM to receive "limited" access rights at retained U.S. sites pursuant to Amended MRA	Resolved: GM to receive "moderated" access rights for retained U.S. sites Open Issues: (i) Protection of GM Mexican supply in lieu of access rights (i.e., through IP rights, product pricing) and (ii) ownership of tooling for GM and other customers

Key Emergence Issues – March 20, 2009

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Major Amended GSA/MRA Issues

Original GM Position	Original Delphi Position	Current Status: Resolution/Open Issues
	Intellectual Property	
REDACTED	REDACTED	REDACTED
	FREINEIN	
GM not to assume pension liability unless terms of Amended MRA met	GM to assume HRP and SRP	Open Issue : Pension unresolved (see slide 9 below)
	Salaried Employees	
GM to have sole discretion on who to hire and does not pay severance	GM to have sole discretion on who to hire but must pay severance to those not hired	Resolved: -GM has sole discretion on who to hire and will not pay severance -Severance costs to be addressed through purchase price.
ey Emergence Issues – March 20, 2009	Page 5	

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
Major Amended GSA/MRA Issues

Original GM Position	Original Delphi Position	Current Status: Resolution/Open Issues
	Assumed Liabilities	
GM to assume liabilities as per Amended MRA	GM to assume all Retained Liabilities (defined in Amended MRA) for all North American sites	Resolved: - Assumption of liabilities pursuant to Amended MRA plus supplemental liabilities (e.g., environmental, cure costs, warranty, salaried employees an workers' comp.) - Cost of retained liabilities to be reflected in purchase price Open Issues: (i) Hedging obligations a acquired sites and (ii) party responsible for cancellation costs for contracts not assumed by GM
	Warranty	
GM to take only post-closing warranty liability for products made at acquired sites	GM to take pre- and post-closing warranty liability for all products made at acquired sites	Resolved : GM to take (i) pre- and post closing warranty liability for GM produc made at UAW Sites and sold to GM an (ii) post-closing warranty liabilities for products made at UAW Sites and sold by GM to non-GM customers

Major Amended GSA/MRA Issues

Original GM Position	Original Delphi Position	Current Status: Resolution/Open Issues		
	Environmental			
GM to take only post-closing environmental liability for acquired sites	GM to take pre- and post-closing environmental liability for acquired sites	Resolved: GM to take pre-and post-closing environmental liability for UAW Sites		
	Transition Services	Open Issue: Saginaw environmental liability		
Delphi to provide reasonable and customary transition services to GM at cost for 18 months and at cost plus a premium for an additional 6 months	Same	Resolved: Structure maintained with 12/31/2012 end date and IT transition services at cost throughout		
	Transfer Effective Date			
Closing to occur pursuant to § 363 sale prior to POR effective date	Closing to occur at effective date of POR confirmed pursuant to § 1129	Resolved: Closing occurs at effective date of POR confirmed pursuant to § 1129		
St	Steering Option Exercise And Timing			
GM to exercise call option for \$1 immediately (upon cessation of marketing activities)	GM to exercise call option for adjusted pricing at emergence (and following cessation of marketing activities)	Resolved: GM Option Exercise Agreement executed 3/3/09 Open Issues : (i) Definitive documentation due 3/23, (ii) actual amount of borrowing base payment and (iii) treatment of alleged PBGC liens on Steering assets		
Key Emergence Issues – March 20, 2009 Page 7				


Anticipated Sources Of Emergence Funding



Key Emergence Issues – March 20, 2009

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Pension




* Note: Delphi-initiated "distressed termination" assumed not feasible due to timing issues

Key Emergence Issues – March 20, 2009

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Event Timeline Assuming June 30, 2009 Emergence*



Event Timeline Assuming June 30, 2009 Emergence – Notes To Event Timeline

- 1. If an amendment to GM-Delphi Agreement increasing GM commitment to \$450 million is not effective, on March 24 Delphi shall repay Tranche A and B loans with any remaining Incremental Borrowing Base Collateral
- 2. If Delphi fails to deliver the March 24 report, on March 25 Delphi shall repay Tranche A and Tranche B loans with any remaining Incremental Borrowing Base Collateral
- 3. If Delphi fails to file a plan by April 2, (i) the Accommodation Period ends on May 5 instead of June 30, and (ii) on April 3 Delphi shall repay Tranche A and B loans with any remaining Incremental Borrowing Base Collateral
- 4. If the requisite percentage of the DIP Lenders directs the Administrative Agent to notify Delphi that the March 24 Report is not satisfactory, within one Business Day of receipt of such notice, Delphi shall repay Tranche A and B loans with any remaining Incremental Borrowing Base Collateral
- 5. If the requisite percentage of the DIP Lenders directs the Administrative Agent to notify Delphi that the Plan of Reorganization is not satisfactory, (i) within one Business Day of receipt of such notice, Delphi shall repay Tranche A and B loans with any remaining Incremental Borrowing Base Collateral, and (ii) the Accommodation Period ends on May 5 instead of June 30
- 6. If Court fails to approve disclosure statement by May 2, the Accommodation Period ends on May 5 instead of June 30

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Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors in Possession

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

 In re
 :
 Chapter 11 Case No.

 GENERAL MOTORS CORP., et al.,
 :
 09-50026 (REG)

 Debtors.
 :
 (Jointly Administered)

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DECLARATION OF RICK WESTENBERG IN SUPPORT OF DEBTORS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER APPROVING (I) MASTER DISPOSITION AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE OF CERTAIN ASSETS OF DELPHI CORPORATION, (II) RELATED AGREEMENTS, (III) ASSUMPTION AND ASSIGNMENT OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS, (IV) AGREEMENT WITH PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, AND (V) ENTRY INTO ALTERNATIVE TRANSACTION IN LIEU THEREOF

I, Rick Westenberg, declare as follows:

1. I am a Director of Business Development for General Motors Corporation

(together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries, "GM"). I have personal knowledge of the facts

set forth herein or have conducted a reasonable inquiry to determine that such statements are true

and correct.

2. I received a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in 1996 from the University of Notre Dame. After graduating from college, I spent five years working as an auditor and financial consultant at Ernst & Young LLP. Thereafter I attended the University of Chicago and received an MBA.

3. I was hired by GM in 2003 and have been employed continuously since then. During my employment at GM I have held several positions in the New York Treasurer's Office focusing on different aspects of corporate finance. I am currently Director of Business Development and have held this position since 2008. As Director of Business Development, I am responsible for supporting the restructuring activities related to GM's involvement in the chapter 11 cases of Delphi Corporation ("**Delphi**"), which has operated under chapter 11 protection since October 2005. I previously supported these same restructuring activities as Manager of Business Development in 2005 through 2006.

4. I have been integrally involved in the negotiations between Delphi, GM and Parnassus Holdings II, LLC ("**Parnassus**") in connection with the purchase by each of GM and Parnassus of certain of Delphi's assets (the "**Proposed Transaction**").

5. I make this declaration in support of GM's motion to approve (i) the purchase, and guarantee of purchase, of certain assets of Delphi pursuant to the MDA¹, (ii) entry into the SPA, the Operating Agreement, the Loan Agreement, the Commercial Agreements, and the Ancillary Agreements with Parnassus in connection with Parnassus's purchase of substantially all of the remaining operating assets of Delphi, (iii) assumption of certain executory contracts in connection with the sale of certain of Delphi's assets and assignment of such

¹ Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to such terms in the Motion.

contracts and leases to Vehicle Holdings, (iv) entry into an agreement with the PBGC in

connection with such transaction, and (v) entry into an Acceptable Alternative Transaction with

the successful bidder, if applicable, in the auction of Delphi's assets (the "Motion").

I. GM's Support to Date to Delphi's Chapter 11 Cases

6. During the Delphi Cases, GM has been forced to spend billions of dollars

and incur billions of dollars of additional liabilities primarily to protect its supply base by

supporting Delphi. The following are some of the most significant contributions made by GM in

the Delphi Cases:

- *Labor Solutions During Delphi's Cases*. GM made several critical contributions to facilitate Delphi's implementation of new agreements with its unions in 2006, 2007, and 2009, including paying or assuming billions of dollars of liabilities to allow Delphi to implement special attrition programs for certain of its hourly employees, providing opportunities for certain hourly employees to flow back to work for GM, the transfer of significant pension and post-retirement health care obligations to GM, and entering into memoranda of understanding with Delphi's unions to subsidize certain payments that GM believes Delphi would otherwise have had to make to its hourly employees.
- *Global Settlement Agreement/Master Restructuring Agreement*. To resolve many of the issues between GM and Delphi and increase Delphi's ability to exit chapter 11, GM and Delphi entered into a Global Settlement Agreement (as amended, the "GSA") and a Master Restructuring Agreement (as amended, the "MRA"), both of which have been amended several times during the Delphi Cases.² The GSA and the MRA both became effective in the fall of 2008. Pursuant to the GSA and the MRA, GM agreed, among other things:
 - to assume post-retirement health care and basic life insurance benefits for the vast majority of Delphi's U.S. hourly retirees (beyond such assumptions already contemplated in the labor contributions described above);

 $^{^{2}}$ All summaries in this Declaration of any agreements are qualified in their entirety by the terms of such agreements and, in the event of any conflict between any summary and the applicable agreement, the terms of such agreement control.

- that the GM hourly pension plan would assume \$2.1-2.4 billion of net liability of Delphi's hourly pension plan in exchange for an allowed administrative expense claim equal to 77.5% of the transferred net liability;³
- to subsidize through 2015 Delphi's U.S. hourly labor costs and, until closure or sale, the costs of operating several of Delphi's U.S. facilities;
- to a revenue plan to provide Delphi with a substantial, long-term book of GM business (in some cases, at pricing GM believes to be higher than market competitive levels) and enhanced opportunities to win future GM business; and
- to reduce GM's unsecured claims against the Delphi Debtors from an asserted amount in excess of \$13 billion to an allowed claim of \$2.7 billion.
- Liquidity Support. While looking for alternatives to exit chapter 11, Delphi sought support from GM in the spring of 2008 to address Delphi's liquidity issues and avoid a shut down. As a result, GM agreed to advance Delphi up to \$650 million in exchange for claims with a priority junior to the claims of the Delphi DIP Lenders (as amended, the "GM-Delphi Financing Agreement"). Since then, GM has made certain amendments to the GM-Delphi Financing Agreement such that GM's commitment to fund loans to Delphi thereunder is currently \$550 million (inclusive of outstanding loans). In addition, GM accelerated the payment of \$300 million in trade payables to Delphi over a three month period beginning in the first quarter of this year.

Notwithstanding the billions of dollars of support GM has already provided to Delphi, Delphi

continues to need further liquidity support. In addition, Delphi's postpetition financing loans

(the "Delphi DIP Loans") – in the current principal amount of approximately \$3.3 billion –

matured on December 31, 2008 and are currently in default. Delphi's DIP Lenders entered into a

series of forbearance agreements, but the forbearance may expire as early as July 10, 2009, at

which point the Delphi DIP Lenders may seek to foreclose on all or some portion of Delphi's

³ GM also agreed that if Delphi could consummate a reorganization plan meeting certain criteria, (i) the GM hourly pension plan would assume an additional approximately \$3.2 billion of net liability (based on current estimated liabilities and asset values) of Delphi's hourly pension plan, (ii) GM would accept preferred stock in reorganized Delphi in lieu of repayment of GM's administrative and general unsecured claims against Delphi, and (iii) GM would, under certain conditions, share a portion of such preferred stock with Delphi's unsecured creditors. Due to the state of the Delphi Cases, GM strongly believes that Delphi will not be able to consummate a reorganization plan meeting such criteria.

assets. The chaos that could ensue as a result of such foreclosures could lead to a cessation of some or all of Delphi's operations. A cessation of operations by Delphi, whether due to liquidity constraints or foreclosures by the Delphi DIP Lenders, could shut down GM's production and lead to the attendant consequences described in the Declaration of Randall L. Pappal in support of the Motion, filed contemporaneously herewith (the "**Pappal Declaration**").

II. The Need for the Proposed Transaction

7. For the reasons set forth in the Pappal Declaration, in GM's relationship with Delphi, protection of supply is paramount. GM must take measures to secure continuity of supply. Due to Delphi's current liquidity crisis and the potential for foreclosure by Delphi's postpetition secured lenders (the "**Delphi DIP Lenders**") in the absence of a consensual resolution, it is imperative that the Debtors immediately secure the supply of parts from Delphi in order for GM's own reorganization to succeed. In light of current circumstances, GM can only obtain confidence that its supply of Delphi's parts will not be threatened by obtaining control of certain of Delphi's assets and/or through a transfer of Delphi's assets to an entity that GM is comfortable will be a stable and well-capitalized long-term supplier of parts to GM.

III. Search for Other Alternatives to the Proposed Transaction

8. Over the past several months, GM and Delphi have discussed with various parties, including the Delphi DIP Lenders and another potential purchaser of Delphi's assets, potential transactions to resolve the Delphi Cases. Platinum Equity Capital Partners II, L.P. ("**Platinum**") was the only party to present a viable business, operating, and restructuring plan, including stability of supply to GM, and to commit to a binding transaction on the expedited timeline required by the current situation. Accordingly, after extensive negotiations with Delphi and Platinum, GM determined that its most reliable and cost-effective option to secure the supply

of parts from Delphi's facilities would be to enter into agreements with Delphi, Parnassus (which was formed by Platinum), Platinum, and certain of Platinum's affiliates to provide for Delphi's sale of substantially all of its operating assets to GM (including to certain of GM's non-debtor affiliates) and Parnassus.

IV. The Benefits of the Proposed Transaction

9. Accordingly, to stabilize and secure for itself the supply of essential parts, GM has entered into the Proposed Transaction with Delphi and Parnassus, which would be partly owned by GM, whereby GM (primarily through wholly-owned non-debtor affiliates) would purchase certain of Delphi's assets used primarily to manufacture parts for GM, and Parnassus would purchase substantially all of Delphi's remaining operating assets (which are also used to produce parts for GM and other customers).

10. More specifically, GM has decided to obtain control of Delphi's global steering business and Delphi's U.S. plants that employ workers represented by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the "UAW") because those plants supply parts primarily to GM and, in the case of the U.S. UAW plants, are important to GM's relationship with the UAW. Operating assets of other Delphi businesses where GM is generally either not the principal customer or where the components are not as critical to GM production interests will be transferred to a third party. Because no other party has been willing to provide sufficient capital to fully reorganize these other assets, GM has agreed to provide significant funding to the entity that will own these assets under the Proposed Transaction to allow such entity to reorganize the assets and become a stable supplier to GM.

11. The Proposed Transaction would meet GM's goal of stabilizing the supply of parts currently manufactured by Delphi. While acquiring certain critical assets directly, the

other assets used to produce parts for GM would be transferred to a stable entity that would be well-capitalized and controlled by Platinum, which has the experience necessary to successfully operate the assets.⁴ In the unlikely event that Parnassus encounters financial difficulties, GM will have greater means to protect itself due to enhanced rights it is obtaining under commercial agreements with Parnassus. Finally, because Parnassus will be properly capitalized and GM has confidence in Parnassus's business, operating, and restructuring plan, GM believes that it will eventually be able to recover most, if not all, of the funds that it will invest in and loan to Parnassus.

V. Consideration to Be Paid by GM

12. Under the Proposed Transaction, GM is providing the following

consideration for the GM Purchased Assets:

- Assumption of certain ordinary course of business liabilities associated with the GM Purchased Assets;
- Assumption or payment of amounts necessary to cure defaults under Delphi's executory contracts that are to be assigned to GM (GM estimates this amount will be no more than \$90 million);
- Payment to Delphi of approximately \$900 million in cash;
- Payment to Delphi of up to \$50 million to fund certain expenses of winding down the Delphi Debtors' estates;
- Payment of 50% of Delphi's professional fees (such payment is capped at \$15 million), plus the costs of solicitation of votes for Delphi's Modified Plan (such payment is capped at \$12 million); and

⁴ Platinum has a successful track record of investing in and operating, among other types of companies, manufacturing and industrial companies. More importantly, Platinum has been doing due diligence on Delphi's assets for more than three years and has devised a comprehensive business plan for Parnassus that is not dependent for success on the automotive industry returning to pre-recessionary sales levels and that GM believes will result in the financial and operational success of Parnassus.

• Payment to Delphi of up to approximately \$145.5 million of the first net proceeds of the Plan Investor Litigation.

VI. Involvement of U.S. Treasury

13. The United States Department of Treasury (the "**U.S. Treasury**") is the Debtors' largest prepetition secured creditor and their postpetition secured lender. As such, the U.S. Treasury was kept abreast of and participated in the negotiations over the Proposed Transaction and approved GM's entry into the Proposed Transaction.

14. Additionally, GM's postpetition secured loan will enable GM to fund the Proposed Transaction or an Acceptable Alternative Transaction that requires funding by GM. To that end, with the approval of the U.S. Treasury, GM's anticipated expenditures with respect to Delphi were built into the initial 13-week budget submitted to the Court as part of approval of GM's postpetition financing (the "**DIP Budget**") and the final DIP Budget reflects all of the projected expenditures to be paid by GM or the other GM Buyers, including funding of capital to Parnassus under the SPA, in connection with the Proposed Transaction or an Acceptable Alternative Transaction.

VII. The PBGC Discussions

15. Delphi's hourly and salaried pension plans are currently significantly underfunded (the hourly plan has a net underfunded liability of approximately \$3.2 billion and the salaried plan has a net underfunded liability of approximately \$2.1 billion). The PBGC has asserted liens against the assets of Delphi's non-debtor affiliates (which include the foreign assets under the Proposed Transaction) to attempt to secure certain of the PBGC's pensionrelated claims against Delphi's ERISA control group. Although Delphi has disagreed that these asserted liens are valid or enforceable, neither GM nor Parnassus (nor presumably any other potential purchaser) is willing to purchase the assets (or shares in the non-debtor affiliates that own the assets) while they are subject to the threat of the PBGC liens. As a result, conditions precedent to the obligations of GM and Parnassus under the MDA are that the PBGC shall have agreed to remove its alleged liens on the assets subject to the Proposed Transaction. Additionally, Delphi's obligations under the MDA are conditioned on Delphi not being subject to liability in respect of its hourly pension plan after the closing of the MDA.

16. GM, Delphi, the PBGC, and the U.S. Treasury have engaged in discussions regarding an agreement to satisfy these conditions and render saleable the assets subject to the PBGC's asserted liens (a "**PBGC Agreement**"). Although no PBGC Agreement has yet been reached, as part of any PBGC Agreement that may be ultimately reached, GM may agree to make a cash payment to the PBGC and/or assume all or some portion of the net underfunded liability of Delphi's hourly pension plan. GM will only agree to make these contributions if they are necessary to enable the Proposed Transaction or any Acceptable Alternative Transaction to proceed and the contributions are clearly outweighed by the benefits GM would receive from the Proposed Transaction or an Acceptable Alternative Transaction. In such circumstances, the GM contributions would be a sound exercise of GM's business judgment. Additionally, as with the other aspects of the Proposed Transaction, any GM contributions under a PBGC Agreement will be subject to U.S. Treasury consent. I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing

is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Dated: July 8, 2009 New York, New York

> /s/ Rick Westengerg RICK WESTENBERG

Harvey R. Miller Stephen Karotkin Jeffrey L. Tanenbaum Joseph H. Smolinsky Robert J. Lemons WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 767 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10153 Telephone: (212) 310-8000 Facsimile: (212) 310-8007

Attorneys for Debtors and Debtors in Possession

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

 In re
 :
 Chapter 11 Case No.

 GENERAL MOTORS CORP., et al.,
 :
 09-50026 (REG)

 Debtors.
 :
 (Jointly Administered)

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DECLARATION OF RANDALL L. PAPPAL IN SUPPORT OF DEBTORS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER APPROVING (I) MASTER DISPOSITION AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE OF CERTAIN ASSETS OF DELPHI CORPORATION, (II) RELATED AGREEMENTS, (III) ASSUMPTION AND ASSIGNMENT OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS, (IV) AGREEMENT WITH PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, <u>AND (V) ENTRY INTO ALTERNATIVE TRANSACTION IN LIEU THEREOF</u>

I, Randall L. Pappal, declare as follows:

1. I am the Executive Director, HVAC and Mexico – Global Purchasing and

Supply Chain for General Motors Corporation (together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries,

"GM"). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein or have conducted a reasonable

inquiry to determine that such statements are true and correct.

2. I have a bachelors degree in industrial engineering, received in 1983, from the Rochester Institute of Technology. I also have an MBA from the University of Michigan, received in 1992.

3. I was hired by GM in 1983 and I have been employed by GM continuously since then. During my employment at GM I have held several positions in the GM organization focusing on purchasing and supply chain operations, both domestic and international. I am currently the Executive Director, HVAC and Mexico – Global Purchasing and Supply Chain and have held this position since 2008. In my current position as Executive Director, HVAC and Mexico – Global Purchasing and Supply Chain, I am responsible for purchasing for global HVAC and electrical commodity, as well as purchasing and supply chain activities for Mexico. In this position, I am also responsible for providing oversight for the Delphi¹ relationship within GM's purchasing organization.

4. I make this declaration in support of GM's motion to approve (i) the purchase, and guarantee of purchase, of certain assets of Delphi pursuant to the MDA, (ii) entry into the SPA, the Operating Agreement, the Loan Agreement, the Commercial Agreements, and Ancillary Agreements with Parnassus in connection with Parnassus's purchase of substantially all of the remaining operating assets of Delphi, (iii) assumption of certain executory contracts in connection with the sale of certain of Delphi's assets and assignment of such contracts and leases to Vehicle Holdings, (iv) entry into an agreement with the PBGC in connection with such transaction, and (v) entry into an Acceptable Alternative Transaction with the successful bidder, if applicable, in the auction of Delphi's assets (the "**Motion**").

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¹ Capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to such terms in the Motion.

I. Commercial Relationship Between GM and Delphi

5. GM and Delphi have a complex history arising from their interdependent relationship. Delphi consisted of divisions and subsidiaries of GM until GM's divestiture of Delphi in 1999. Since the spin-off, Delphi has been, and continues to be, GM's largest component parts supplier, accounting for approximately 11.3% of GM's North American purchases and 9.6% of GM's global purchases in 2008. Delphi is a sole-source, just-in-time, supplier of many critical parts to GM, including parts that are used in essentially every GM product line in North America.

6. In turn, since the spin-off, GM has been, and continues to be, Delphi's largest customer. Although Delphi's sales to GM have declined over the years, in 2008, Delphi's sales to GM aggregated approximately \$6.8 billion, or approximately 33% of Delphi's revenues. Thousands of Delphi's employees work at plants whose production is primarily dedicated to production for GM or GM's suppliers.

II. Affect on GM of Termination of Deliveries of Parts by Delphi

7. Consistent with industry practice, GM operates on a "just-in-time" inventory delivery system, in which component parts from suppliers are typically assembled onto vehicles by GM within a few hours of the delivery of the parts to the vehicle assembly facility. Because GM operates on a just-in-time inventory delivery system, it generally maintains little or no inventory of parts on site, and relies instead upon frequent and regular shipments of parts from its suppliers, including Delphi. Consequently, if Delphi ever ceases shipping even a small fraction of production parts to GM, the GM plants relying on such shipments may run out of inventory of such parts and have to shut down within a matter of days. 8. Most parts that Delphi manufactures for GM are not readily available from an alternate source due to, among other things, capacity issues within the automotive parts supply industry, the length of time it takes to validate and obtain safety regulatory approval of a new supplier's parts, and lead time to develop and build tools for manufacture. While GM can accelerate efforts to resource Delphi parts in the event of a supply interruption, the sheer magnitude of the parts to be resourced and revalidation required would take at least several months to achieve.

9. The shutdown of GM plants as a result of termination of deliveries of affected parts from Delphi could idle tens of thousands of GM workers, and it is estimated that GM's revenues would decrease significantly. GM would also incur costs related to expedited resourcing efforts, including, but not limited to, hundreds of millions of dollars for duplicate tooling, premiums and price increases paid to alternative suppliers, and the continued costs of maintaining idled plants (such as plant overhead and other fixed costs).

10. Moreover, because GM purchases parts from many other automotive parts suppliers, a GM shutdown will likely affect many of its other suppliers. In the event of a shutdown of its North American facilities, GM would have no need for parts from its other suppliers and would be forced to stop purchasing all other parts used in the shut-down facilities, which include parts from over 1,500 other suppliers. Such a loss of revenue could force those suppliers to seek bankruptcy protection themselves, thus creating a broader risk to GM's and other motor vehicle manufacturers' future sources of parts supply.

11. In short, a prolonged cessation in the supply of parts from Delphi to GM would have a devastating effect on GM, its ability to reorganize, and the communities that depend on employment by GM and its community of parts suppliers.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing

is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Dated: July 8, 2009 New York, New York

> /s/ Randall L. Pappal RANDALL L. PAPPAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 28, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ Abby C. Wright ABBY C. WRIGHT